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Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential to decentralized finance, offering continuous liquidity and enabling intermediary-free trading on blockchains. However, participants in AMMs are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) exploitation. Users face threats such as front-running, back-running, and sandwich attacks, while liquidity providers (LPs) incur the loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR). In this paper, we introduce RediSwap, a novel AMM designed to capture MEV at the application level and refund it fairly among users and liquidity providers. At its core, RediSwap features an MEV-redistribution mechanism that manages arbitrage opportunities within the AMM pool. We formalize the mechanism design problem and the desired game-theoretical properties. A central insight underpinning our mechanism is the interpretation of the maximal MEV value as the sum of LVR and individual user losses. We prove that our mechanism is incentive-compatible and Sybil-proof, and demonstrate that it is easy for arbitrageurs to participate. We empirically compared RediSwap with existing solutions by replaying historical AMM trades. Our results suggest that RediSwap can achieve better execution than UniswapX in 89% of trades and reduce LPs' loss to under 0.5% of the original LVR in most cases.

Trading through decentralized exchanges (DEXs) has become crucial in today's blockchain ecosystem, enabling users to swap tokens efficiently and automatically. However, the capacity of miners to strategically order transactions has led to exploitative practices (e.g., front-running attacks, sandwich attacks) and gain substantial Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) for their own advantage. To mitigate such manipulation, Ferreira and Parkes recently proposed a greedy sequencing rule such that the execution price of transactions in a block moves back and forth around the starting price. Utilizing this sequencing rule makes it impossible for miners to conduct sandwich attacks, consequently mitigating the MEV problem. However, no sequencing rule can prevent miners from obtaining risk-free profits. This paper systemically studies the computation of a miner's optimal strategy for maximizing MEV under the greedy sequencing rule, where the utility of miners is measured by the overall value of their token holdings. Our results unveil a dichotomy between the no trading fee scenario, which can be optimally strategized in polynomial time, and the scenario with a constant fraction of trading fee, where finding the optimal strategy is proven NP-hard. The latter represents a significant challenge for miners seeking optimal MEV. Following the computation results, we further show a remarkable phenomenon: Miner's optimal MEV also benefits users. Precisely, in the scenarios without trading fees, when miners adopt the optimal strategy given by our algorithm, all users' transactions will be executed, and each user will receive equivalent or surpass profits compared to their expectations. This outcome provides further support for the study and design of sequencing rules in decentralized exchanges., Comment: 14 Pages, ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security (DeFi'23)

Play-to-earn is one of the prospective categories of decentralized applications. The play-to-earn projects combine blockchain technology with entertaining games and finance, attracting various participants. While huge amounts of capital have been poured into these projects, the new crypto niche is considered controversial, and the traditional gaming industry is hesitant to embrace blockchain technology. In addition, there is little systematic research on these projects. In this paper, we delineate play-to-earn projects in terms of economic & governance models and implementation and analyze how blockchain technology can benefit these projects by providing system robustness, transparency, composability, and decentralized governance. We begin by identifying the participants and characterizing the tokens, which are products of composability. We then summarize the roadmap and governance model to exposit there is a transition from centralized governance to decentralized governance. We also classify the implementation of the play-to-earn projects with different extents of robustness and transparency. Finally, we discuss the security & societal challenges for future research in terms of possible attacks, the economics of tokens, and governance.

The selfish mining attack, arguably the most famous game-theoretic attack in blockchain, indicates that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. Most subsequent works mainly focus on strengthening the selfish mining strategy, thus enabling a single strategic agent more likely to deviate. In sharp contrast, little attention has been paid to the resistant behavior against the selfish mining attack, let alone further equilibrium analysis for miners and mining pools in the blockchain as a multi-agent system. In this paper, first, we propose a strategy called insightful mining to counteract selfish mining. By infiltrating an undercover miner into the selfish pool, the insightful pool could acquire the number of its hidden blocks. We prove that, with this extra insight, the utility of the insightful pool could be strictly greater than the selfish pool's when they have the same mining power. Then we investigate the mining game where all pools can either choose to be honest or take the insightful mining strategy. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of this mining game, and derive three corollaries: (a) each mining game has a pure Nash equilibrium; (b) honest mining is a Nash equilibrium if the largest mining pool has a fraction of mining power no more than 1/3; (c) there are at most two insightful pools under equilibrium no matter how the mining power is distributed.

