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Smart logistics is an effective way to meet the challenges of fast-changing customer expectations, take opportunities brought by new technologies, and facilitate new business models. This review pa...

Human reliability analysis (HRA) and optimization in manufacturing systems are effective to reduce system failure. The purpose of this study is to examine the HRA and optimization through a Bayesian network (BN) model and human factors experiments (HFEs). This study was applied to a flexible intermediate bulk container manufacturing plant. The human physiological and psychological factors consisting of personal abilities of flexibility, coordination, memory, and attention were regarded as the only performance shaping factors in this study. With the BN model, the relationship between human factors and human errors was described qualitatively and the impact of the human factor on system failures was judged quantitatively. Then the workers’ abilities training with HFEs based on the fault diagnosis results was carried out. The total numbers of errors have been decreased by 69.06% and the system failure rate has been reduced significantly after training.

Product variant design, as one of the key enabling technologies of mass customization, is the transfer of variant information among mating parts from the perspective of informatics. A dimension constraint network (DCN) among mating parts carries on the task of transferring variant information. What are the information transfer characteristics of dimensions in a constraint network is a fundamental issue to plan the product variant design process reasonably. We begin by showing the natural dynamics of the DCN from two aspects: structure and uncertainty. The information efficiency of the DCN was proposed based on its simple path to specify the information transfer capability of the network. Based on this, the information centrality of the dimension was developed by measuring the efficiency loss of the DCN after the removal of a dimension from the network, which describes the information transfer capability of this dimension. Further, the information centrality of a part was derived. Using a spherical valve subassembly, we calculated the information centrality of the dimensions in a constraint network. We determined that the information centrality of dimension is highly correlated to its out-degree. An approach to plan the sequence of the part variant design according to its information centrality was proposed. We calculated the uncertainties of the DCN and its cumulative uncertainties under different sequences of the part variant design. Results indicate that part variant design under the descending information centrality of the parts minimizes the uncertainty of the DCN. This suggests a new method of planning the sequence of part variant design.

This paper models printer cartridge recycling with a framework of a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and two competing retailers, which investigates the dynamics of the manufacturer’s pricing, including both wholesale price for new cartridges and transfer price for collected ones, and retailers’ ordering and collection strategies. The analysis shows a negative correlation between the wholesale price and the number of retailers engaged in the collection; it also shows that the collection effort is negatively correlated with the wholesale price and positively correlated with the transfer price under low and moderate pricing. A case study of original HP ink cartridges in the U.S. demonstrates that (i) the manufacturer and retailers reach their maximum profits with less ordering and collection under low pricing; retailers’ ordering and collecting are most stimulated under moderate pricing but the manufacturer and retailers have lower profits compared with low pricing; (ii) price reduction strategy is the best way for the manufacturer to deal with the increase of manufacturing costs under low and moderate pricing; (iii) under low pricing, the return reward is paid by the manufacturer at the transfer price, not by retailers, resulting in limited effects on their decisions; however, this reward is extremely detrimental to place orders and take collection under moderate pricing.

Considering the preference of green consumers for remanufactured products, a dual-sale-channel supply chain model with government non-intervention, government remanufacturing subsidy policy, and carbon tax policy is constructed, respectively. The difference of the optimal decision between the firm and the government under the two policies is discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, we analyze the influence of green consumers on the government&rsquo, s optimal decision, based on social welfare maximization. It is found that without government intervention, social welfare is the lowest. The carbon tax policy is better when the proportion of green consumers and the environmental coefficient are extreme or moderate at the same time. Otherwise, the subsidy policy is better. The carbon tax policy is more effective than the subsidy policy in controlling carbon emissions. Profit-sharing contracts should be established by enterprises and governments to achieve win&ndash, win results.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs, (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.

Considering the reverse logistics system composed of two manufacturers and two recyclers under the cross-competitive take-back mode, which is influenced by multiple factors (industry competition, economies of scale, government subsidies, remanufacturing rate, etc.), a model for remanufacturing reverse logistics system based on Stackelberg game is established. Then, the Nash equilibrium solution of decision variables is solved to obtain the best profit of all participants under the cross-competitive take-back mode. Furthermore, the parameter constraint analysis is carried out, and the monopolistic take-back mode is introduced for comparative analysis. Then, the sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out. At last, a case analysis is carried out based on the current situation of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling in China. The results show that the cross-competitive take-back mode is more advantageous to all participants in the reverse logistics system than the monopolistic take-back mode. Recyclers should actively sign contracts with multiple manufacturers to recycle waste products, making full use of the advantages of cross-competitive take-back mode to maximize the profits of all participants, so as to encourage them to recycle waste products and achieve sustainable development.