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A manufacturer of an established product repeatedly interacts with a retailer that can sell an inferior new product thereby improving it. The manufacturer's exclusionary strategy consists of a permanently below‐cost wholesale price and "vertical collusion" with the retailer to exclude via a future reward of a reduced fixed fee. The latter tool is available only in an infinite game. Although contracts include fixed fees, the retailer sells the new product more than what maximizes industry profits. Exclusive dealing or a vertical merger between the manufacturer of the established product and the retailer replicate the vertically integrated outcome and increase prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between manufacturer‐retailer supply chains. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand and manufacturers pay retailers 'information rents'. I study collusive equilibria between the supply chains that may or may not involve the retailers. I find that including forward‐looking retailers in the collusive scheme may facilitate or hinder collusion, depending on the likelihood of a high demand and the gap between a high and a low demand. Moreover, collusion on monopoly profits can be easier or more difficult to implement than collusion on upstream profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider an infinitely repeated platform competition in a market with network externalities. The platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes the incumbent in the current period. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that prohibits both platforms (symmetric regulation), or just the incumbent (asymmetric regulation) from charging predatory prices. We show that symmetric regulation decreases consumer surplus and does not affect efficiency. Asymmetric regulation increases consumer surplus and improves welfare when the size of the market remains constant over time. Yet, when market size varies over time, this policy may lead to inefficient entry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the public‐good aspect of platform's data collection on users. Data have commercial benefits to the platform, personal benefits to the user, and public benefits to other users. We ask who should decide which data the platform commercializes. We find that the answer depends on the type of heterogeneity in the disutility of data commercialization. When heterogeneity is across users (data items) and the public benefit of data is high (low), it is welfare enhancing to let the platform (users) control the data. Furthermore, dynamic data accumulation strengthens our results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]