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The TCA (EU-UK Trade and Copperation Agreement) establishes a very comprehensive institutional framework with Partnership Council and diverse Committees having partly substantial decision-making powers for the development of the TCA. These considerable public functions prompt legitimacy concerns as to their democratic control, which this article explores in detail. It will be shown that the exercise of public powers by TCA treaty bodies meets with a sobering legal situation regarding democratic control mechanisms over treaty body decision-making at different levels. Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the legal and legitimate transfer of powers requires additional safeguards as to their democratic legitimacy. Solutions for better control of treaty body decisions by parliaments must be developed at several levels simultaneously. EU association agreements, EU trade agreements, treaty bodies, decision-making, democracy, accountability, Trade and Cooperation Agreement

This article takes the proliferation of EU soft law instruments in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to analyse their effects and challenges to democracy and rule of law in the EU posed by the use of EU soft law in the implementation of EU law. A proposal will be made for a general legal framework on the adoption of administrative EU soft law in order to address them. Enhancing the legitimacy of EU governance requires a general legal framework that introduces minimum procedural, transparency and participatory safeguards and foresees looser rules for urgent soft measures. The article thus makes an original contribution by reconsidering the debate about EU soft law in the context of COVID-19 soft law with a view to its salience for domestic implementation of EU law and by developing core elements of a general legal framework.

The Commission’s proposal for a regulation on third country subsidies inter alia provides for ex officio supervision by the European Commission, comparable to its supervision in the field of state aid. Nevertheless, there are significant divergences. This article compares the instruments with regard to ex officio proceedings and analyzes similarities and differences in the procedures and investigative powers, most importantly that the addressee of a decision under the new regulation is an undertaking, not a Member State, and that the decisive facts for assessing whether a benefit to an undertaking was granted have taken place in a foreign country.

ZusammenfassungDie nukleare Katastrophe in Fukushima hat mehr Todesfälle durch Evakuierungsmaßnahmen gefordert als durch die ionisierende Strahlung selbst. Die Erkenntnisse haben u. a. dazu geführt, folgendes Gebot in das Strahlenschutzkonzept aufzunehmen: Bei der Rechtfertigung einschneidender Schutzmaßnahmen sind sowohl die strahlenbedingten gesundheitlichen Risiken als auch die mit der Maßnahme verbundenen gesundheitlichen und gesellschaftlichen Risiken zu berücksichtigen.Die erfolgreiche Umsetzung von Schutzkonzepten in Ausnahmesituationen ist nur dann möglich, wenn sie fachlich und organisatorisch gut vorbereitet, regelmäßig in realistischen Übungen erprobt und auf Basis aktueller wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse fortentwickelt werden. Die Wissensbasis in der Bevölkerung und bei zentralen Berufsgruppen in der Medizin ist dazu erforderlich und sollte z. B. in Ausbildungskurrikula aufgenommen werden.

As WTO members increasingly invoke security exceptions and the first panel report insofar was issued in Russia – Traffic in Transit, the methodical and procedural preliminaries of their adjudication must be reassessed. The preliminaries pertain to justiciability and to the proper interpretive approach for their vague terms that seemingly imply considerable discretion to WTO members, all the more as general exceptions are subject to expansive interpretation. Reading security exceptions expansively appears not viable as they miss the usual safeguard against abuse (i.e. the chapeau of Articles XX GATT/XIV GATS). This lack of safeguards rather suggests caution in conceptualising them expansively, as do the systemic consequences of recent attempts to re-politicize security exceptions which run the risk of nullifying the concept of multilateral trade regulation altogether. Furthermore, the appropriate standards of review and proof must be explored which have to strike a balance between control and deference in national security.

Considering the new focus of the European Union (EU) trade policy on strengthening the enforcement of trade rules, the article presents the proposed amendments to the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation 654/2014. It analyzes the EU Commission proposal and the amendments suggested by the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), in particular with regard to uncooperative third parties and the provision of immediate countermeasures. The amendments will be assessed in view of their legality under World Trade Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and general international law and in view of their political implications for the EU’s multilateralist stance. Finally, the opportunity to amend Regulation 654/2014 to use it for the enforcement of FTA trade and sustainable development chapters will be explored. The analysis shows that the shift towards more effective enforcement should be pursued with due care for respecting existing international legal commitments and with more caution to multilateralism.