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本稿では，近年注目が高まっている経済政策の不確実性（Economic Policy Uncertainty）に関する近年の研究を概観する．特に，Baker et al. (2016）によって作成された経済政策の不確実性指数を利用する研究に焦点を当てている．併せて，日本における Arbatli-Saxegaard et al. (2022）らの不確実性指数に基づき，日本企業の投資行動に与える影響について検証し，経済政策の不確実性が高いと投資が抑制されることを含意する結果であることを報告する．, This study reviews recent research on economic policy uncertainty（EPU）, which has received increasing attention. In particular, we focus on studies that utilize an index of EPU. Then, we empirically examine the effects of EPU on the investment behaviors of Japanese firms. We find that Japanese firms invest less when EPU increases. Our findings suggest that Japanese managers are more cautious when making investment decisions in response to a rise in EPU in Japan.

本稿は，2020年11月に経済産業研究所が実施して中小企業を中心に約5千社から回答を得た「新型コロナウイルス感染症下における企業実態調査」に基づき，企業が受けたショック，とった対応，利用した資金繰り支援措置の概要を集計するとともに，支援措置利用企業の属性に関して分析したものである．対象企業の一部が世界金融危機時に行った企業サーベイ調査にも回答していることを利用し，世界金融危機とコロナショックの間の異同にも注目する．得られた主な知見は以下の4点である．（1）多くの企業にとって，コロナショックは販売先企業や消費者への売上・販売の減少が顕在化したものであり，企業は，主に金融機関からの新規借入と休業・従業者の休職で対処した．（2）コロナショック後に資金繰りが「悪化した」企業の割合は世界金融危機時と同程度だが，資金繰りの水準が「悪い」企業の割合は世界金融危機時よりも高く，ショック以前から資金繰りが厳しかった企業が一定割合存在した．（3）多くの支援措置について，コロナショック前の評点が低い企業ほど利用する傾向にあり，特に政府系金融機関による貸出でこうした傾向が強い．（4）金融機関や政府の支援がなければ事業を継続できないゾンビ企業がサンプル企業全体に占める比率が，世界金融危機以降に高まっているかどうかはゾンビ企業の定義に依存するが，コロナショック時において世界金融危機時よりも明確に高まっているとはいえない．ショック前にゾンビと特定された企業が政府による支援措置を利用する比率は非ゾンビ企業よりも高く，その傾向は，世界金融危機時と今回のコロナショック後の期間のいずれにおいても観察される．, This paper provides a detailed account of firms’ behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. We use the “Survey on the Status of Firms under the COVID-19 Pandemic” conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI) in November 2020, which received responses from about 5,000 companies that are mostly small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, this study provides an overview of the damage suffered by firms, the responses they took, and the financial support measures they used. It also examines the attributes of firms that used the support measures. Taking advantage of the fact that some surveyed firms also responded to surveys conducted during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2009, we also focus on the differences between the GFC and the COVID-19 pandemic. We obtained the following four major findings: (1) Many firms experienced the adverse effect of the pandemic by a decline in sales to customer firms and consumers. Many of them coped with the damage mainly by taking out new loans from financial institutions and by giving a leave of absence to employees. (2) The percentage of firms whose financing conditions worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic was about the same as during the GFC, whereas the percentage of firms whose financing conditions were severe was higher. (3) For many of the support measures, firms with low credit scores before the COVID-19 pandemic tended to use them more frequently than those with high scores. (4) The share of zombie firms that were unable to continue their businesses without support from financial institutions or the government varies wildly across different definitions of zombies. However, the share is not always higher during the COVID-19 pandemic than during the GFC for all the zombie definitions. The share of these zombie firms that used government support measures was higher than that of non-zombies. We observe this tendency both during the GFC and the COVID-19 pandemic., (小特集：コロナ禍の下での経済・社会：サーベイ調査に基づくエビデンス = The Economy and Society under the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from Surveys)

We introduce this special issue on Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) with a focus on how EPU affects allocative efficiency. We observe that EPU affects the market value of firms in about 37% of Fama–French 30 industries, but leads to lower investments in 90% of them. Allocation decisions in a market economy rely on signals from the capital market, which EPU distorts. This may cause increasing conflicts of interest between managers and investors. We highlight key studies in the EPU literature and then describe each paper in this special issue. We also provide suggestions for future research. Accepted version

We provide the first large sample comparison of earnings management by Japanese listed and unlisted firms. Based on the theoretical predictions by Stein (1989), we empirically examine whether managers’ myopic behaviors exist through inflating current earnings at the expense of long-term earnings. We find that listed firms are more likely to engage in earnings management. We also find that firm managers are more likely to manage earnings as the information content of current earnings about future earnings (stock price) increases. More importantly, we note that this manipulation is pronounced only for listed firms. This is the first study that empirically shows the market pressure for raising stock price induces earnings manipulation.

