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The UK parliament of 2017–2019 had to decide what form of Brexit, if any, it would accept in the government's negotiations with the EU over a withdrawal agreement. Despite a large majority of MPs having supported Remain in the 2016 referendum, with most opposed to a 'hard' Brexit of looser ties between the UK and the EU, all attempts to pass a 'soft' Brexit failed. The final withdrawal agreement reflected a hard Brexit that was closer to the preferences of a 28-strong group of Eurosceptic Conservative MPs than to those of any other party or faction in a 650-seat parliament. This article identifies the two-party system for government as a crucial variable in explaining this unexpected outcome. Governments seek majorities from among their own MPs rather than relying on the uncertain support of the opposition. This not only makes party cohesion vital, but also creates leverage for organised factions to hold sway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has seen the United Kingdom (UK) abandon membership of and formal influence over policy making in the EU and pursue a policy of disintegration from and minimal commitments towards the EU. Although the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement is strikingly lacking in ambition, it does involve a dense and complex institutional framework to manage relations. Moreover, the post‐Brexit UK–EU relationship includes a unique set of arrangements that keep Northern Ireland in the EU's customs territory and internal market for goods. These arrangements involve dynamic regulatory alignment and are managed by a dedicated institutional set‐up that has the potential at least to provide the UK 'in respect of Northern Ireland' with a particular decision‐shaping role with regard to applicable areas of the EU acquis. This article considers the initial operation of these sets of institutional frameworks and their potential for UK influence over the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit, the historically unique process of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, has continued to dominate the global conversation for several years and its significance has not waned. The withdrawal of a state from the EU happened for the first time in more than half a century of its history. Despite the formal completion of Brexit, many related issues regarding the implementation of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, the status of Northern Ireland, the implementation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the two parties, the place of EU law in the British national legal order, are still not finally resolved. The adopted legal decisions influence the current development of both the EU and especially the UK's legal order. All this allows us to talk about the actual continuation of Brexit and the formation of its modern agenda.

The aim of this article is analysis of how the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union governs the mechanisms for monitoring its implementation and resolving disputes. All solutions are based on the international principle of good faith, which obliges the parties of the Agreement to apply it fully. Constant contact between them is ensured by the Joint Committee together with the Special Committees. Any dispute between the parties can only be solved based on the solutions contained in the Agreement, through international arbitration by an arbitration panel. Furthermore, of interest are the provisions governing the specific extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the practice of the parties to date.

