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Using the framework of centripetal and centrifugal force, this article analyzes alternating periods of peace and conflict in South Korea-Japan mutual perceptions since 1998 when the two nations took unprecedented conciliatory actions. Centripetal force is comprised of political leaders’ reconciliation initiatives, restrained historical/territorial disputes, and common security threats. Centrifugal force incorporates heated historical/territorial disputes, political leaders’ use of those disputes for their political purposes, and divergent security priorities. This article suggests that top political leaders in both nations can play a significant role in improving or aggravating mutual perceptions between the two neighbors. However, political leaders’ conciliatory initiatives are a necessary but insufficient condition in reconciling the two former adversary states.

When and why does a perpetrator state take a contrite stance on its past wrongs? More specifically, why do Japanese behaviors differ over time in addressing apology and compensation with regard to the comfort women issue? In this article I address these questions by testing two hypotheses, utilizing an instrumentalist approach and a transnational-political activism model. The former posits a perpetrator state is more likely to take a contrite stance on its past misdeeds when it calculates such action is in its security and/or economic interests. The latter hypothesizes that when transnational activism is powerful and a perpetrator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more likely to adopt conciliatory policies toward historical issues. I find that the transnational-political activism model possesses more explanatory power than instrumentalism for within-case variations in Japanese behavior toward the comfort women issue. The two approaches are not, however, mutually exclusive and are complementary in some regards. The effect of transnational activism is heightened when the target state is faced with other geopolitical incentives and/or when the target state is led by a progressive ruling coalition and has weak conservative reaction.

What changes has the Cheonan incident brought about in the Northeast Asian region? How and to what extent have those changes shifted as time goes by? I find that the Cheonan sinking has played a key role in deepening the ideological chasm in South Korea between conservatives and progressives. It has also become a serious obstacle to the improvement of South Korea-North Korea relations, and has been the catalyst for the emergence of a Cold War-like rivalry between the US-South Korea-Japan and the China-North Korea-Russia blocs. However, relations among neigh-boring countries in Northeast Asia have shifted over time, including significant improvement in China-Republic of Korea relations and worsening of relations between China and North Korea and South Korea and Japan. KEYWORDS: Cheonan incident, ideological divide, South Korean politics, inter-Korean relations, Northeast Asian security relations.ON MARCH 26, 2010, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK OR SOUTH Korea) navy corvette PCC-722 Cheonan sank while conducting a patrol mission in the Yellow Sea just south of the Northern Limit Line near Baekryeong Island. As a result, forty-six out of 104 crew members were killed while fifty-eight were rescued. Following an investigation, a Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) consisting of experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, and South Korea, announced on May 20 that the Cheonan had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo attack. What changes has the Cheonan incident brought about in the Northeast Asia region? How and to what extent have those changes shifted over time?The JIG's official report, instead of leading to a consensus view among South Koreans, sparked a debate over the cause of the incident. The already deep ideological chasm between con- servatives and progressives in South Korean society worsened. The sinking of the Cheonan also further undermined interKorean relations and served as the catalyst for the emergence of a Cold War-like rivalry between the US-ROK-Japan and the China-North Korea-Russia blocs. Along with these changes in regional security dynamics, the tragic incident also exerted significant influence on interstate relations among neighboring countries in Northeast Asia. In the short run, the Cheonan sinking weakened China-ROK, US-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea), and US-China relations, whereas it helped strengthen China-DPRK, US-ROK, US-Japan, and ROK-Japan relations. Further shifts have occurred since the incident as China-ROK relations have significantly improved while China-DPRK and ROK-Japan relations have notably worsened.In this article, I first examine the widening ideological gap between conservatives and progressives in South Korea after the sinking of the navy ship by exploring the hotly contested points of the JIG's report. I then look into the impact of the Cheonan incident on Northeast Asian security relations and how and to what extent the changes produced by the incident have shifted over time.The Ideological Divide in South KoreaA Catalyst for Deepening MistrustIdeological disputes between conservatives and progressives in South Korea are hardly new. Since the end of the Korean War, the two camps have mainly clashed over policies toward the DPRK and the security role of the United States. Conservatives give top priority to fostering a close partnership with the United States and maintaining vigilance against the threat from North Korea. Progressives, however, "radically oppose that narrative, seeing the North more as a kin nation with which to be reconciled and the United States as a disruptive interloper" (Chae and Kim 2008, 77).This ideological divide became more evident after progressive President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) launched an engagement policy toward North Korea, called the Sunshine Policy. Conservative politicians, intellectuals, and media strongly opposed the Kim government's initiatives, criticizing him for not demanding reciprocal actions by the DPRK. …

This chapter explains why North Korea has long suffered economic stagnation, while reviewing some cross-temporal variations in the North Korean economy over the last seven decades. In the 1950s, after the Korean War, the DPRK attained a quick economic recovery through the mass mobilization of labor forces under a Soviet-style command economy. However, the North Korean economy continued to decline after the 1960s, because of the inherent ineffectiveness of the centrally planned economy, great emphasis on building heavy industry and militarization, ineffective and expensive construction projects, the decline of Soviet aid, and economic autarky based on the ideology of self-reliance. In the 1990s, the North Korean economy plunged into an unprecedented economic crisis and massive famine. This dismal incident resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union, natural disasters such as drought and flooding, and the DPRK regime’s mismanagement. After this famine, Kim Jong-il adopted some economic reforms, but he often reverted to anti-market policies to regain his grip over society. Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un has quite persistently pursued economic reform measures without reverting to anti-market measures. However, North Korean economic conditions have not notably improved. Nevertheless, North Korea is currently experiencing significant changes, such as the deepening of marketization, the rise of private entrepreneurs, and the symbiotic relationship between the state and markets.

