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In the present work, we set out to assess whether and how much people learn in response to their stereotypic assumptions being confirmed, being disconfirmed, or remaining untested. In Study 1, participants made a series of judgments that could be influenced by stereotypes and received feedback that confirmed stereotypes the majority of the time, feedback that disconfirmed stereotypes the majority of the time, or no feedback on their judgments. Replicating past work on confirmation bias, patterns in the conditions with feedback indicated that pieces of stereotype-confirming evidence exerted more influence than stereotype-disconfirming evidence. Participants in the Stereotype-Confirming condition stereotyped more over time, but rates of stereotyping for participants in the Stereotype-Disconfirming condition remained unchanged. Participants who received no feedback, and thus no evidence, stereotyped more over time, indicating that, matching our core hypothesis, they learned from their own untested assumptions. Study 2 provided a direct replication of Study 1. In Study 3, we extended our assessment to memory. Participants made judgments and received a mix of confirmatory, disconfirmatory, and no feedback and were subsequently asked to remember the feedback they received on each trial, if any. Memory tests for the no feedback trials revealed that participants often misremembered that their untested assumptions were confirmed. Supplementing null hypothesis significance testing, Bayes Factor analyses indicated the data in Studies 1, 2, and 3 provided moderate-to-extreme evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Discussion focuses on the challenges these learning patterns create for efforts to reduce stereotyping.

Smiles are nonverbal signals that convey social information and influence the social behavior of recipients, but the precise form and social function of a smile can be variable. In previous work, we have proposed that there are at least three physically distinct types of smiles associated with specific social functions: reward smiles signal positive affect and reinforce desired behavior; affiliation smiles signal non-threat and promote peaceful social interactions; dominance smiles signal feelings of superiority and are used to negotiate status hierarchies. The present work advances the science of the smile by addressing a number of questions that directly arise from this smile typology. What do perceivers

Smiles are nonverbal signals that convey social information and influence the social behavior of recipients, but the precise form and social function of a smile can be variable. In previous work, we have proposed that there are at least three physically distinct types of smiles associated with specific social functions: reward smiles signal positive affect and reinforce desired behavior, affiliation smiles signal non-threat and promote peaceful social interactions, dominance smiles signal feelings of superiority and are used to negotiate status hierarchies. The present work advances the science of the smile by addressing a number of questions that directly arise from this smile typology. What do perceivers think when they see each type of smile (study 1)? How do perceivers behave in response to each type of smile (study 2)? Do people produce three physically distinct smiles in response to contexts related to each of the three social functions of smiles (study 3)? We then use an online machine learning platform to uncover the labels that lay people use to conceptualize the smile of affiliation, which is a smile that serves its social function but lacks a corresponding lay concept. Taken together, the present findings support the conclusion that reward, affiliation, and dominance smiles are distinct signals with specific social functions. These findings challenge the traditional assumption that smiles merely convey whether and to what extent a smiler is happy and demonstrate the utility of a social–functional approach to the study of facial expression.

Although individual-level bias confrontations have received considerable empirical attention, most group-based training confrontations (e.g., “diversity trainings”) are neither evidence-based nor rigorously assessed. In this chapter, we discuss the prejudice habit-breaking intervention, which is evidence-based like individual-level approaches, but, like group-based trainings, is not focused on responding to a particular instance of bias in the moment. Specifically, this training intervention helps egalitarian people to become (1) aware of, (2) concerned about, and (3) motivated to address their vulnerability to unintentional biases. The intervention teaches people that unintentional biases are like bad habits that can be overcome through sustained effort over time and provides evidence-based strategies to reduce unintentional biases. Across several randomized-controlled studies, the prejudice habit-breaking intervention has shown considerable promise for empowering people to address biases within themselves and in the world around them, with long-lasting effects.

Many granting agencies allow reviewers to know the identity of a proposal's principal investigator (PI), which opens the possibility that reviewers discriminate on the basis of PI race and gender. We investigated this experimentally with 48 NIH R01 grant proposals, representing a broad range of NIH-funded science. We modified PI names to create separate white male, white female, black male and black female versions of each proposal, and 412 scientists each submitted initial reviews for 3 proposals. We find little to no race or gender bias in initial R01 evaluations, and additionally find that any bias that might have been present must be negligible in size. This conclusion was robust to a wide array of statistical model specifications. Pragmatically, important bias may be present in other aspects of the granting process, but our evidence suggests that it is not present in the initial round of R01 reviews.