The article provides an in-depth analysis of the various bargaining strategies that the European Parliament (EP) used to leverage its influence over the negotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. More specifically, it focuses on five bargaining self-empowerment strategies (obstructing, moving first, issue-linking, allying with other actors, and mobilising public opinion), elucidating if, how and to what extent the EP was using these strategies vis-à-vis the Brexit process. Conceptually, the article rests on the theory of bargaining-based rational institutionalism. The analysis covers almost a five year period, from the announcement of the in/out referendum results on 24 June 2016 until 27 April 2021 when the EP consented to the conclusion of the TCA. The data used for the analysis come from a number of sources, including 17 original interviews and email communications with MEPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union was supposed to be definitively settled several times during the past decade - yet it was not. The 2016 referendum brought about a surge in interest in legal questions, especially of EU law and international economic law. This presented scholars with a questionable gift: on the one hand, countless new opportunities for research, publications, and public visibility; on the other, the curse of chasing a rapidly and at times erratically moving target. Therefore, this essay reflects on the continued relevance of Brexit scholarship and different strategies for extending its shelf-life. It argues that the relevance of this scholarship may indeed extend into the future when foresighted and innovative approaches are being put forward. Looking ahead, the essay observes that the Windsor Framework to overhaul the Northern Ireland Protocol likely marks the end point of the frenzied and fraught EU-UK relationship between 2016 and 2023. The essay concludes that, while disagreements will continue, the EU-UK relationship as a topic is entering a period of normalization. Rigorous legal and innovative interdisciplinary scholarship will remain necessary both to develop EU-UK relations as a sub-topic of its own and to embed it into wider discourses of EU and international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the fallout between the United Kingdom and the European Union regarding the Northern Ireland Protocol. The Northern Ireland Protocol was agreed between the United Kingdom and the European Union to ensure frictionless trade on the Island of Ireland and created a customs border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Opposition to this new trading arrangement soon emerged following the end of the transition period of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union (January 2021). We adopt a mixed-method approach of content analysis (narrativisation and framing) and a critical analysis of the articulation of discourses through texts and speeches from the UK right-wing media and Conservative politicians. The analysis finds that despite the Government of Boris Johnson agreeing to the Northern Ireland Protocol, both the Conservative Party and the right-wing media blamed the European Union for the backlash against it, as they attempted to apply pressure on Brussels for a renegotiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit has directly impacted Spain’s relationship with the UK due to the Gibraltar issue. The British withdrawal from the EU has forced the redefinition of the European statute of Gibraltar, and its relations with Spain and the European Union, in institutional, legal and economic terms. In this context, novel mechanisms have also been devised to regulate cross-border cooperation with Gibraltar, which is frequently the subject of political ups and downs and changes with the different Spanish and British governments. The cross-border cooperation of the territory of Gibraltar with the Campo de Gibraltar, Andalusia and Spain has had intermittent phases in its evolution over time. Within the British exit process framework, a new model has been agreed in successive EU-UK agreements that combine Hard Law (Primary EU Law) with Soft Law (Memoranda of Understanding – MOUs). This regulation has required a specific prior British-Spanish negotiation. The first Withdrawal Treaty of 2019 has formed a peculiar cross-border cooperation system involving the UK, the EU, Gibraltar and Spain, through a series of MOUs interconnected with the Protocol on Gibraltar. The Protocol refers to the Tax Treaty and establishes concrete cooperation on citizens’ rights and cross-border workers; tobacco and other products; cooperation in environmental matters; and police and customs cooperation. For its part, the Future Relationship Trade Agreement does not deal with the status of Gibraltar, as it has been preferred to devote a separate UK-EU Treaty to Gibraltar’s status with the EU, a Treaty that has yet to be negotiated and concluded. To this end, a prior Spanish-British ‘Principle of Agreement’ was agreed on 31.12.2020, then embodied in the Council Decision of 05.10.2021 authorising the opening of negotiations with the negotiating mandate and directives for the negotiation of the future EU-UK Treaty in respect of Gibraltar. This Treaty, currently under negotiation, foresees a complete and renewed legal status for Gibraltar in its relationship with the EU and Spain, with reinforced and guaranteed cross-border cooperation with the Campo de Gibraltar and Andalusia. In short, the Brexit process seems to provide an innovative and imaginative model for cross-border cooperation with Gibraltar, bilaterally articulated by Spain and the UK and incorporated into the EU’s institutional and legal framework.

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Przegląd Europejski is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The European Union’s secondary law includes several regulations and dispositions concerning the social security rights enjoyed by nationals of the EU Member States, nationals of Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein (as states which are part of the European Economic Area), Switzerland, stateless persons, and refugees who reside in one of these states, as well as citizens from third-party states, if they legally reside on the EU’s territory and have exercised their freedom of movement. As a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, it has become necessary to clarify the legal status and social security rights that individuals falling into one of the aforementioned categories enjoy, whether they be British citizens whose contributions have been paid in an EU Member State, or citizens of an EU Member State whose contributions have been paid in the UK. The Withdrawal Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the European Union covers the cross-border situations in existence at the end of the transition period, which concluded on 31 December 2020. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU, Euratom, and the UK, which was signed on 30 December 2020, contains provisions regarding the coordination of social security systems between the parties to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, largely borrowing from the existing EU legislation on the matter, but also diverging from it in some aspects. This article will analyse the relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, those of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, as well as potential legislative changes concerning the coordination of social security systems.

The United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020. On 29 March 2017, the UK practically initiated formally the withdrawal procedure, in accordance with Article 50 TEU, informing the European Council of its intention to leave the European Union. In less than three years, the UK ratified the Withdrawal Agreement, with the purpose that the Agreement would enter into force on 31 January 2020 and, implicitly, produce legal effects. Of all the consequences of this withdrawal, naturally, we will focus on those which have legal implications, being however closely related to all the other effects, about which a lot has been written, and it certainly will be written in the years to come.

