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With the growing popularity of charging pile infrastructure and the development of smart electronic devices and 5G communication technologies, the electric vehicle aggregator (EVA) as a bidding entity can aggregate numerous electric vehicle (EV) resources to participate in the electricity market. Moreover, as the number of grid-connected EVs increases, EVA will have an impact on the nodal marginal prices of electricity market clearing. Aiming at the bidding and offering problem of EVA participation in the day-ahead and intra-day electricity markets, based on the Stackelberg game theory, this paper establishes a bilevel optimization model for EVA participation in the two-stage electricity market as a price-maker. In the proposed bilevel model, the upper-level and lower-level models are constructed as an operational problem for EVA and a market-clearing problem for independent system operator (ISO), respectively. In the day-ahead stage, EVA is optimized to maximize its own expected benefits, and ISO aims to improve the social benefits. In the intra-day stage, EVA is optimized to maximize its self-interest, and the ISO aims to make it possible to minimize the cost of expenditures to maintain the system's supply–demand balance. Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions and dual theory are used to transform the nonlinear bilevel programming model into a mixed-integer single-level linear programming model. In order to verify the validity of the proposed bilevel model as well as to comparatively analyze the impact of EVA's participation in the electricity market on the market clearing results. Two scenarios are set up where EVA is seen as the price-taker in Scenario 1 and EVA is seen as the price-maker in Scenario 2. ISO's revenue under Scenario 2 increased by USD 2262.66 compared to Scenario 1. In addition, the EVA acts as an energy consumer in Scenario 1 with a charging cost of USD 26,432.95, whereas in Scenario 2, the EVA can profit by participating in the electricity market with a revenue of USD 26,432.95, at which point the EVA acts like a virtual power plant. The simulation examples verify that the proposed bilevel optimization model can improve the benefits of ISO and EVA at the same time, achieving mutual benefits for both parties. In addition, the simulation analyzes the impact of abandonment penalty price on ISO and EVA intra-day revenues. Comparing the scenarios where the abandonment penalty price is 0 with USD 10/MW, the ISO's revenue in the intra-day market decreases by USD 197.5. Correspondingly, EVA's reserve capacity is dispatched to consume wind power in the intra-day market, and its revenue increases by USD 197.5. The proposed two-stage bilevel optimization model can provide a reference for EVA to develop scheduling strategies in the day-ahead and intra-day electricity markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the wide deployment of charging piles and the development of vehicle-to-grid technology, electric vehicles (EVs) will have more opportunities to participate in the operation and scheduling of electric power system through the EV aggregator (EVA), an intermediate agent between the power grid and EV users. Quantitatively evaluating the response capability (RC) of EVA, i.e., charging and discharging power ranges, is of fundamental importance for its trading with the operator of power grid. This article proposes a user-aware method to obtain a more accurate range of multitimescale RC considering the response willingness of EV users. First, a temporal RC evaluation model of a single EV considering charge-discharge state and state of charge (SOC) is established. Second, based on the user psychology model, which reflects the relationship between users' responsivity and incentive price, a multitimescale RC evaluation model of EVA considering users' willingness is built. The day-ahead RC of EVA is evaluated by the state prediction data of EVs. According to the control strategy which considers response time and SOC indicators comprehensively, the RC evaluation is updated intraday. Finally, using the statistical data from the EU MERGE project, the effectiveness of the proposed evaluation model is verified, and the impact of incentive price and scheduling time scale on the RC of EVA are analyzed. The results indicate that the proposed model can effectively track the scheduling goals of the system and realize the dynamic update of the RC of EVA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]