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The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted nearly every boardroom in the world. However, neither the extant leadership literature nor the corporate governance literature offers succinct guidance on what constitutes effective board leadership during such a calamity. To address this theoretical and practical need, we develop a moderated mediation model, in which directive leadership from the board chair promotes competitive simplification at the onset of the crisis, which in turn promotes firm financial performance during the crisis. Using survey responses from 120 directors of U.S. public firms in Spring of 2020, combined with firm-level archival data from multiple sources and time periods, we find support for this mediated relationship—but only if the chair is not CEO. If the chair is CEO, we find no evidence of a positive relationship between directive leadership and either competitive simplification or firm financial performance; rather, we find some evidence of a negative relationship. We explore the implications of these findings for the theory and practice of corporate governance and crisis management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The executive labor market (ELM) is a topic of interest that spans several academic fields. The outcomes of the ELM, including executive selection, succession, and compensation, are important considerations as they influence executive decision making and other organizational outcomes. Yet, a comprehensive framework of ELM dynamics currently does not exist. To address this shortcoming, we reviewed the existing literature using five fundamental questions: (1) What executive jobs are available? (2) Who is available to fill executive jobs, and what is valued on the ELM? (3) Who signals interest in the executive jobs? (4) Who gets offered/accepts the executive job, and what is the agreed-upon compensation? (5) How do status and social capital influence ELM outcomes? By answering these questions, our review provides a framework for integrating existing research on the ELM while suggesting avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how executives' prior employment ties to interlocking directors, or those who hold additional board seats or executive positions at outside firms, influence individual executive interfirm mobility. As organizational boundary spanners, interlocking directors may be able to influence executive outcomes both within and outside of executives' current firms. But given natural constraints on internal promotion for executives, we suggest most executives will tend to leverage ties to interlocking directors to access external opportunities, as manifested by movement to outside firms. Analysis of interfirm mobility among a sample of Standard & Poor's 1500 executives between 2000 and 2014 offer support for this idea. We find a positive association between individual executives' prior employment ties to interlocking directors and their hazard of movement to outside firms, including to the other firms where these directors serve. At the same time, we argue and find that the strength of this latter relationship will further depend on directors' competing motivations owing to their specific positions in the focal and interlocking firms. Whereas holding a lead position on the focal firm's board (i.e., as chairperson or lead independent director) weakens this relationship, holding the position of chief executive officer in the interlocking firm strengthens it. Our theory and findings highlight the unique and important role of interlocking directors in executive interfirm mobility and, in doing so, contribute novel insights regarding how ties to boundary spanners can influence individual outcomes for those to whom they are linked. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1638. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As professional athletes are traded from team to team, various in-kind and monetary transactions for certain jersey numbers are becoming more common. Given the size of some of the recent payments, these stories have transitioned from relative obscurity to mainstream sports news. In this article, the authors provide two areas where these kinds of interactions can enhance the learning experience in undergraduate microeconomics or undergraduate labor and sports economics. These are (a) simple, illustrative ways of discussing the importance of markets (and related concepts), and (b) an interesting extension of G. S. Becker's (1975) human capital theory. (Contains 1 table.)

Strategic entrepreneurship integrates the fields of strategy and entrepreneurship to consider firms' simultaneous engagement in opportunity- and advantage-seeking behaviors to create wealth. Since its conceptualization in the early 2000s, the study of SE has gained considerable momentum. At the same time, some scholars criticize SE and question its comprehensiveness as a way to understand the strategic application of entrepreneurship. We present a comprehensive review and integration of research related to the study of SE as a construct, theoretical model, and research domain. In doing this, we offer a research agenda across these different approaches to the study of SE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research contends that internal capital should be allocated in proportion to divisional performance, but scholars are often puzzled to find that managers do not adhere to this winner‐picking approach. We argue this is because scholarship has not incorporated corporate‐level factors that influence how corporate managers structure holistic capital allocation strategies. In this study, we build on the behavioral theory of the firm to focus on analyst performance projections for multidivisional corporations and how they inform corporate managers' allocation strategies. Specifically, we theorize corporate managers deviate from the winner‐picking allocation approach owing to search‐related behaviors stemming from projected performance below or above expectations. We further theorize about conditions that offer corporate managers opportunities to deviate from winner‐picking, focusing particularly on multidivisional relatedness and asset durability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Management research increasingly recognizes omitted variables as a primary source of endogeneity that can induce bias in empirical estimation. Methodological scholarship on the topic overwhelmingly advocates for empirical researchers to employ two-stage instrumental variable modeling, a recommendation we approach with trepidation given the challenges associated with this analytic procedure. Over the course of two studies, we leverage a statistical technique called the impact threshold of a confounding variable (ITCV) to better conceptualize what types of omitted variables might actually bias causal inference and whether they have appeared to do so in published management research. In Study 1, we apply the ITCV to published studies and find that a majority of the causal inference is unlikely biased from omitted variables. In Study 2, we respecify an influential simulation on endogeneity and determine that only the most pervasive omitted variables appear to substantively impact causal inference. Our simulation also reveals that only the strongest instruments (perhaps unrealistically strong) attenuate bias in meaningful ways. Taken together, we offer guidelines for how scholars can conceptualize omitted variables in their research, provide a practical approach that balances the tradeoffs associated with instrumental variable models, and comprehensively describe how to implement the ITCV technique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]