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Background: The prevalence of diabetes and diabetic complications increased alarmingly which also brought heavy burden to patients and health system.Methods: We used mix approaches to summarize evidence from published articles and policy documents on the extent and trends of diabetic complications, potential causes, and awareness and services utilization of diabetes in China.Results: The annual direct medical expense per patient varied among different types of complications and increased dramatically with the number of diabetic complication and patients were exposed to great financial risk. The number of health policies and strategies on diabetes and its complications at the national level is limited. Primary and secondary preventions such as health education and early diagnosis are necessary.Conclusions: With an increasingly burden of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and its complications, efforts should be invested in education, early screening mechanism and patient management programs to improve the primary and secondary prevention of diabetes and its complications. An integrated services delivery system centered on primary level is recommended to promote education, early case-detection and screening, patient management, referral and care-coordination between primary, secondary and tertiary health care providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informal payment for medical services is a common phenomenon in China. Patients make informal payments, in cash or in kind, to physicians in addition to official charges billed for medical services. This paper assesses the associations between patients' perceptions of the physician as an agent for the patient's interests (physician agency problem) and informal payment behavior. Using data of 24,000 and 6700 rural households respectively from the Health Development of Rural China Program database (collected in 2008) and Ningxia data source (collected in 2015), we find that patients' concern about physician agency problems is significantly associated with informal payments. The data shows that patients are more likely to make informal payments when they show low trust towards their physicians. For example, in the surgical cases, among patients who strongly distrusted the physicians, 17.9% (95% confidence interval [CI]:]: 13.5, 22.3) initiated informal payments, compared to 8.0% (95% CI: 5.1, 10.9) who expressed "strong trust" in their physicians. Poor communication was also significantly associated with an increase in the informal payment rate. For example, in the non-surgical setting, among the patients who rated the physicians' explaining skills as "poor," 5.9% (95% CI: 5.0, 6.9) of them made informal payments, significantly higher than the patients who rated "excellent" (of whom 1.8% made informal payments 95% CI, 0.9, 2.7). In this study, we provide an explanation for this finding: patients may initiate informal payments to physicians in order to mitigate the physician agency problem. It suggests that to mitigate informal payments, improving alignment between doctors' incentives and patients' interests would be essential. • Informal payments were directly related to patients' concerns about physicians' behavior. • Patients were more likely to make informal payments when they showed low trust towards their physicians. • Poor communication between patients and physicians was related to informal payment rate. • Informal payment might be viewed as an effort by the patients to align the physicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]