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We study the optimal one-shot tax reform in the standard incomplete markets model where households differ in their wealth, earnings, permanent labor skill, and age. The government can provide transfers by raising tax revenue and has several tax instruments at its disposal: a flat capital income tax, a flat consumption tax, and a non-linear labor income tax. We compute the equilibrium and transitional dynamics for 3888 different tax combinations and find that the optimal fiscal policy funds a transfer that is above 60 percent of GDP through a combination of very high taxes on consumption and capital income. The labor tax schedule has a high average rate and more progressivity than the current US system. We explore the role of transitional dynamics, debt issuance, intergenerational disagreement, and fiscal spending rules in shaping the optimal policy. Policy is broadly similar if it is determined through majority voting rather than by a utilitarian planner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Repeatedly solving the Aiyagari (1994) model with random parameters, we construct hundreds of examples with multiple stationary equilibria. We never find multiplicity with risk aversion less than ≈ 1.49, depreciation less than ≈ 0.19, or income persistence less than ≈ 0.47, and multiplicity requires a disaster state for income. In cases with multiplicity, the lowest rental rate occurs near depreciation times the capital share. It is possible for the economy, without a change in fundamentals, to transition rationally from a higher-rate equilibrium to one with a lower rental rate, lower inequality, and lower welfare (for most agents). We also construct the first Krusell and Smith (1998) examples with multiple recursive competitive equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We quantitatively evaluate the effects of UI on bankruptcy in an equilibrium model of labor market search and defaultable debt. First, we ask whether a standard unsecured credit model extended with labor market search and matching frictions can account for the negative correlation between UI caps and bankruptcy rates observed in the data. The model can account for this fact only if estimated with the employment rate among bankruptcy filers as a target. Not matching this employment rate underestimates the consumption smoothing benefits of UI cap increases, as the model assigns too much importance to unemployment shocks for driving default, and implies large welfare losses from increasing the cap rather than negligible gains. Second, with bankruptcy available, there are significant welfare gains from increasing the replacement rate above the calibrated value, but not in the absence of default. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use cross-state differences in minimum wage (MW) levels and county-level consumer bankruptcy rates from 1991-2017 to estimate the effect of changes in minimum wages on consumer bankruptcy by exploiting policy discontinuities at state borders. We fnd that Chapter 7 bankruptcy rates are signifcantly lower in counties belonging to states with higher MW compared to neighboring counties in the lower MW state: a 10 percent increase in MW decreases the bankruptcy rate by around 4 percent. Before the 2005 bankruptcy reform, this effect was almost twice as large as for the entire sample. Theoretically, we cannot sign the effect of MW on bankruptcy and credit utilization; we use a stylized consumption/saving model with default to illustrate the dependence on particular parameters and to provide intuition on how to interpret our results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]