Withdrawing from an organization through an orderly negotiation process would appear as a particularly unproblematic form of leaving international institutions. However, the example of Brexit shows that negotiated dissociations have significant potential to adversely affect relations between exiting and remaining states. This study, which contributes to a forum on the impact of dissociation processes on post-withdrawal relations, argues that the management of conflict during the Brexit process had profound implications for relations between the United Kingdom and European Union member states. The negotiations on the Northern Ireland Protocol were marked by increasingly fundamental accusations against each other regarding (non)compliance with basic norms of international conduct. This led to a deterioration of relations and eventually – despite the avoidance of full escalation – to deadlock when implementation problems arose. To demonstrate this and explore the particular features of negotiated dissociations, the study examines three episodes of conflict: the disputes over ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, over the Internal Market Bill, and over implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit raises a whole range of legal issues in multiple areas. The consequences on the EU framework for jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments are of particular interest for private parties involved in cross-border commercial agreements. This paper explores the legal basis for the jurisdiction of courts and the enforcement and recognition of judgments between the UK and EU-27 courts after Brexit. In addition, it broadly contrasts the main differences of the proposed solutions compared to the EU system. The paper argues that international conventions can provide answers to some of the questions as they set out rules for the jurisdiction, enforcement and recognition of judgments. However, there are factors that can have an impact on possible legal outcomes, such as the framework of the future deal between the UK and the EU-27, the moment of the commencement of proceedings by the parties in the transition period, or the fact that the parties did not opt for exclusive jurisdiction in their agreements. The Withdrawal Agreement provides for some clarity on which EU law provisions apply during the transition period. In addition, the EC Notices and the UK Brexit legislation provide for guidelines as to the rules applicable in and immediately after the transition period. Nevertheless, as the paper analyses, there is still a need for further clarification. Therefore, other methods of dispute resolution proposed in the article such as moving to arbitration instead of English court jurisdiction could provide legal certainty for private parties.

This article is about the United Kingdom’s withdrawal procedure from the European Union, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. It analyses the action of the political institutions involved in the withdrawal agreement negotiations, in particular, the constitutional dispute about the exit deal between the UK Government and the Parliament, as well as the way the European Union acted in the course of the whole procedure. Special attention will be given to the decisions delivered by the UK Supreme Court and by the European Court of Justice regarding the withdrawal procedure. The article aims to offer a new perspective, different from the prevailing accounts on the United Kingdom withdrawal negotiations, one that is based on a critical analysis of the attitudes of the main actors in the exit agreement, trying to apprehend their interaction during the whole process.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2019 4(3), 671-674 | Editorial | (Abstract) After 47 years of membership, the United Kingdom has left the European Union at the end of January 2020. But Brexit is far from being done. For anyone au courant with EU affairs, it is rather obvious that the hardest part of Brexit is yet to be delivered. The entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement is a watershed moment in the history of EU integration. The Withdrawal Agreement - which provides a legal framework for Brexit - regulates primarily the separation issues. It deals, inter alia, with the acquired rights of EU and UK migrating citizens, the UK contributions to the EU budget and future arrangement for Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it also serves as a foundation for the transitional period, keeping the UK outside of the EU institutional framework but inside of the Internal Market and all other EU policies. So, Brexit is not done yet; it is in progress. The end of transition is penciled in for 31 December 2020, with a possibility of a single extension, either for 1 or 2 years. So, what one can expect from the forthcoming negotiations? The Brexit spectacle has come to the end of Act 1. After a short interval, a way more dramatic Act 2 has begun. There is no detailed and comprehensive script, just a few sketches. Inevitably, it will be largely improvised.

