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When managers face relative profit performance competition, we formulate a green managerial delegation contract where the owners impose profit‐oriented environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) on their managers. We show that the owner adopts ECSR as a commitment device to reduce outputs under quantity competition if the degree of relative profit performance competition is sufficiently high, which can increase not only industry profits but also environmental quality. We also examine an endogenous choice of ECSR and find that the profitable level of ECSR in the asymmetric ECSR case is higher than that in the symmetric ECSR case while both firms undertake ECSR in equilibrium if the severity of competition is sufficiently high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of cross-ownership on the strategic incentive of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) within a green managerial delegation contract in a triopoly market engaged in price competition. It demonstrates that bilateral cross-ownership between insiders provides weak incentives to undertake ECSR, which has a non-monotone relationship with cross-ownership shares, while it provides strong incentives for outsiders, which increases the ECSR level as cross-ownership increases. It also compares unilateral cross-ownership and finds that a firm that owns shares in its rival has a greater incentive to undertake ECSR than its partially-owned rival, while an outsider has more incentive than firms in bilateral scenarios. These findings reveal that a firm's incentive to increase a market price through ECSR critically depends on its cross-ownership share, while it decreases environmental damage and increases social welfare when the environmental damage is serious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the effects of cross-ownership between private firms (i.e. private cross-ownership) on R&D and social welfare in a mixed oligopoly in which a partially privatized public firm competes with two private firms. The main findings are that: (i) private cross-ownership induces the public firms' R&D, despite it reduces the private firm's R&D; (ii) private cross-ownership leads to a decrease (an increase) in industry profits if the degree of privatization is low (high); and (iii) private cross-ownership improves (decreases) consumer surplus and social welfare if the degree of privatization is low (high). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adopts a green managerial delegation model in a polluting network industry wherein consumers form fulfilled rational expectations of network externalities. We show that firms are consistently incentivized to undertake ECSR (environmental corporate social responsibility) under price competition, while positive network externalities can increase the strategic level of ECSR. We also show that product substitutability between network products can play an important role in determining a firm's strategic level of ECSR and resulting profits. Finally, ECSR is conducive to increasing environmental quality and social welfare in a high-polluting network industry. Therefore, the strategic adoption of ECSR in a network industry is Pareto-improving as environmental damage becomes serious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines strategic environmental research and development (ER&D) under environmental tax in a mixed duopoly and further analyzes the impact of privatization on it. We show that the environmental tax may not necessarily promote the private (or public) firm's ER&D, and the relative ER&D performance between firms depends on the public firm's environmental attitudes and the tax rate. When the public firm cares much for environment, it can be used as an instrument to correct the private firm's underinvestment (or overinvestment) in ER&D. Moreover, privatization can (cannot) raise both firms' ER&D simultaneously if the tax rate is high (low). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates how the partial privatization on the public firm affects the R&D risk choice in a mixed duopoly market. It mainly finds that: (i) the partial privatization of the public firm leads to a decline in the optimal level of R&D risk chosen by the private (or public) firm, and the higher the degree of privatization the lower the optimal level of R&D risk; (ii) for the public firm, the partial privatization policy always causes the private optimum to be lower than the social optimum; (iii) for the private firm, whether the private optimum is higher or lower than the social optimum depends on the partial privatization level of the public firm. When the degree of privatization is small (large), the private optimum is higher (lower) than the social optimum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This study examines the R&D risk choice in a duopoly market with technology spill overs. The firms conduct R&D programmes with different degrees of risk but an identical expected outcome and they compete or cooperate in R&D. Findings indicate that, in equilibrium, the R&D risk level decreases in the spill over rate under noncooperative R&D, while it may increase under cooperative R&D. Firms are more likely to engage in higher R&D risks under cooperative R&D than they are under non-cooperative R&D. Moreover, the equilibrium R&D risk level both under competition and cooperation R&D is always too low from the perspective of social welfare, and the extent of this inefficiency increases with the spill over rate if the size of the spill over is large, but the opposite may occur if the size of the spill over is small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]