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The transposition of European Union (EU) league in Poland before accession is examined considering the wider significance of the core executive variable in research on compliance in the EU member states. The extent to which the Polish government complied with transposition commitments in a timely manner is related to the institutionalization of rules that the domestic core executive could use to extend selective incentives and monitoring to ministers and departments.

Centralized agenda control is a feature of many parliaments, with important consequences for the conduct and outcomes of legislative politics. Much previous work has thus sought to understand the emergence of centralized agenda‐setting rules. We extend this literature by studying the “Balfour reforms”, which centralized agenda control in the early twentieth century UK House of Commons. Our aim is to probe a conventional claim in the existing literature: that the opposition supported these reforms. This is a counter‐intuitive claim, which rests on relatively little direct evidence. We analyze historical roll‐call data from 1902 to assess how far the opposition supported agenda centralization. We complement this analysis by examining attempted amendments and speech contributions to parliamentary debates. Contrary to the standard view, we find that the primary opposition party consistently resisted these reforms. This evidence of controversy rather than consensus revises our understanding of a key milestone in the development of the Westminster parliament, and contributes to the wider literature on the choice of agenda‐setting procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Identifying important policy outputs has long been of interest to political scientists. In this work, we propose a novel approach to the classification of policies. Instead of obtaining and aggregating expert evaluations of significance for a finite set of policy outputs, we use experts to identify a small set of significant outputs and then employ positive unlabeled (PU) learning to search for other similar examples in a large unlabeled set. We further propose to automate the first step by harvesting "seed" sets of significant outputs from web data. We offer an application of the new approach by classifying over 9,000 government regulations in the United Kingdom. The obtained estimates are successfully validated against human experts, by forecasting web citations, and with a construct validity test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has shown an increasing interest in the historical evolution of legislative institutions. The development of the UK Parliament has received particularly extensive attention. In this article, we contribute to this literature in three important ways. First, we introduce a complete, machine‐readable data set of all the Standing Orders of the UK House of Commons between 1811 and 2015. Second, we demonstrate how this data set can be used to construct innovative measures of procedural change. Third, we illustrate a potential empirical application of the data set, offering an exploratory test of several expectations drawn from recent theories of formal rule change in parliamentary democracies. We conclude that the new data set has the potential to substantially advance our understanding of legislative reforms in the United Kingdom and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When are minority cabinets effective? We study the extent to which minority cabinets demonstrate legislative reliability, that is, introduce to parliament the bills they have announced in their legislative agendas. We test hypotheses drawn from two theories of minority government effectiveness: the positional agenda power theory which emphasizes the central location of the minority cabinet in the policy space and the ideological proximity theory which stresses the importance of the ideological closeness of opposition parties to the government. In an analysis of over 1600 bills announced by Danish and Swedish minority cabinets in 19 legislative agendas published between 1998 and 2012, we find more support, overall, for the ideological proximity than for the positional agenda power model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do coalitions do what they promise? Previous research has focused on the extent to which parties implement electoral pledges. In this article, we examine how coalition cabinets fulfil post-electoral legislative agendas. Many coalitions announce programmes identifying bills that they plan to introduce to parliament in the months ahead. Even though coalition parties publicly signal commitment to all such proposals, there is variation in the extent to which cabinets meet their own deadlines. We argue that pledge fulfilment is driven by differences in the divisiveness and salience of legislative initiatives. We test our theoretical expectations based on an empirical analysis of over 500 legislative pledges made by the Polish cabinet between 2008 and 2011. Our results confirm that pledges dealing with less divisive and more salient issues are likely to be fulfilled with less delay than those dealing with more divisive and less important issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article compares cabinet institutions for coordinating the transposition of EU legislation in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines how national executives have adapted to European integration and what factors have shaped institutional variation across countries and over time. During pre-accession, the Hungarian, Polish and (to a lesser extent) Czech cabinets established strong core executives for tracking EU-related legislative commitments, monitoring progress and reviewing the quality of transposition. After accession, the cores in all three cabinets loosened the grip on transposition, although to different degrees. The analysis shows that, if sectoral factors are kept constant, variation in the patterns of national adaptation can be explained with reference to external incentives and constitutional rules. High benefits of transposition before accession encouraged centralization, particularly in prime-ministerial cabinets. Fewer incentives under full membership contributed to a halt or reversal in core executive ascendancy, especially in ministerial-type cabinets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]