The defeat of Theresa May's Withdrawal Agreement in the British Parliament is often ascribed to the prime minister's precarious situation in Parliament and her inability to negotiate a deal that satisfied domestic stakeholders. But the contradictions of Brexit were always going to produce a least‐worst agreement and patterns of support for the deal were largely invariant to changes in its contents. Drawing on the literature on ratification, this article sets out an alternative explanation for the demise of the Withdrawal Agreement. It argues that the government's ability to threaten MPs with a 'no deal' outcome placed the executive in a strong position following the referendum, and that the primary source of ratification failure was the breakdown of this ability over the course of the negotiations. This account helps us understand why the government was initially unwilling to seek the support of stakeholders outside of the Conservative Party for its Brexit proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article highlights the legal and procedural restrictions a Member States faces during its withdrawal from the EU and subsequent talks on a future trade relationship by analyzing the unprecedented case of the UK. One such restriction consists of an obligation to negotiate withdrawal as a result of the principle of sincere cooperation. Other limits derive from the withdrawal process itself, designed as it was by the European institutions on the basis of a very scant Article 50 TEU. By then comparing the three substantive pillars of the EU-UK WA—citizens' rights, the financial settlement, and the Irish border— with the UK's initial negotiating red lines, I offer two conclusions: That the aforementioned constraints on the withdrawing state can significantly weaken the defense of its interests during its withdrawal process and that having to agree to important issues in a first and separate stage of "orderly withdrawal" talks also diminishes the state's bargaining power with regards to the next stage of negotiating a future partnership with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a general understanding of the main aspects of mobility (no longer referred to as free movement) and social security coordination, in the Brexit international agreements that govern the relationship of the EU with the United Kingdom: the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The article shows that both topics, mobility (or migration) and social security coordination, were relevant to the origins of Brexit. Before analysing both Brexit Agreements, the article gives a comparative overview of them, considering their principal features and their relationship. The article then analyses the mobility and coordination of social security in each agreement from a practical perspective, giving examples and highlighting the significant differences in coverage that they generate for the different citizens included in their personal scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides analysis of the most prominent legal issues arising as a consequence of a voluntary withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union pursuant to Article 50 TEU. Particular attention is given to the aspects which have not been explicitly regulated, as well as to those that remain unclear due to the complex wording of Article 50 TEU. Following the introduction, the first section focuses on the termination of application of EU law. The second section provides a more detailed insight into the consequences of the voluntary withdrawal on the issues related to the EU citizenship. The next section elaborates on the legal framework for establishing relations between the withdrawing state and the EU under international law. Finally, the last section of the paper analyzes the consequences for the position of the withdrawing state vis-à-vis international organizations and under international law in general.

The article analyzes the updated agreement on the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, as well as the concessions that the parties made to achieve it. The possibility of revising the agreement was not provided for by EU leaders for a long time, however, the election of a new British prime minister and his tough stance regarding the country's withdrawal from the Union, as well as the real prospects of withdrawing without a deal, pushed the EU to new negotiations. It was the revision of the agreement that became the main concession on the part of the EU. In addition, Boris Johnson achieved the abolition of the backstop mechanism and the customs union with the EU. For his part, he complied with the requirements of the European Union to keep the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland transparent and to maintain the existing inter Irish cooperation. However, the price paid for this is very high - transferring the inevitable customs border to the Irish Sea and preserving some of the EU rules in Northern Ireland. Thus, in the normative plan, the region will be separated from the rest of the United Kingdom, which may have serious consequences in the future. The presence of an updated exit agreement and a slightly modified Political Declaration made it possible for Johnson to submit documents for new approval in the House of Commons, and the next postponement of the exit granted by the European Union to achieve holding early elections in the country. In this way, the European Union and the United Kingdom made serious concessions to break the brexit process.

The first half of 2019 finds the European Union facing two challenges: the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union is held by Romania, one of the newest members of the organisation, while the United Kingdom prepares to withdraw, after being the first state to invoke, in March 2017, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. Romania assumes this position of great responsibility for the first time since its accession to the EU and finds itself confronted with a task that has raised problems even for other, more experienced, states that have held the Presidency of the Council after the UK notified the EU of its intention to leave. Moreover, March 2019 marks the end of the two-year term provided by Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union for the enforcement of a withdrawal agreement, placing Romania as President of the Council of the EU at the moment when the UK would be expected to officially lose its status as a Member State, unless an extension is agreed upon by the European Council and the UK. In this context, it is important to take note of the progress made in the matter of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, to identify the legal means the Presidency of the Council has at its disposal to ensure that a satisfying solution is reached and to analyse the role that the Romanian Presidency, specifically, plays in this process.