We investigated how the large and growing volumes of lending by listed, Japanese, parent companies to their subsidiaries responded to parents’ and to subsidiaries’ sources and uses of funds during 1984-2014. We found that parents lent more to their subsidiaries when (1) parents’ profitability rose relative to that of their subsidiaries and (2) parents’ capital expenditures fell relative to those of their subsidiaries. We also found that the extent of ownership matters. Parents lent more internally when their existing equity investments in their subsidiaries was (1) larger relative to the parents’ total equity and when it was (2) larger relative to the subsidiaries’ total equity. Our results also pointed to important connections of internal capital markets to external lenders, particularly banks. We found that internal lending rose during economic and financial crises in Japan—unless its commercial banks were at the center of the crisis. Internal lending from parents softened the shocks to business groups’ subsidiaries more when Japanese banks were quite strong, such as during the 2008 global financial crisis. In contrast, parents provided much less credit through internal capital markets during the banks were quite strong, but not during the Japanese banking crisis around 2000.

This version: April 5, 2019, We provide the first large sample comparisons of disinvestment by listed and unlisted firms. This study focuses on Japanese firms from 2001-2017, as this was a period of economic stagnation and financial reforms encouraging companies to restructure. We show that stock market listing is positively related to disinvestment. Listed firms disinvest 1.9% more than similar unlisted firms. Disinvestment activities of listed companies are also more sensitive to investment opportunities. Additionally, firms that disinvest show improvements in ROA and increases in future investment. Finally, we find that foreign (financial institution) ownership is positively (negatively) related to disinvestment., Ryosuke Fujitani greatly appreciates financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellow (No. JP17J03278) provided by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture. Yukihiro Yasuda greatly appreciates the financial support from Mizuho Securities and from a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) (No. JP17K03798) provided by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture. Jo-seph French acknowledges financial support from the Tointon Research Fund.

本稿の目的は、企業間信用の利用が、企業パフォーマンス、あるいは株式リターンの予測可能性に対してどのような影響を与えるのかを実証的に検証することである。本稿の分析結果によると、企業間信用の増加は、翌期の売上成長、売上総利益率あるいは総資産利益率（ROA）などで測った企業パフォーマンスと正の相関関係があることが分かった。株式リターンの予想可能性については、Goto et al. (2015) やHill et al. (2013,2015) などの先行研究と同様に、企業間信用と株式リターンの間に正の相関関係があることが分かった。特に、資金制約に直面する企業においてより強い正の相関関係が確認された。総じて、企業間信用は株式リターンの予測において情報有用性があることを示唆する結果であるといえる。

First Draft: March 10 This Version: June 14, We dissect the influence of bank-firm relationships on mergers and acquisitions in Japan. Using a comprehensive data set spanning fifteen years, we show that stronger bank-firm relationships generally increase the likelihood and size of M&A. Contrary to conventional wisdom of the adverse effects of bank-firm relationships in Japan, such as ‘zombie lending', our results indicate that Japanese banks facilitate restructuring in the 2000's. However, in cases where a bank plays a dual role as a lender and shareholder to a firm, the likelihood and size of M&A declines. This result stems from a bank's desire to maintain existing corporate governance mechanisms and control rights.

In this paper we empirically examine the diversification effects of the deregulation of bank-sales channel into the insurance business by Japanese banks. Using the Japanese unique data set on fee-based revenues, we identify separate fee-based revenues, such as insurance and/or mutual fund sales. We find that banks with a higher BIS ratio, more branches, more monopolistic power in loan market, and higher loan-to-deposit ratios tend to have shifted towards an insurance fee-based business. This indicates that bank health and branch expansion can affect the fee business strategy at each bank. We also find that banks with lower mutual fund fee revenues tend to earn more insurance fee revenues, implying that a substitute relationship has developed between them after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. We find that banks with higher insurance revenues are positively associated with return volatilities (such as ROA and/or ROE) but are not related with total risk or Z score. The results indicate that although increased fee-based activities can increase the volatility of bank earnings, they have only had a small impact on equity and/or insolvency risks at Japanese banks.

