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In this paper, we focused on a problem of authentication on low-cost devices. We have proposed a new light-weight protocol for mutual authentication of communication entities with non-repudiation of realized events. The protocol is simple and suitable for implementation on low-cost devices. Non-repudiation of realized events is achieved by involving a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to the communication. The proposed protocol uses only an appropriate lightweight hash function and pre-shared secret data. Security of the proposed protocol was verified by the BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic.

Power analysis presents the typical example of successful attacks against trusted cryptographic devices such as RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentifications) and contact smart cards. In recent years, the cryptographic community has explored new approaches in power analysis based on machine learning models such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), RF (Random Forest) and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP). In this paper, we made an extensive comparison of machine learning algorithms in the power analysis. For this purpose, we implemented a verification program that always chooses the optimal settings of individual machine learning models in order to obtain the best classification accuracy. In our research, we used three datasets, the first containing the power traces of an unprotected AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) implementation. The second and third datasets are created independently from public available power traces corresponding to a masked AES implementation (DPA Contest v4). The obtained results revealed some interesting facts, namely, an elementary k-NN (k-Nearest Neighbors) algorithm, which has not been commonly used in power analysis yet, shows great application potential in practice.

This paper describes an innovative method of the power analysis which presents the typical example of successful attacks against trusted cryptographic devices such as RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentifications) and contact smart cards. The proposed method analyzes power consumption of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm with neural network, which successively classifies the first byte of the secret key. This way of the power analysis is an entirely new approach and it is designed to combine the advantages of simple and differential power analysis. In the extreme case, this feature allows to determine the whole secret key of a cryptographic module only from one measured power trace. This attribute makes the proposed method very attractive for potential attackers. Besides theoretical design of the method, we also provide the first implementation results. We assume that the method will be certainly optimized to obtain more accurate classification results in the future.

The article describes the main principle and methods of simple electromagnetic analysis and thus provides an overview of simple electromagnetic analysis.The introductions chapters describe specific SPA attack used visual inspection of EM traces, template based attack and collision attack.After reading the article, the reader is sufficiently informed of any context of SEMA.Another aim of the article is the practical realization of SEMA which is focused on AES implementation.The visual inspection of EM trace of AES is performed step by step and the result is the determination of secret key Hamming weight.On the resulting EM trace, the Hamming weight of the secret key 1 to 8 was clearly visible.This method allows reduction from the number of possible keys for following brute force attack.