Copyright of e-Revista Internacional de la Protección Social is the property of e-Revista Internacional de la Proteccion Social and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Withdrawal Agreement protects most of the rights of nationals of the United Kingdom who came to work or retire in Spain before the end of 2020. Since 1 January 2021, British nationals are now subject to the more demanding Spanish rules governing immigration of thirdcountry nationals. This article seeks to highlight the position of British nationals and their families under the clauses of the Withdrawal Agreement - their rights to reside, work, healthcare and pensions - as well as the bilateral treaty between Spain and the United Kingdom that allows each other's nationals to vote in local elections in their country of residence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the provisions in the withdrawal agreement regarding the coordination of the social security schemes of the United Kingdom and the Member States after Brexit. The UK's withdrawal from the EU raises numerous questions about the consequences for the social security rights, including access to health care, of persons who find themselves in a cross-border situation between the UK and the EU27. The detailed provisions in the agreement concern, in the first place, the arrangements during the transition period, which ends on 31 December 2020. They also establish the rights of persons who are in a cross-border situation between the UK and a Member State at the end of this transition period. Furthermore, the agreement includes rules for persons who have been in such a situation in the past. These provisions are formulated in a complicated manner and will undoubtedly give rise to problems of interpretation and implementation for many decades to come. This article tries to clarify the basic content of this part of the withdrawal agreement, including the arrangements on administrative cooperation, monitoring and enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 23 June 2016 almost 17.5 million citizens of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. The UK government invoked the relevant Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on 29 March 2017. As authors of the said provision have admitted, it was never to be used (Fabbrini, 2017). And yet here we all are/were (depending on when you are reading it), anno domini 2020, witnessing an unprecedented event of a sovereign state “taking back control” i.e. leaving in great pain the most powerful economic and political union of sovereign states ever established, taking advantage of the procedure that had initially not only been de iure impossible, but also seemed inconceivable in and of itself. According to Theresa May, “Brexit means Brexit”. Little help did that tautological definition bring anyone. And yet, after Brexit came, the transition period started. Written in the middle of the said transition period, the purpose of this paper is to briefly treat on Brexit in general and the near-term future related thereto. In addition, also considering the timing of this paper, i.e. May / June 2020, a particular regard will be paid to the more distant future ahead of us – certain matters pertaining to international commercial dispute resolution after Brexit. Considering the overall uncertainty surrounding Brexit that we find ourselves in, the relevance of the topic discussed in the paper is unquestionable. In addition, relevance-wise, one could consider whether the process we are all witnessing could result in encouraging or, rather, discouraging any similar future initiatives. In this context, a broader perspective will be utilised to come to certain indicative conclusions as to whether Brexit can result in good know-how practices learned for future similar initiatives, or rather serve as an example for “never again”.

The article deals with the issue of ensuring the rights of EU citizens living in the UK and Britons living in the EU countries after Brexit. On the basis of official documents of the European Union and the UK the author reveals the differences that await EU citizens in the event of the country's withdrawal with or without an agreement. In the first case, EU citizens residing in the UK must obtain rights that are almost identical to those they would have within the country's current EU membership. In the second case, while maintaining a significant amount of rights, the British government intends to limit the timing of their receipt and therefore the number of potential applicants. The principle of reciprocity is likely to be applied to British citizens in the European Union

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2018 3(3), 1333-1352 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. EU citizens and their family members: "autonomous" vs. "derived" residence rights. - III. Residence rights enjoyed by EU citizens as inalienable rights? - III.1. Residence rights of UK nationals and their family members in the EU27. - III.2. Residence rights of EU27 citizens and their family members in the UK. - III.3. Intermediary conclusion. - IV. Brexit and residence rights: an essential issue for any negotiated solution. - IV.1. Changing citizenship statuses at the EU level. - IV.2. Preserving residence rights for EU27 citizens/UK nationals and their family members. - V. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) One of the fundamental pillars of the European Union is the right of EU citizens and their family members to move freely between and reside in the different EU member States. In recent case law, the Court of Justice has made it abundantly clear that EU citizens derive these rights directly from their EU citizenship status, whereas their family members have only "derived" residence rights, which are dependent on the EU citizen having exercised his freedom of movement. The impact of Brexit on the free movement of persons between the UK and the remaining EU Member States has remained one of the most controversial and politically sensitive issues ever since the British people voted to leave the EU. This Article tries to shed some light on the legal arguments underlying this debate. On the one hand, it provides an overview of a number of arguments deriving from EU law or international law on the basis of which, according to some scholars, EU citizens and their family members would continue to enjoy the residence rights attached to citizenship after Brexit. On the other hand, it will analyse a number of legal principles which would, according to some scholars, have to be respected by any withdrawal agreement between the EU27 and the UK and which, arguably, provide a basis for continued residence rights after Brexit.