We take advantage of institutional changes and its characteristics in Japan to empirically examine mandatory business risk disclosure. We find that there is a negative impact on total risk from the introduction of mandatory business risk disclosure. This suggests that an increase in business risk disclosure reduces a firm's cost of capital, which is contrary to the results of previous research. However, we also find that there is a positive relationship across firms and years after inception between the amount of business risk disclosure and total risk, indicating that mandatory business risk disclosure has a negative impact on investors' assessment of firms' risk. Although these two effects offset each other, the positive effects of enhanced disclosure of business risks on the cost of capital overcome the negative effects.

This paper shows theoretically that if bank supervision is weak, capital adequacy requirements provide an incentive for troubled banks with their non-performing loans to refinance their client distressed firms, even those with poor prospects. We also argue that in some cases rollover is desirable because the bank can resolve the debt overhang problem of its clients. Therefore, results such as these indicate that loan rollovers need to be assessed more carefully.

We empirically examine the economic effects of disclosure by focusing on mandatory textual business risk disclosures in Japan. A unique feature of this study is the construction of a new risk measure, which enables us to isolate economic disclosure effects (i.e., information risk) from fundamental value effects (i.e., fundamental risk). We find that there is a positive association between the number of items within business risk disclosures and information risk. We also find that the results are more pronounced for firm-level disclosure that deviates from that of other firms in the same industry and year. This indicates that business risk disclosures affect investors' risk perceptions and thus increase the information component in the cost of capital.

First version March 29, 2015; This version March 15, 2016, During the global financial crisis (GFC), Japan and the U.S. differed in at least two important ways: (1) while markets were stable in Japan then, the bubbles in the U.S. housing and financial markets burst and (2) while Japanese banks suffered few losses, huge losses badly weakened U.S. banks. In addition, and unlike the U.S., Japan requires firms' balance sheets to show, not only their total debt, but also the components of their debt: bonds, loans, and other debt. We used data for listed, non-financial, Japanese firms' bonds, bank loans, and other debt to investigate whether the 2008 "Lehman shock" in the U.S. disrupted Japanese bond markets. The Japanese data al-lowed us to estimate how much the Lehman shock affected Japanese firms' bonds outstanding and issued and to estimate how much, in turn, the Lehman shock resulted in firms' getting more loans from Japanese banks. The estimates revealed important cross-currents during the crisis. Our estimates implied that, while the crisis reduced bond issuance, it was accompanied by enough more bank loans to raise total debt. During the crisis, both bonds outstanding and bond issuance responded less to prior bond shortfalls and responded less to their maturing bonds. Second, while it greatly reduced bonds issued and outstanding at smaller, listed firms, the crisis boosted them at the very largest firms. In contrast, bank loans then rose more at smaller firms. Third, bank loans rose more, and bonds outstanding fell more, at firms with greater exposure to foreign sales. Fourth, the crisis led firms, and especially larger firms, to hold more cash and fewer securities and to reduce costs. Fifth, capital expenditures generally declined during the crisis, but declined significantly less at larger firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the effects of rate-deregulation on Japanese Property and Casualty (P/C) insurers' pricing and risk-taking behaviors. As long as we know, there is little empirical evidence of the determinants of risk-taking at P/C insurance companies in Japan. Applying the basic ideas from the field of banking, we investigate the factors affecting risk-taking at P/C insurance companies. We find that the price setting at Japanese P/C insurers are decreased after the deregulation. In contrast, we find the risk levels of Japanese P/C insurers are generally increased after the rate-deregulation. However, franchise value that is measured by simple Q contributes adversely to P/C insurer risk-taking only before the deregulation. Lastly, we find that P/C insurers that belong to keiretsu groups have reduced the insurer rates but increased risk taking after the deregulation. In this sense, the impacts of deregulation are higher for P/C insurance companies that belong to the Keiretsu groups.

A number of policy measures have been undertaken in response to the financial crisis started by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the following severe recessions. They included an introduction of the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) Financing Facilitation Act, which solicited financial institutions to renegotiate loan terms and conditions with distressed borrowers and thus provided assistance to firms that were financially constrained. In order to examine the current financial status of SMEs after the termination of the Act at the end of March 2013, RIETI sent out a survey questionnaire to 20,000 firms mainly comprised of SMEs in October 2014 and received more than 6,000 responses. The main issues of the survey include: (1) effect of the SME Financial Facilitation Act on the firms' financial procurement; (2) loan renegotiations between financial institutions and borrower firms that were solicited by the Act; (3) restructuring programs submitted to financial institutions after loans are renegotiated; and (4) ex-post performance of borrower firms whose loans were renegotiated. The summary of the survey provides many novel insights on each of the above four issues. Furthermore, the survey summarizes the current status of equity financing among firms in the appendix.