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An essay is presented on the constitutionalism attached to the U.S. Senate. It discusses the Senate's complex constitutional identity and informs that the Senate adopted its first version of a rule for cloture in 1917. It mentions that concept of deliberation has been distorted or abused in service of Senate mythology. It states that a supermajority cloture is controversial because of its unilateral alteration of the distribution of power within the Senate.

The article focuses on the Federalist Papers' theory of institutional power in the United States. It mentions that public views institutional power as the dynamic relationship between and among formal constitutional powers, institutional organization, and constituency. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses in the theory. It adds that the theory relates with American political science to study each institution separately instead of as a system.

The article presents a study which examines the origins and intent behind staggered elections in the U.S. Senate. The sole constitutional basis for the idea of a continuing body is through Senate rotation or staggered terms, which generated the concept of continuing body through textual and physical reality. The structure and power of the Senate, and how the origins and purpose contradict the wisdom of staggered terms and their role in supporting the continuing body doctrine is also examined.

The article discusses a study of the military policy as a field of public policy in the American comparative politics. It states the myriad approaches to and debates on the formation of military policy as depicted in the review of the full spectrum of contributions in the theories of the policy process. It also mentions that public policy and theories of public policy studies are commanded by economic regulation, welfare and agriculture.

This article argues that disparate strands of analysis should be comined to offer a more accurate characterization of congressional behavior in the U.S. national security policy arena. Particular focus is given to the dynamics of national security policy during the administration of President George W. Bush. It cites party competition, the nature of the issues involved and the structure of the separation of powers as factors influencing bias in the system that tends to favor militaristic policies.

This paper examines the early institutionalization of the Senate. Working forward from the contradictory political expectations and constitutional uncertainties surrounding the Senate, I seek to show when and how these ambiguities and contingencies were resolved. The goal is not to discover when the Senate first developed its modern forms but to see how the operations of the early national government clarified or eliminated the most significant constitutional and political uncertainties about the place and purpose of the Senate in the new system. This paper concentrates on the Senate's relationship with the House and the presidency and how the Senate dealt with the constitutional ambiguities surrounding the separation of powers and bicameralism. The Senate was an institution poised somewhat ambiguously between the executive and the House, and the early years of the Senate in action rapidly eliminated most of that uncertainty. The actual Senate would be less dramatic in form and function than either the hopes of its creators and advocates or the fears of its detractors. By 1796, before the end of Washington’s presidency, the fundamental elements of the Senate in action had been arranged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]