Globalisation has not only increased international competition but also led to an increasingly more integrated and evolving legal system. On 23 June 2016, 52 percent of British voters opted to leave the European Union in the hope of ‘regaining their freedom’. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has triggered an important political crisis at the same time as raising various questions as to the implications of such a withdrawal. This referendum leaves much uncertainty about the future in many areas, such as competition. Brexit raises particular problems for competition policy and law because of the influence of the European Commission in this field. Indeed, the Commission is the major direct actor, while the national authorities mainly operate within the European framework. Many authors have argued that the implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union depend on the type of agreement that is secured by the UK. However, this article argues that whatever the type of agreement the UK strikes with the EU, EU competition law will still play a predominant role.

Negotiations on the terms of the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union lasted more than a year and a half. Both sides made concessions to achieve the desired result. As expected, the European Union was able to meet almost all of its requirements, and Britain had to retreat from part of its original requirements. However, the agreed text has caused discontent in the British political community. As a result, the prospects for its ratification in the House of Commons remain very vague. Refusal to ratify threatens political chaos for the UK and a possible exit «without a deal» which objectively does not meet the interests of the parties

Copyright of Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nisu is the property of Law Faculty in Nis and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

UK withdrawal from the EU - Brexit - poses particular challenges for Northern Ireland notably concerning its essentially invisible border with Ireland, an important feature of the peace process. With the EU having committed to finding 'flexible and imaginative solutions' during the withdrawal negotiations to address the 'unique circumstances on the island of Ireland', the UK and the EU agreed differentiated withdrawal terms in a dedicated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. These effectively keep Northern Ireland in the EU customs territory and, through a process of dynamic regulatory alignment, its internal market for goods. A unique but contested status - a 'place between' in the UK-EU relationship - has thus been conferred on Northern Ireland. The Protocol has some important shortcomings and implementation poses significant challenges yet also offers opportunities. How the challenges are met will play an important role in determining whether in 2024 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly vote to retain these arrangements. If they do not, politicians and officials will once again be faced with the question of how to avoid a physical hardening of the border on the island of Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the absence of agreed institutional arrangements for the post-Brexit EU-UK relationship the present contribution explores whether guidance can be found for the institutional dimension of their future relationship in a number of other documents and principles. We will, first of all, examine the institutional framework laid down in the 'Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, done at Brussels and London on 24 January 2020', and its implementation. Second, we will uncover some aspects of the future institutional relationship based on the 'Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom' of 17 October 2019, which was adopted by the EU and the UK in parallel with the Withdrawal Agreement. Third, we will explore how the Commission sees that relationship based on its March 2020 draft text. Fourth, we will discuss at a meta level the principles which will in any event govern the institutional side of the future relationship, in particular the principle of good faith. Some brief concluding remarks round up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the status of jobseeker in Directive 2004/38 that is aimed to simplify and strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens. Unlike the categories of economically active and inactive persons, Directive 2004/38 employs a somewhat piecemeal approach towards setting out the status of jobseekers. It is submitted that this leads to much uncertainty over their residence rights and raises the prospect of divergent national implementation measures, leaving much leeway for the adoption of stringent approaches. While this is manifested itself, for instance, in the UK's policy towards Union jobseekers, it is also particularly salient within the framework