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As many as three million households with school-aged children in the United States do not have any Internet service at home, and 18% do not have a broadband connection, creating a "homework gap" between those who can access the Internet to support their schoolwork at home, and those who cannot. Based on a series of empirical case studies of efforts to develop wireless projects across the United States, coupled with a review of relevant spectrum and wireless regulations, this study informs academics and practitioners how different wireless broadband technologies can help bridge the gap. However, as our case studies show, wireless should not be viewed as a magic bullet to solving the homework gap. Closing this gap requires social initiatives to promote uptake and productivity enhancing usage and skills levels, and financial and regulatory support from policymakers and other stakeholders.

We analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger, though the effect on prices, quantities, and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries. We further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture (i.e., by delegation of input pricing). (JEL L13, L23, L42), I. INTRODUCTION Collaboration via joint production can present an attractive alternative for rival firms contemplating a horizontal merger, particularly for large firms concerned with an antitrust challenge. U.S. antitrust guidelines [...]

We study price-cap regulation in a market in which a vertically integrated upstream monopolist sells an essential input to a downstream competitor. In the absence of regulation, entry benefits both firms, but may harm downstream consumers because the upstream monopolist can set a high input price that would push downstream prices above the unregulated monopoly level. However, if a regulator caps the incumbent's upstream and downstream prices, consumers and firms are better off after entry than under a price-cap monopoly. We extend our model to examine the concern that price caps may induce incumbents to forgo cost-reducing investments and dampen entrants' incentives to self-provision the input. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]