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Author(s): Cinzia Zanetti [sup.1] , Fabrizio Butera [sup.1] [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) https://ror.org/019whta54, grid.9851.5, 0000 0001 2165 4204, Institute of Psychology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, [...], Collective cheating can have serious consequences in professional and educational settings. Existing data show that collective cheating is common and that individuals cheat more when they are in groups, highlighting the existence of some collective organisation in the endeavour. However, little is known about the emergence of this behaviour and the group processing involved. Drawing on qualitative data from 20 semi-structured interviews and a thematic analysis, the present study explored collective cheating in academic contexts. Seven themes emerged that retrace the chronology of collective cheating from its beginning to its impact on the group: reasons, birth and organisation of collective cheating, risk management, concealment strategies, justifications and social impact. Participants emphasised the extrinsic benefits, the interdependence of members and the importance of existing social norms, as well as the positive valence of this kind of dishonesty. In participants' recalls, cheating together means cooperating, showing solidarity, helping and supporting each other.

Collective cheating is a widespread phenomenon in school and academia. A large majority of students report having cheated—individually or collectively—at school. In many settings, collective cheating is part of a culture and reveals a descriptive norm. However, no measure exists, to our knowledge, that captures the presence of a collective cheating culture in a school or academic environment. The present research aimed to develop and validate an instrument that could account for the existence and extent of a collective cheating culture that may constitute a descriptive norm, translating the acceptance of this form of dishonesty. Study 1 was planned to develop the Culture of Collective Cheating Scale (CCCS). Studies 2 and 3 evaluated the validity of the CCCS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The worldwide spread of a new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) since December 2019 has posed a severe threat to individuals' well-being. While the world at large is waiting that the released vaccines immunize most citizens, public health experts suggest that, in the meantime, it is only through behavior change that the spread of COVID-19 can be controlled. Importantly, the required behaviors are aimed not only at safeguarding one's own health. Instead, individuals are asked to adapt their behaviors to protect the community at large. This raises the question of which social concerns and moral principles make people willing to do so. We considered in 23 countries (N = 6948) individuals' willingness to engage in prescribed and discretionary behaviors, as well as country-level and individual-level factors that might drive such behavioral intentions. Results from multilevel multiple regressions, with country as the nesting variable, showed that publicized number of infections were not significantly related to individual intentions to comply with the prescribed measures and intentions to engage in discretionary prosocial behaviors. Instead, psychological differences in terms of trust in government, citizens, and in particular toward science predicted individuals' behavioral intentions across countries. The more people endorsed moral principles of fairness and care (vs. loyalty and authority), the more they were inclined to report trust in science, which, in turn, statistically predicted prescribed and discretionary behavioral intentions. Results have implications for the type of intervention and public communication strategies that should be most effective to induce the behavioral changes that are needed to control the COVID-19 outbreak., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. This research was supported by a “Covid-19 Grant” awarded from the European Association of Social Psychology to Stefano Pagliaro and by the Pomilio Blumm Communication Agency. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.