of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement that authorises a constitutive approach to post-Brexit residence status, which is shown to carry a greater risk for UK nationals residing in EU Member States. Both instances are argued to further substantiate the need for a more systematic approach towards the outline of the status of jobseeker in Directive 2004/38, though the introduction of any legislative change may not currently be politically viable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about the United Kingdom’s withdrawal procedure from the European Union, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. It analyses the action of the political institutions involved in the withdrawal agreement negotiations, in particular, the constitutional dispute about the exit deal between the UK Government and the Parliament, as well as the way the European Union acted in the course of the whole procedure. Special attention will be given to the decisions delivered by the UK Supreme Court and by the European Court of Justice regarding the withdrawal procedure. The article aims to offer a new perspective, different from the prevailing accounts on the United Kingdom withdrawal negotiations, one that is based on a critical analysis of the attitudes of the main actors in the exit agreement, trying to apprehend their interaction during the whole process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the United Kingdom's negotiating position on the revision of the EU Coordinating Regulations proposed by the European Commission in December 2016, in the context of Brexit and the negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement. The Withdrawal Agreement contains provisions on the future coordination of social security for UK and EU nationals who have exercised their freedom of movement rights before the end of the transition period. The coordination envisaged by the Withdrawal Agreement has not been sealed at the point of the UK's departure but will continue to evolve and incorporate future changes in the EU Coordinating Regulations, including the reforms contained in the Commission's current legislative proposal. The UK had a seat at the negotiating table until it left the European Union on 31 January 2020, which it used to try to influence the reform of the Coordinating Regulations to reflect its future interests. The article finds that, while the UK participated in negotiating the current revision of the Coordinating Regulations and several of the revisions are in line with its aims, its influence is waning as the UK moves from being a rule maker to a rule taker in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With echoes of the dividing lines of the United Kingdom's 2016 referendum, a majority of voters in Northern Ireland supported pro-Remain candidates in the 2019 European Parliament election. However, whereas the results in many parts of the UK reflected a highly polarised electorate, voters in Northern Ireland appeared more receptive to compromise: a majority of their newly elected MEPs expressed support for the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by the UK government with the EU – the only constituency in the UK where this was the case. The comfortable re-election of Diane Dodds and Martina Anderson affirmed the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin as the dominant unionist and nationalist parties respectively. However, a surge in support for the Alliance Party, which saw Naomi Long win a seat at the expense of the Ulster Unionist Party, marked a notable shift towards the ethno-national centre-ground: one in five first preference votes went to a candidate aligned with neither nationalism nor unionism. This report contextualises the election campaign and considers the implications of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2017 2(3), 845-862 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Art. 50 TEU: does it provide for a transitional arrangement? - III. Art. 50 TEU as a transition. - IV. Tailor-made transitional arrangement. - IV.1. Introduction. - IV.2. Where to regulate a transitional arrangement? - IV.3. Institutional and substantive aspects of a tailor-made transitional arrangement. - V. Conclusions. | (Abstract) With the imminent closure of the first part of Brexit negotiations, the EU and the UK are shifting the centre of gravity from discussions about the termination of membership to the future arrangements. Anyone au courant with EU affairs is aware that what is left of the two-year period laid down in Art. 50 TEU will not be enough to negotiate, to sign and to ratify a future trade agreement. This is one of the reasons why both sides have recently engaged in discussions about a transitional period. As this Article proves, this is idea has merits, yet it will be hard to accomplish a plausible solution. Arguably, it may be more beneficial, and less problematic, to extend the two-year period instead.

