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Local government has long been the site of experiments and innovation in transparency. Since the 1990s waves of reforms have sought to open up local government in Britain, from the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act in the 2000s to Open Data in the 2010s. This paper looks across the evidence to see how well these new transparency tools have worked, who is using them and why. It then moves to analyse what impact the changes have had on local government, in line with hopes of campaigners and fears of (some) politicians. Have reforms succeeded in making local government more open, more accountable and more participative, and in what situations? Or have they, as some claim, simply driven decision-making into other arenas, and made local bodies 'better at hiding'? Finally, how does transparency sit with the fragmented and disjointed landscape of local politics today, from outsourcing and devolution to financial crisis? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tests Poguntke and Webb's theory of 'electoral presidentialization' through a comparison of Silvio Berlusconi and Boris Johnson. Johnson and Berlusconi stand as particular examples of 'electoral presidentialization', where dominance lies in power as an election 'winner' and 'mediatised leader'. This approach is highly contingent and reliant on continuous validation, and, as a result, both leaders failed to translate electoral 'autonomy' into concrete and lasting change. Utilising the three presidentialization 'faces', we identify three crucial weaknesses. First, their own electoral and mediatized focus created a pressure to permanently campaign and generate conflict, driving a 'politics of spectacle' that distracted from the politics of governing. Second, the centrality of their personality left them exposed to personal scrutiny, which increasingly focused on corruption, wrongdoing, and irregularities. Third, despite electoral command, their 'presidentialized' style rested on fragile party and coalition dynamics, leading to volatility and internal conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK has a fragmented, partial and weak system of lobbying regulation. The system creates a self-reinforcing cycle of 'exposure' and worsening public attitudes. In order to make the case for reform and indicate possible paths, this article reviews the system's faults and weaknesses and then analyses how the lack of political will for reform in Westminster has contributed to a transparency and integrity regime which falls below international standards. Finally, it examines how this cycle can be broken. While the UK lobbying law needs reform, we must look beyond the letter of regulation, taking into account the levels of use and political support, as well as the transparency and ethics ecosystem in which lobbying sits. Only by improvements to all of these areas can there be the possibility of stronger, more positive feedback loops, which can shift behaviour and, ultimately, attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]