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Our analysis of data from a nationally representative survey of adults shows that beliefs in whether the January 6th insurrection was justifiable and whether it required investigation through the creation of the U.S. House Select Committee are inexorably steeped in affective partisanship and racial resentment. It is easy to attribute the insurrection to partisan machinations, but evidence shows that racial resentment is the dominant explanation: this includes the fact that allegations of election fraud were centered on districts with large African American and Latino populations; that many of the insurrectionists were white nationalists, racists, and members of radical right-wing groups; and that a large proportion of the electorate had voted to retain a president who fueled whites’ sense of victimization by African Americans and other minorities. We argue that reactions to the legitimacy of the January 6th insurrection have become an example of how racial resentment fuels affective partisanship.

Abstract Americans’ trust in government is lower than ever. However, while all groups have seen a decline in trust since the 1960s, the gap in trust between racial and ethnic minorities and Whites in this period has varied not only in size but also in direction. At times, racial and ethnic minorities have actually had higher rates of trust than Whites, contradicting the broad assumptions in research about race and political trust. Explanations of the causes of trust in government that emphasize institutional experience and early socialization would not predict this outcome. We propose that an underutilized component in the study of race and political trust is perceived justice. On one hand, racial and ethnic minorities’ sensitivity to institutional injustice often leads to lower rates of trust. On the other hand, when racial and ethnic minorities perceive there are greater opportunities for racial progress, which signal that widespread harm can be repaired, their political trust tends to increase, sometimes to levels that exceed those for Whites. The interplay between political realities that shape perceived justice as well as political hope for racial progress likely creates the variable longitudinal patterns of racial and ethnic differences in trust.

This study examines how members of the public frame artificial intelligence (AI) along with how news use predicts “frames in mind” for AI. The study also tests whether news use, science fiction viewing, and discussing technology influence attitudes toward AI independently and in conjunction with one another. The analyses use data from a nationally representative online panel survey. Respondents invoked social progress and Pandora’s box frames for AI, and technology news use predicted mentioning each frame. Use of technology news also predicted change in support for AI, while science fiction viewing and discussing technology were conditionally related to such change.

Abstract Racial reckoning in response to racial injustice has compelled individuals, organizations, and institutions to acknowledge and adopt policies that actively challenge racial injustice. A central tenet of this era of reckoning is that it is no longer acceptable to ignore racist behaviors and expressions. To the extent that active opposition to racial prejudice is an effective strategy for individuals to pursue, we examine individual inclinations to act on matters of racial prejudice. We argue that in spite of best intentions, the motivation to act against racism, what we call “antiracism action orientation,” can be disrupted by system-justifying beliefs that raise questions about deservingness, legitimize the status quo, and therefore defend inaction. Survey data from the 2020 Congressional Election Study show that antiracism action orientation is strongest among African Americans, and those with more positive affect toward racial-ethnic minorities, and supporters of change. Among Whites, racial resentment dominates the motivations for antiracism to the point that typical political allies like Democrats, liberals, and those who acknowledge White privilege reduce their antiracism action orientation to lower levels than Republicans, conservatives, and deniers of White privilege. We conclude that most Americans, but especially Whites, have a high bar for change, making racism an ongoing American dilemma because of both racial attitudes and the costs of change.

Background While it is known that the majority of pages on the World Wide Web are in English, little is known about the preferred language of users searching for health information online. Objectives (1) To help global and domestic publishers, for example health and food agencies, to determine the need for translation of online information from English into local languages. (2) To help these agencies determine which language(s) they should select when publishing information online in target nations and for target subpopulations within nations. Methods To estimate the percentage of Web publishers that translate their health and food websites, we measured the frequency at which domain names retrieved by Google overlap for language translations of the same health-related search term. To quantify language choice of searchers from different countries, Google provided estimates of the rate at which its search engine was queried in six languages relative to English for the terms “avian flu,” “tuberculosis,” “schizophrenia,” and “maize” (corn) from January 2004 to April 2006. The estimate was based on a 20% sample of all Google queries from 227 nations. Results We estimate that 80%-90% of health- and food-related institutions do not translate their websites into multiple languages, even when the information concerns pandemic disease such as avian influenza. Although Internet users are often well-educated, there was a strong preference for searching for health and food information in the local language, rather than English. For “avian flu,” we found that only 1% of searches in non-English-speaking nations were in English, whereas for “tuberculosis” or “schizophrenia,” about 4%-40% of searches in non-English countries employed English. A subset of searches for health information presumably originating from immigrants occurred in their native tongue, not the language of the adopted country. However, Spanish-language online searches for “avian flu,” “schizophrenia,” and “maize/corn” in the United States occurred at only

