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The empirical changes in global financial governance (GFG) and China's position in it, against the backdrop of the 2008 global financial crisis and China's economic rise in recent decades, suggest two plausible conclusions: (1) the present GFG system has been significantly reformed and improved by forming a networked architecture and a regime complex; (2) China's economic rise has automatically extended to China's rise in GFG, embodying its full integration into the architecture and regime. This article constructs a three-dimensional international political economy (IPE) analytical framework to reexamine the two conclusions and thus finds two illusions: an increasingly widespread—or rising—illusion of a much improved and more stable GFG system and an illusion of China's rising in GFG via an automatic transformation from economic might to governance power. The "rising illusion" of a much-improved GFG risks resulting in a reform dilemma, while the illusion of China's rise in GFG risks escalating the China-US and, more broadly, emerging-dominant states conflicts into full-scale confrontation. The prevalence of these two illusions highlights the need for greater attention from academic and policy spheres to relevant issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's exchange-rate regime reform policies have fluctuated since the early 1990s, experiencing at least six significant policy changes: 1994 unification, 1998 stabilization, 2005 reform, 2008 stagnation, 2010 relaunch and 2015 '8•11' reform. This policy fluctuation plausibly suggests that China has behaved as a speculative pragmatist without being disciplined by established and consistent values, principles or national interests, particular against the backdrop of the current international power transition. Adopting an integrative Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) analytical framework that differentiates and bridges International Relations (IR) national interests with FPA policy motivations, this article compares the six policy changes and argues that China has been a steadfast reformer rather than a speculative pragmatist since the early 1990s. Namely, the market-oriented exchange-rate regime reform has consistently reflected China's national interest since the early 1990s, notwithstanding occasional policy fluctuations that diverge from the national interest. This integrative analysis contributes to transcending the 'holism failure' of IR studies by looking into the specific decision-making processes, and escaping from the 'reductionist gamble' of FPA studies by examining the long-term tendency and interests behind these apparently inconsistent policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A series of CaZrO3:Bi3+, CaZrO3:Eu3+, CaZrO3:Eu3+, Bi3+, and CaZrO3:Eu3+, Bi3+, Li+ phosphors are synthesized by high-temperature solid-state reaction method in air. Their luminescence properties are researched, compared, and analyzed. CaZrO3:Bi3+ phosphor under excitation at 310 nm emits deep-blue light with chromaticity coordinate (0.1612, 0.0254). CaZrO3:Eu3+ phosphor under excitation at 310 and 395 nm shows red-emitting with chromaticity coordinate (0.6386, 0.3611). CaZrO3:Eu3+, Bi3+ phosphor under excitation at 310 nm exhibits a systematically varied hue from deep-blue to red light by changing Eu3+ ion concentration, and that with excitation at 395 nm only emits red light with chromaticity coordinate (0.6386, 0.3611). The energy transfer process from Bi3+ to Eu3+ ions may be indicated by their spectral properties. The optimal Eu3+ and Bi3+ ions concentrations are 5 mol% and 0.9 mol%, respectively. The emission intensity CaZrO3:Eu3+, Bi3+ phosphor may be enhanced about 1.6 times due to the co-doping Li+ ion as charge compensator role. The luminous mechanism of CaZrO3:Eu3+, Bi3+ phosphor is explained by the simplified energy level diagrams of Bi3+ and Eu3+ ions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A holism tendency in International Relations (IR) studies treats international systems and states as unitary wholes and thus leads to a tripartite view on China's international role as either a revisionist, status quo or a pragmatist power. China's stances in global financial governance (GFG), however, are inconsistent, which indicates that China is not a pure challenger or status quo power. These inconsistent stances do not allude to China being a pragmatist power, which makes policies and takes actions in a practical and matter-of-fact way without consistent national interests. Instead, China has inconsistent stances but consistent core national interests. The ostensible contradiction is due to the explanatory deficiency of the IR holistic tendency, which pays inadequate attention to fragmentations of international and domestic systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]