How and to what extent did both transnational activist networks and Japanese conservative forces affect Japanese historical narrative and textbook policy during the period of 1995–2010? Addressing this question, this article first establishes the concepts of Type I and II transnational activism regarding history textbooks. The article argues that starting in the late 1990s, a positive trend of Japanese historical narrative and textbook policy was reversed by a systematic conservative campaign, despite the presence of strong Type I and II transnational activism. Nevertheless, Type I transnational activism – pushing for a perpetrator state to change its policy – played a pivotal role in lowering the adoption rate of Japan's nationalistic history textbooks at the local level, although not reversing the conservative direction of Japan's historical narrative and textbook policy at the state level. In the long run, with vibrant Type I transnational activism it would be necessary to strengthen Type II transnational activism – textbook cooperation and historians' dialogue – in order to resolve the issue of biased Japanese historical textbooks.

Prior to the late 1960s, German history textbooks lacked coverage of Poland and depicted Germany's eastern neighbor with negative images. The 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed positive changes to the contents of German school textbooks—particularly with respect to their descriptions of Poland and German-Polish relations. How and why did Germany promote a more reflective view of history and correct negative descriptions of the Poles in German history textbooks between the 1970s and 1980s? This article addresses this question by focusing on the influence of Brandt's Ostpolitik and on the activities of the German-Polish History Textbook Commission. The article also shows how contemporary conservative reaction was not powerful enough to reverse these positive changes to German history textbooks.

Under what conditions do sets of two former adversary states with deeply rooted historical animosity try to reconcile with each other? When they seek bilateral reconciliation, why are the outcomes significantly different? France and Germany were historic antagonists that fought three catastrophic wars between 1870 and 1945. In the postwar era, however, their antagonism and hostility dramatically evolved into mutual partnership and cooperation. Unlike the Franco-German case, Japan-Republic of Korea relations still remain frigid due to mistrust and enmity, although sixty-three years have passed since Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule. This article argues that in both cases, the motives for reconciliation were mainly derived from realpolitik concerns such as security and economy. Structural conditions also affected the initiation of international reconciliation. Nonetheless, it was the dynamics of political leaders and nongovernmental organizations that played central roles in differentiating the reconciliation processes and outcomes in the two dyadic relationships. Key words: international reconciliation, Japan-ROK relations, Franco-German relations, East Asian politics Introduction Under what conditions do sets of two former adversary states with deeply rooted historical animosity try to reconcile with each other? When they seek bilateral reconciliation, why are the outcomes significantly different? This article addresses these questions by examining two dyadic cases-postwar Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter, ROK or South Korea) and Franco-German relations. Although the two sets of dyads share deep-seated historical antagonism, France and Germany reached a far deeper stage of reconciliation than Japan and the ROK during the postwar era. France and Germany were historic antagonists that fought three catastrophic wars-the France-Prussia war and two World Wars-between 1870 and 1945. France's sudden defeat during World War II by the Nazi invasion in June 1940 led to its humiliation and the persistence of harsh Nazi rule for nearly four years.1 In the postwar era, however, the antagonism and hostility between France and Germany dramatically evolved into the establishment of mutual partnership and cooperation. Notable in this evolution are the formation of a security alliance, the engagement in economic and political integration of the European community, the joint writing of a history textbook, and the improvement of mutual perception. The Franco-German reconciliation has thus played a key role in promoting peace and prosperity throughout Western Europe.2 On the other hand, the Japan-ROK relationship progressed in a different direction during the postwar era. The origin of the historical antipathy between Japan and Korea dates back to 1592 when Japan invaded Korea. Yet the most significant root of historical enmity stems from Japan's colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945. During this period, Koreans suffered under Japan's relentless political repression, economic exploitation, attacks against Korean culture, and violations of the human rights of Koreans.3 Unlike the Franco-German case, Japan and South Korea followed a fluctuating path ranging from chronic antagonism to limited cooperation during the postwar era. Although sixty-three years have passed since Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, it still appears as if Japan-ROK relations remain frigid due to distrust and hostility. This article argues that in both cases, the motives for reconciliation were mainly derived from realpolitik concerns such as security and economy. Structural conditions also affected the initiation of international reconciliation. However, it was the dynamics of political leaders and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that played pivotal roles in differentiating the reconciliation processes and outcomes in the two dyadic relationships. The Franco-German case was marked not only by political leadership that commonly favored reconciliation, but also by the vibrant activities of reconciliation-promoting NGOs during the early postwar period. …