Nowadays, sharding is deemed as a promising way to save traditional blockchain protocols from their low scalability. However, such technique also brings several potential risks and huge communication overheads. An improper design may give rise to the inconsistent state among different committees. Further, the communication overheads arising from cross-shard transactions unfortunately reduce the system's performance. In this paper, we first summarize five essential issues that all sharding blockchain designers face. For each issue, we discuss its key challenge and propose our suggested solutions. In order to break the performance bottlenecks, we propose a reputation mechanism for selecting leaders. The term of reputation in our design reflects each node's honest computation resources. In addition, we introduce a referee committee and partial sets in each committee, and design a recovery procedure in case the leader is malicious. Under the design, we prove that malicious leaders will not hurt the system and will be evicted. Furthermore, we conduct a series of simulations to evaluate our design. The results show that selecting leaders by the reputation can dramatically improve the system performance.

The design of permissioned blockchains places an access control requirement for members to read, access, and write information over the blockchains. In this paper, we study a hierarchical scenario to include three types of participants: providers, collectors, and governors. To be specific, providers forward transactions, collected from terminals, to collectors; collectors upload received transactions to governors after verifying and labeling them; and governors validate a part of received labeled transactions, pack valid ones into a block, and append a new block on the ledger. Collectors in the hierarchical model play a crucial role in the design: they have connections with both providers and governors, and are responsible for collecting, verifying, and uploading transactions. However, collectors are rational and some of them may behave maliciously (not necessarily for their own benefits). In this paper, we introduce a reputation protocol as a measure of the reliability of collectors in the permissioned blockchain environment. Its objective is to encourage collectors to behave truthfully and, in addition, to reduce the verification cost. The verification cost on provider $p$ is defined as the total number of invalid transactions provided by $p$ and checked by governors. Through theoretical analysis, our protocol with the reputation mechanism has a significant improvement in efficiency. Specifically, the verification loss that governors suffer is proved to be asymptotically $O(\sqrt{T_{total}})$ ($T_{total}$, representing the number of transactions verified by governors and provided by $p$), as long as there exists at least one collector who behaves well. At last, two typical cases where our model can be well applied are also demonstrated.

Traditional public distributed ledgers have not been able to scale-out well and work efficiently. Sharding is deemed as a promising way to solve this problem. By partitioning all nodes into small committees and letting them work in parallel, we can significantly lower the amount of communication and computation, reduce the overhead on each node's storage, as well as enhance the throughput of the distributed ledger. Existing sharding-based protocols still suffer from several serious drawbacks. The first thing is that all non-faulty nodes must connect well with each other, which demands a huge number of communication channels in the network. Moreover, previous protocols have faced great loss in efficiency in the case where the honesty of each committee's leader is in question. At the same time, no explicit incentive is provided for nodes to actively participate in the protocol. We present CycLedger, a scalable and secure parallel protocol for distributed ledger via sharding. Our protocol selects a leader and a partial set for each committee, who are in charge of maintaining intra-shard consensus and communicating with other committees, to reduce the amortized complexity of communication, computation, and storage on all nodes. We introduce a novel semi-commitment scheme between committees and a recovery procedure to prevent the system from crashing even when leaders of committees are malicious. To add incentive for the network, we use the concept of reputation, which measures each node's trusty computing power. As nodes with a higher reputation receive more rewards, there is an encouragement for nodes with strong computing ability to work honestly to gain reputation. In this way, we strike out a new path to establish scalability, security, and incentive for the sharding-based distributed ledger., Comment: Full version of the paper in IPDPS2020