Police officers are charged with protecting the public, and they must make difficult life-or-death decisions in tense circumstances. High-profile instances of officers shooting innocent Black people led to a flurry of shooter bias research, which examines how race influences split-second shooting decisions. We give an overview of the evidence in this literature to date, to evaluate the robustness of the evidence related to shooter bias and police officers. The extant experimental evidence from police officer samples is mixed, and does not allow us to make any strong inferences about the role of race in officers’ shooting decisions. We then discuss whether the questions asked by shooter bias research are even relevant to the decisions jurors must during cases of officer-involved shootings.

In recent years, several empirical studies have claimed to provide evidence in support of the popular folk notion that people possess “gaydar” that enables them to accurately identify who is gay or lesbian (Rule, Johnson, & Freeman, 2016). This conclusion is limited to artificial lab settings, however, and when translated to real-world settings this work itself provides evidence that people’s judgments about who is gay/lesbian are not pragmatically accurate. We also briefly review evidence related to the consequences of perpetuating the idea of gaydar (i.e., “the gaydar myth”). Although past claims about accurate orientation perception are misleading, the work that gave rise to those claims can nevertheless inform the literature in meaningful ways. We offer some recommendations for how the evidence in past “gaydar” research can be reappraised to inform our understanding of social perception and group similarities/differences.

Police officers make life-or-death shooting decisions in complex situations under extreme time pressure. If officers make a mistake, there are dire consequences—they could kill an innocent or be killed themselves. In contrast to prior work's near-exclusive focus on suspect race, the present study examined features of methodology, officers, suspects, and neighborhoods that may affect officers’ shooting decisions. Empirical exploration of officers’ shooting decisions and mistakes is still in its infancy, and given the seriousness and importance of this phenomenon—and the potential for this research to inform policy decisions—additional research is needed.

Contemporary prejudice research focuses primarily on people who are motivated to respond without prejudice and the ways in which unintentional bias can cause these people to act inconsistent with this motivation. However, some real-world phenomena (e.g., hate speech, hate crimes) and experimental findings (e.g., Plant & Devine, 2001; 2009) suggest that some expressions of prejudice are intentional. These phenomena and findings are difficult to explain solely from the motivations to respond without prejudice. We argue that some people are motivated to express prejudice, and we develop the motivation to express prejudice (MP) scale to measure this motivation. In seven studies involving more than 6,000 participants, we demonstrate that, across scale versions targeted at Black people and gay men, the MP scale has good reliability and convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. In normative climates that prohibit prejudice, the internal and external motivations to express prejudice are functionally non-independent, but they become more independent when normative climates permit more prejudice toward a target group. People high in the motivation to express prejudice are relatively likely to resist pressure to support programs promoting intergroup contact and vote for political candidates who support oppressive policies. The motivation to express prejudice predicted these outcomes even when controlling for attitudes and the motivations to respond without prejudice. This work encourages contemporary prejudice researchers to broaden the range of samples, target groups, and phenomena that they study, and more generally to consider the intentional aspects of negative intergroup behavior.

This project explores the impact of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign and the resulting high levels of exposure to a positive, counter-stereotypic Black exemplar, on prejudice and stereotyping among non-Black participants. We found dramatically decreased levels of implicit anti-Black prejudice and stereotyping as compared with bias observed previously at the same institutions and in the literature. Providing some insight why the bias was reduced, Study 1 demonstrated that participants had positive Black exemplars come to mind or anticipated that other people have positive exemplars come to mind when they thought of Black people and this was associated with low levels of racial prejudice. Our second study revealed that participants who had qualities strongly associated with Obama as a political figure (e.g., president) activated when they were primed with “Black” had lower levels of implicit prejudice. These findings indicate that the extensive exposure to Obama resulted in a drop in implicit bias.