European regional integration seemed to be unstoppable and unbreakable despite the many political and economic crises it navigated since the 70s, and more recently in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Yet, for the first time in its history, the UK, one of its largest and most politically and economically powerful and influential Member States, took the extraordinary decision in 2016 to leave the European Union. Following an explanation of the Brexit process, two fundamental issues are addressed, namely whether Brexit was predictable and inevitable, and the potential consequences of a no-deal Brexit.

Since 2010, free movement of EU citizens to the UK has become one of the most politicized issues in the UK, with a special focus on the so-called welfare tourism. Migration has turned from a matter of some concern to a source of instability, with migrants labelled as cultural and security threats. Thus, immigration was one of the most emotive, most contentious issues of the Brexit referendum campaign in 2016, and reached so many controversies, such as Farage's infamous poster, urging the British citizens to take back control of borders. The article aims to briefly reveal UK's short history of migration, then the focus will move on the withdrawal agreement and its impact on migration and the risks associated with a no deal scenario. The changes induced by Brexit into the migration and mobility processes are diverse, therefore, the objective of the Withdrawal Agreement is to limit to a minimum the disruption to people's lives which the UK's departure might cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an attempt to determine the significance of Brexit, I analyse both the internal (national) and international consequences of Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May's ongoing attempts at negotiating the United Kingdom's (UK's) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). At the time of writing this article (May 2019), it has become clear that Brexit is a foreignpolicy issue for the rest of Europe. In London, however, it revolves primarily around a battle for domestic power and the survival of the UK as a political unit. Seldom before has the impact of domestic affairs on foreign affairs been so vividly demonstrated as in the case of political divisions in the UK driving foreign-policy positions on Brexit and, in particular, PM May's hard line position with respect to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Because of this fixation on and preoccupation with the ECJ the UK views many of its position points through this ECJ-prism. The issue of the Irish border touches the soul of the UK. The continuation of its four united entities is at stake. As are peace arrangements that have lasted now for more than 30 years. Of all the remaining EU countries the Republic of Ireland (RI) will experience the consequences of Brexit the most - in whatever shape or form it materialises. The emergence of the Irish backstop border issue as a deal breaker during the parliamentary debates on Brexit in the latter part of 2018 caused havoc. In the final analysis Brexit is not just about tariffs or trade and their consequences: it is about history, and making sure it is not repeated. This is a real concern. The backstop was an attempt to avoid renewed instability in Northern Ireland (NI) and is an effort to avoid a hard border between the RI and NI. Opponents argue that it could keep the UK trapped in the EU's customs union and keep the UK enmeshed in the EU. The siren call of the Brexit campaign was for the UK to "take back control". It was stubbornly determined to regain its distinctive identity in the world, how it chooses to proceed in the world and to formulate a previously untested approach. To achieve that PM May adopted a hard line approach to Brexit. She drew red lines and endorsed previous ones. Each one of them - and the one on the ECJ in particular - was incompatible with the relationship between the UK and the EU. But, she drew them nevertheless. More so in an effort to appease the anti- EU wing of her party. Brexiteers mobilised around the slogan of regaining control which then became a policy objective. Three years later nobody was in control. The failure to take back control was due to the PM failing to take and keep control. With her laid down contradictory red lines, breaking them was inevitable. Removing the UK from the purview of the ECJ is a delicate and sensitive issue with questions being raised over whether the UK can totally sever all ties with the Court without harming relations with the EU. The reasons why any future relationship with the EU will be nearly impossible without the Court are equally numerous. Whatever position the UK adopted it would not escape ECJ-related consequences. Considered from PM May's hard line standpoint on the Court it was a fact that she could hardly bear to contemplate. The EU has one common purpose. Foremost, it was determined to ensure that its Court continues to be the protector of all that have been created by the Union for the well-being of its Member States and their citizens, whether the negotiations with the UK succeeded or failed. European integration has brought peace and prosperity to Europe and allowed for an unprecedented level of cooperation on matters of common interest in a rapidly changing world. For the EU economic and political integration are intertwined and have been advanced and enhanced by the ECJ. PM May's red line on the ECJ overshadowed the negotiations and caused her headaches both internally and with the EU. Her negotiations with the EU on this issue and other crucial matters required patience, diplomatic ability and skill, together with an in depth understanding of the workings of all the EU institutions. The UK displayed no sign of any of these qualities. The Withdrawal Agreement, which PM May negotiated would be legally binding once it was approved by the UK Parliament and EU Members and ratified by the EU Parliament. It will thereafter govern the terms of the UK's departure from the EU. Its draft provisions include a transition period ending on 31 December 2020. Coupled with this Agreement is the nonbinding Political Declaration. It details the UK's longer-term relationship with the EU. It envisages an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership. On Brexit the EU stands united as never before; the UK is regarded simply as a divisive entity. To exarcerbate matters, the UK government consistently underestimated the EU's resolve to stay united. Furthermore, it tried and failed dismally to drive a wedge between Member States and the EU Commission. Its Ministers misled themselves and the public in the UK into believing that the continentals would cave in because of their trade surplus with the UK. Ministers were either not briefed or ignored briefings on critical core features of the EU that conditioned the latter's approach and drove its ambition to stay united and speak with one voice. Seldom before have 27 States acted in such unison. By contrast, divisiveness characterised the UK's performance. UK officials knew right from the start that a leaving state was required to accept the EU position as the basis for the talks. In the Brexit talks, it was 27 to one. But their Ministers and not least of all their PM gave the impression that the UK had equal political weight to the EU in the negotiations. They minimised the difficulties. They implied the talks would be a walkover. When reality dawned, they accused the EU of stubbornness and unwillingness to cooperate. They questioned the good faith of their EU interlocutors. When they were not doing that they cried victory after every encounter with the EU negotiators. It would serve the UK well to approach the new round of negotiations with a new frame of mind so as to give substance to a future relationship with the EU. One that would treat their European counterparts as worthy negotiating partners and not as foil for use in domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]