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Using a phone survey conducted in 2012, we examined whether there is a gender difference in financial literacy among Hong Kong workers; and if such a difference exists, whether it can be explained by gender differences in sociodemographic variables, social or psychological factors, and/or the outcomes of retirement planning. Results show a gender gap in financial literacy as well as age, spousal support for retirement savings, risk tolerance, computational ability, and perceived financial knowledge. Multivariate data analyses show that a proportion of the gender difference in financial literacy could be explained by gender differences in risk tolerance, computational ability, and self-reported financial knowledge; but the difference remained after adjusting for variables found to be associated with gender. Our findings suggest that it may be important to develop programs targeted specifically to women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's central–local relations have been marked by perpetual changes amidst economic restructuring. Fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side has been paralleled by centralization on the revenue side, accompanied by political centralization. Hence, our understanding of China's fiscal relations is not without controversy. This paper aims to make a theoretical contribution to the ongoing debate on ‘fiscal federalism’ by addressing crucial questions regarding China's central–local fiscal relations: first, to what extent do Chinese central–local fiscal relations conform to fiscal federalism in the Western literature? Second, are there any problems with existing principles of fiscal federalism and, if so, how to refine them? Third, how are refined principles relevant to the Chinese case and what policies should the Chinese government pursue in the future? Based on an in-depth and critical review of the theories on fiscal federalism, we develop a refined prototype of fiscal federalism. The model shows that quasi-traditional fiscal federalism is a much closer reality in China, while we argue that the refined fiscal federalism should be the direction of future reform in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Decentralized governance is often viewed as an effective way to improve public services and government accountability. Many also document the negative dimensions of fiscal decentralization, especially in transition economies; thus, the combination of decentralization and centralized control has gained currency in some countries in recent years. Based on first-hand data and other documentary sources, and using civil service remuneration as an example, this paper attempts to explore how decentralized governance works in China and what hinders decentralization from performing better. The findings show that Chinese centralized control over expenditure in public sector remuneration primarily serves to enhance ministry control. Local bureaucrats, meanwhile, exploit better remuneration to boost their personal interests. This paper argues that political commitment rather than central transfer is greatly needed for utilizing the benefits of decentralized governance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]