In the present work, we investigate the pop cultural idea that people have a sixth sense called "gaydar," to detect who is gay. We propose that "gaydar" is an alternate label for using social stereotypes to infer orientation (e.g., inferring that fashionable men are gay). According to some recent work, however, people may possess a facial perception process that enables them to identify sexual orientation from the face (Rule et al., 2008). In the present 5 experiments, participants made gay-or-straight judgments about fictional targets that were constructed using experimentally-manipulated stereotypic cues, real gay/straight people's face cues, or combinations of stereotypic and face cues. This work reveals that orientation is not visible from the face—purportedly "face-based" gaydar arises from a third-variable confound. People do, however, readily infer orientation from stereotypes (e.g., fashion, career choice). Furthermore, the notion of gaydar serves as a legitimizing myth: Compared to a control group, people stereotyped more when led to believe in gaydar, whereas people stereotyped less when told gaydar is an alternate label for stereotyping. Discussion focuses on the implications of the gaydar myth and why, contrary to claims of some prior work, stereotypes are highly unlikely to result in accurate judgments about orientation.

Social psychologists fighting prejudice and clinical psychologists fighting depression have long been separated by the social–clinical divide, unaware that they were facing a common enemy. Stereotypes about others leading to prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989) and schemas about the self leading to depression (e.g., A. T. Beck, 1967) are fundamentally the same type of cognitive structure. According to the integrated perspective on prejudice and depression, negative stereotypes (i.e., schemas) are activated in a Source, who expresses prejudice toward the Target, causing the Target to experience depression. This linking of prejudice and depression (i.e., “comorbid” prejudice and depression) can occur at the societal level (e.g., Nazis’ prejudice causing Jews’ depression), the interpersonal level (e.g., an abuser’s prejudice causing an abusee’s depression), and the intrapersonal level (e.g., a person’s self-prejudice causing his or her depression). The integrated perspective addresses several longstanding paradoxes, controversies, and questions; generates new areas of inquiry; and spotlights specific methods and findings that have direct cross-disciplinary applications in the battle against prejudice and depression. Ironically, some interventions developed by depression researchers may be especially useful against prejudice, and some interventions developed by prejudice researchers may be especially useful against depression.

We advance a theory-driven approach to stereotype structure, informed by connectionist theories of cognition. Whereas traditional models define or tacitly assume that stereotypes possess inherently Group → Attribute activation directionality (e.g., Black activates criminal), our model predicts heterogeneous stereotype directionality. Alongside the classically studied Group → Attribute stereotypes, some stereotypes should be bidirectional (i.e., Group ⇄ Attribute) and others should have Attribute → Group unidirectionality (e.g., fashionable activates gay). We tested this prediction in several large-scale studies with human participants (NCombined = 4,817), assessing stereotypic inferences among various groups and attributes. Supporting predictions, we found heterogeneous directionality both among the stereotype links related to a given social group and also between the links of different social groups. These efforts yield rich datasets that map the networks of stereotype links related to several social groups. We make these datasets publicly available, enabling other researchers to explore a number of questions related to stereotypes and stereotyping. Stereotype directionality is an understudied feature of stereotypes and stereotyping with widespread implications for the development, measurement, maintenance, expression, and change of stereotypes, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.

In the present study, participants administered painful electric shocks to an unseen male opponent who was either explicitly labeled as gay or stereotypically implied to be gay. Identifying the opponent with a gay-stereotypic attribute produced a situation in which the target’s group status was privately inferred but plausibly deniable to others. To test the plausible deniability hypothesis, we examined aggression levels as a function of internal (personal) and external (social) motivation to respond without prejudice. Whether plausible deniability was present or absent, participants high in internal motivation aggressed at low levels, and participants low in both internal and external motivation aggressed at high levels. The behavior of participants low in internal and high in external motivation, however, depended on experimental condition. They aggressed at low levels when observers could plausibly attribute their behavior to prejudice and aggressed at high levels when the situation granted plausible deniability. This work has implications for both obstacles to and potential avenues for prejudice-reduction efforts.

We developed a multi-faceted prejudice habit-breaking intervention to produce long-term reductions in implicit race bias. The intervention is based on the premise that implicit bias is like a habit that can be reduced through a combination of awareness of implicit bias, concern about the effects of that bias, and the application of strategies to reduce bias. In a 12-week longitudinal study, people who received the intervention showed dramatic reductions in implicit race bias. People who were concerned about discrimination or who reported using the strategies showed the greatest reductions. The intervention also led to increases in concern about discrimination and personal awareness of bias over the duration of the study. People in the control group showed none of the above effects. Our results raise the hope of reducing persistent and unintentional forms of discrimination that arise from implicit bias.