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This paper investigates the effect of competition in both the domestic and foreign markets on firm productivity and export decisions using firm level data from 139 countries. Using a Sample Selection Endogenous Treatment (SSET) Poisson model that tackles both the issue of endogenous sample selection and endogenous treatment at the same time, we document robust evidence that strong competition in the domestic market propels firms to be more productive, and rising domestic competition increases firms' propensity to export. However, firms' export intensity, i.e. how much they export, is not directly influenced by competition in the domestic market. Moreover, lower competition in the foreign market increases the propensity of domestic firms to export, enlarging the set of exporting firms to firms with relatively smaller export amount.

Appendix S1: Statistical Models; Appendix S2. Global Fund Effect in Country Subsets; Appendix S3. Global Fund Interactions with PEPFAR and Health Workforce; Appendix S4. Additional Specifications; Appendix S5. Analyses Using Different Lag Durations; Appendix S6. Malaria Funding Exposure per Person at Risk; Appendix S7. Sampling From Mortality Uncertainty Bounds. (DOCX 349Â kb)

The large and persistent deviations of nominal exchange rates from their purchasing power parities comprise a key stylized fact in international economics. This paper sheds light on these persistent deviations by combining two disparate strands of empirical work. The first strand focuses on real economic shocks such as sectoral technology shocks suggested by the celebrated Balassa-Samuelson model, whereas the second strand emphasizes monetary shocks which create persistent effects on both the real interest rate and the real exchange rate. We also hypothesize a third factor which may affect real exchange rates - shocks to the global financial system, which we proxy by the real price of gold. Although each factor in isolation has limited explanatory power, we find that these three factors in conjunction can successfully explain the medium to long run movements in 14 bilateral U.S. dollar real exchange rates from 1970 to 2006. The three factors are sectoral total factor productivity differentials, real interest rate differentials, and the real price of gold, representing real shocks, monetary shocks, and shocks to the global financial system, respectively. We document evidence suggesting that bilateral U.S. dollar real ex-change rates are cointegrated with these three factors.

We empirically examine some listed Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints. Politically-connected firms display no financing constraints whereas firms without connection experience significant constraints. Non-connected family-controlled firms bear greater constraints than non-connected state-owned firms.

Some emerging economies have recently experienced large government surpluses and accelerating foreign exchange reserve accumulation far in excess of what would be implied by the literature on optimal reserves. China in particular has repeatedly stressed that there may be an upper limit to how many reserves it is willing to hold. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we show that the credible expectation of such a limit would lead to a balance of payments anti-crisis, which is characterized by an economic boom, real appreciation, growing demand for domestic currency, and domestic inflation, in the period prior to the limit being reached.

Groenewold et al (2004a) documented that the Chinese stock market is inefficient. In this paper, we revisit the efficiency problem of the Chinese stock market using time-series model based trading rules. Our paper distinguishes itself from previous studies in several aspects. First, while previous studies concentrate on the viability of linear forecasting techniques, we evaluate the profitability of the forecasts of the self-exciting threshold autoregressive model (SETAR), and compare it with the conventional linear AR and MA trading rules. Second, the finding of market inefficiency in earlier studies mainly rest on the statistical significance of the autocorrelation or regression coefficients. In contrast, this paper directly examines the profitability of various trading rules. Third, our sample covers an extensive period of 1991-2010. Sub-sample analysis shows that positive returns mainly concentrate in the pre-SOE reform period, suggesting that China’s stock market has become more efficient after the reform.

This paper examines the impact of recent financial liberalization in China on the financing constraints and investment of publicly-listed Chinese firms. Two continuous indices are constructed to measure the evolution and intensity of financial reforms: a financial liberalization index and a capital control index. Dynamic panel GMM method is used to estimate firms’ financing constraints in an Euler-equation investment model. The results indicate that while smaller firms face significant financing constraints than larger firms, financial liberalization has raised the financing constraints for the latter and failed to relieve the constraints for the former. It appears financial reforms in China have subjected larger firms to greater market discipline but the reforms probably have not been profound enough to benefit smaller firms.

This paper examines the impact of recent financial liberalization in China on the financing constraints of publicly-listed Chinese firms with and without politically-connected CEO/Chairman. Two continuous indices are used to measure the evolution and intensity of financial reforms: a financial liberalization index and a capital control index. The results indicate that while firms without politically-connected CEO/Chairman face significant financing constraints and politically-connected firms do not, financial liberalization has reduced the constraints for the former. Similarly, lower capital control in China’s equity market lessens credit constraints for non-connected firms. No statistically-significant impact is detected with regards to firms that have CEO/Chairman with powerful political background.

This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select patent strengths that are weaker than is optimal from a global perspective. The paper introduces three new features to the analysis: trade barriers, firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity and political economy considerations in setting patent policies. The first two features (trade barriers interacting with firm heterogeneity) tend to reduce the size of cross-border externalities in patent protection and therefore make national IPR policies closer to the global optimum. With firm lobbying creating profit-bias of the government, it is even possible that the equilibrium strength of global patent protection is greater than the globally efficient level. Thus, the question of under-protection or not is an empirical one. Based on calibration exercises, we find that there would be global under-protection of patent rights when there is no international policy coordination. Furthermore, requiring all countries to harmonize their patent standards with the equilibrium standard of the most innovative country (the US) does not lead to global over-protection of patent rights.