This research note examines how framing influences attitudes toward artificial intelligence (AI). It uses an experiment embedded in a nationally representative online survey to test the effects of text-based frames and visuals on opinion about developing, funding, and banning AI. Participants exposed to a “social progress” frame reported greater support for AI than those exposed to a “Pandora’s box” frame. Images (virtual assistants, personal robots, menacing movie AIs, or none) did not influence opinion by themselves but interacted with textual frames to do so. The results extend our understanding of framing effects on public attitudes toward emerging technologies.

AbstractThis essay posits that justice is the core value epitomizing our moment. Justice is violated when positive outcomes are undeserved, and the felt sense of injustice motivates a need for retribution. Because politics involves allocation (distribution and redistribution), deservingness is a core appraisal of “who gets what” and therefore justice is fundamental for politics. This is especially germane to race, ethnicity, and politics scholars. I present a few core tenets of justice theory, and argue that political science can take advantage of the moment to engage the concept of justice; especially as it relates to the study of racial attitudes and the identification of racial enablers—those ostensible non-racists who facilitate the status quo. Summarily, I propose that justice can unify debates over prejudice and politics, and advance our scholarly understanding of how well-intentioned people—regardless of their identities, or ideological or partisan labels—can facilitate racism, racial inequality, and injustice.

Numbers do matter; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)'s 2010 data that the waste sector is responsible for just 3% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has led to the misperception that solid waste management (SWM) has little to contribute to climate mitigation. Global efforts to control methane emissions and divert organic waste from landfills had already reduced direct emissions. But end-of-pipe SWM has also been evolving into more circular waste and resource management, with indirect GHG savings from the 3Rs (reduce, reuse, recycle) which IPCC accounts for elsewhere in the economy. The evidence compiled here on both direct emissions and indirect savings demonstrates with high confidence that better waste and resource management can make a significant contribution to climate mitigation, and must form a core part of every country's nationally determined contribution. Even the most advanced countries can still achieve much from the 3Rs. In the Global South, the challenge of extending waste collection to all and stopping open dumping and burning (sustainable development goal 11.6.1), essential to improve public health, can be turned into a huge opportunity. Moving early to divert waste from landfill by separation at source and collecting clean organic and dry recycling fractions, will mitigate global GHG emissions, slash ocean plastics and create decent livelihoods. But this can only happen with targeted climate, plastics and extended producer responsibility finance; and help to local communities to help themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intermediate sized earthquakes (≈M4-6.5) are often measured using the teleseismic body-wave magnitude (mb). mb measurements are especially critical at the lower end of this range when teleseismic waveform modeling techniques (i.e., moment tensor analysis) are difficult. The U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) determines the location and magnitude of all M 5 and greater earthquakes worldwide within 20 min of the rupture time, and therefore accurate magnitude estimates are essential to fulfill its mission. To better understand how network geometry and noise levels affect the global response capabilities, we developed a method to spatially estimate the minimum measurable mb. To do this, we compare expected mb amplitudes at every station to the station's background noise level. We find that using NEIC's current network geometry and these idealized thresholds, NEIC can potentially estimate mb magnitudes down to M 4.5 globally. Low-latitude regions in the Southern Hemisphere present the biggest opportunity to improve monitoring capabilities. However, logistically they also present the biggest hurdles for network operators. Finally, to test the resiliency of the network we removed the 20 most important stations and found the mb threshold remains mb 4.5. However, the region where only mb 4.5 and greater can be estimated increases and is again restricted to the Southern Hemisphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]