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Within formal semantics, there are two views with regard to the ontological status of degrees: the ‘degree-as-number’ view (e.g., Seuren, 1973; Hellan, 1981; von Stechow, 1984) and the ‘degree-as-kind’ view (e.g., Anderson and Morzycki, 2015). Based on (i) empirical distinctions between comparatives and equatives and (ii) Stevens’s (1946) theory on the four levels of measurements, I argue that both views are motivated and needed in accounting for measurement- and comparison-related meanings in natural language. Specifically, I argue that since the semantics of comparatives potentially involves measurable differences, comparatives need to be analyzed based on scales with units, on which degrees are like (real) numbers. In contrast, since equatives are typically used to convey the non-existence of differences, equatives can be based on scales without units, on which degrees can be considered kinds., Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, Vol 24 No 2 (2020): Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 24

'Enough'-/'too'-constructions (E/T constructions) have an implicative reading: e.g., "Mary was clever enough to leave early yesterday" entails Mary left early yesterday. I argue that this implicative reading is not due to the lexical semantics proper of 'enough'/'too', but due to its bi-clausal structure (e.g., the above-mentioned example is analyzed as "Mary left early yesterday because she was clever enough"). I analyze 'enough' and 'too' simply as degree modifiers that involve a comparison: 'enough' means reaching the lower bound of an interval, while 'too' means exceeding the upper bound of an interval. Then inspired by Schulz (2011), Baglini and Francez (2015), and Nadathur (2016), I relate the semantics of E/T constructions to causal dependence: due to some sufficiency/excess, the infinitival complement clause in E/T constructions is episodically or generically (depending on its aspect being perfective or imperfective) true/false. I also argue that this infinitive has its tense and aspect marked on the main predicate of sentences, resulting in the seeming correlation between aspect and implication in languages that overtly make a distinction between perfective and imperfective aspects (e.g., French).

Semantic representation, a crucial window into human cognition, has been studied independently in neuroscience and computer science. A deep understanding of neural computations in the human brain and the revolution to a strong artificial intelligence appeal for a necessity of joint force in the language domain. We investigated the representational formats of comparable lexical semantic features between these two complex systems with fine temporal resolution neural recordings. We found semantic representations generated from computational models significantly correlated with EEG responses at an early stage of a typical semantic processing time window in a two-word semantic priming paradigm. Moreover, three selected computational models differentially predicted EEG responses along the dynamics of word processing in the human brain. Our study provided a finer-grained understanding of the neural dynamics underlying semantic processing and developed an objective biomarker for assessing human-like computation in computational models. Our novel framework trailblazed a promising way to bridge across disciplines in the investigation of higher-order cognitive functions in human and artificial intelligence.

There seems an interplay between (i) the interpretation of sentences containing non-increasing modified numerals (e.g., fewer than 4, between 4 and 8) and (ii) the type of predicates in those sentences. For example, (i) fewer than 4 boys smiled, where the predicate is distributive, has no existential entailment, but an upper-bound reading; while (ii) fewer than 4 boys lifted the piano together, where the predicate is collective, has an existential entailment, but no upper-bound reading. Following Brasoveanu (2013)’s post-supposition-style account for modified numerals, here I propose that (I) the semantic contribution of non-increasing modified numerals is twofold: (i) introducing a maximal referent as at-issue meaning in the derivation, and (ii) adding a cardinality constraint as a secondary dimension of meaning, and that (II) it is the type of predicates (distributive vs. collective) that determines the scope of maximization and where to evaluate this secondary dimension of meaning – at the sentential level or within a group-denoting DP., Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, Vol 21 No 2 (2018): Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21

I use empirical evidence from attitude reports to motivate a new characterization of natural language identity relation. More specifically, when de dicto attitude reports express an identity relation (e.g., John thinks A is B, John thinks A and B are the same), felicitous de re reports corresponding to them are systematically absent. This finding means that the identity relation encoded in natural language cannot be analyzed as a simple co-reference relation. Instead, I propose that in a given context, the identity relation between A and B means that contextually salient properties of A hold in certain worlds (e.g., in the belief worlds of an attitude holder) for B and vice versa. Based on this, I propose a new unified account for internal and external uses of same. Essentially, same is anaphoric: its antecedent is a plurality of individuals (i.e., res) and same means the intersection of contextually salient properties of each atomic individual involved in an identity relation., Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, Vol 20 (2016): Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 20

Enough-/too-constructions (E/T constructions) have an implicative reading: e.g., Mary was clever enough to leave early yesterday entails Mary left early yesterday. I argue that this implicative reading is not due to the lexical semantics proper of enough/too, but due to its bi-clausal structure (e.g., the above-mentioned example is analyzed as Mary left early yesterday because she was clever enough). I analyze enough and too simply as degree modifiers that involve a comparison: enough means reaching the lower bound of an interval, while too means exceeding the upper bound of an interval. Then inspired by Schulz (2011), Baglini and Francez (2015), and Nadathur (2016), I relate the semantics of E/T constructions to causal dependence: due to some sufficiency/excess, the infinitival complement clause in E/T constructions is episodically or generically (depending on its aspect being perfective or imperfective) true/false. I also argue that this infinitive has its tense and aspect marked on the main predicate of sentences, resulting in the seeming correlation between aspect and implication in languages that overtly make a distinction between perfective and imperfective aspects (e.g., French). Keywords: enough, too, comparatives, causal dependence, necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) causes, sufficient (but not necessarily necessary) causes, infinitives, implicatives., ZAS Papers in Linguistics, Bd. 61 (2018): Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 22, 2