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Since natural and triggered lightning are demonstrated hazards to launch vehicles, payloads, and spacecraft, NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) follow the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) for launches from Federal Ranges. The LLCC were developed to prevent future instances of a rocket intercepting natural lightning or triggering a lightning flash during launch from a Federal Range. NASA and DoD utilize the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) to establish and develop robust rationale from which the criteria originate. The rationale document also contains appendices that provide additional scientific background, including detailed descriptions of the theory and observations behind the rationales. The LLCC in whole or part are used across the globe due to the rigor of the documented criteria and associated rationale. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopted the LLCC in 2006 for commercial space transportation and the criteria were codified in the FAA's Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for Safety of an Expendable Launch Vehicle (Appendix G to 14 CFR Part 417, (G417)) and renamed Lightning Flight Commit Criteria in G417.

Since natural and artificially-initiated (or "triggered") lightning are demonstrated hazards to the launch of space vehicles, the American space program has responded by establishing a set of Lightning Flight Commit Criteria (LFCC), also known as Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC), and associated Definitions to mitigate the risk. The LLCC apply to all Federal Government ranges and similar LFCC have been adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration for application at state-operated and private spaceports. The LLCC and Definitions have been developed, reviewed, and approved over the years of the American space program, progressing from relatively simple rules in the mid-twentieth century (that were inadequate) to a complex suite for launch operations in the early 21st century. During this evolutionary process, a "Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP)" of top American scientists in the field of atmospheric electricity was established to guide it. Details of this process are provided in a companion document entitled "A History of the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory Panel for America s Space program" which is available as NASA Special Publication 2010-216283. As new knowledge and additional operational experience have been gained, the LFCC/LLCC have been updated to preserve or increase their safety and to increase launch availability. All launches of both manned and unmanned vehicles at all Federal Government ranges now use the same rules. This simplifies their application and minimizes the cost of the weather infrastructure to support them. Vehicle operators and Range safety personnel have requested that the LAP provide a detailed written rationale for each of the LFCC so that they may better understand and appreciate the scientific and operational justifications for them. This document provides the requested rationales

The history of the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) used at all spaceports under the jurisdiction of the United States is provided. The formation and history of the Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP) that now advises NASA, the Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration on LLCC development and improvement is emphasized. The period covered extends from the early days of space flight through 2010. Extensive appendices provide significant detail about important aspects that are only summarized in the main text.

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) (Krider etal., 1999; Krider etal., 2006). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM II) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. Details may be found in Dye et al., 2007. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be less restrictive while remaining at least as safe. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. VAHIRR is the product of the volume averaged radar reflectivity times the radardetermined cloud thickness. The reflectivity average extends horizontally 5 km west, east, south and north of a point along the flight track and vertically from the 0 C isotherm to the top of the radar cloud. This region is defined as the "Specified Volume". See Dye et al., 2006 and Merceret et al., 2006 for a more thorough description of VAHIRR. The units are dBZ km (not dBZ per kilometer) and the threshold is 10 dBZ km. It is safe to fly through an anvil cloud for which VAHIRR is below this threshold everywhere along the flight track as long as (1) the entire cloud within 5 nmi. (9.26 km) of the flight track is colder than 0 C, (2) the points at which VAHIRR must be evaluated are at least 20 km from any active convective cores and recent lightning, and (3) the radar return is not being attenuated within the Specified Volume around those points.

A study of two long-lived Florida anvils showed that reflectivity greater than 20 dBZ increased in area, thickness and sometimes magnitude at mid-level well downstream of the convective cores. In these same regions electric fields maintained strengths greater than 10 kV m(sup -1) for many tens of minutes and became quite uniform over tens of kilometers. Millimetric aggregates persisted at 9 to 10 km for extended times and distances. Aggregation of ice particles enhanced by strong electric fields might have contributed to reflectivity growth in the early anvil, but is unlikely to explain observations further out in the anvil. The enhanced reflectivity and existence of small, medium and large ice particles far out into the anvil suggest that an updraft was acting, perhaps in weak convective cells formed by instability generated from the evaporation and melting of falling ice particles. We conclude that charge separation must have occurred in these anvils, perhaps at the melting level but also at higher altitudes, in order to maintain fields greater than 10 kV m(sup -1) at 9 to 10 km for extended periods of time over large distances. We speculate that charge separation occurred as a result of ice-ice particle collisions (without supercooled water being present) via either a noninductive or perhaps even an inductive mechanism, given the observed broad ice particle spectra, the strong pre-existing electric fields and the many tens of minutes available for particle interactions. The observations, particularly in the early anvil, show that the charge structure in these anvils was quite complex.

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Sferic Array has recorded electric-field-change waveforms simultaneously at several stations surrounding the ground-strike points of numerous return strokes in cloud-to-ground lightning flashes. Such data are available from the five-station sub-networks in both Florida and New Mexico. With these data it has been possible for the first time to compare the waveforms radiated in different directions by a given stroke. Such comparisons are of interest to assess both the effects of channel geometry on the fine structure of subsequent-stroke radiation fields and the role of branches in the more jagged appearance of first-stroke waveforms. This paper presents multiple-station, time-domain waveforms with a 200 Hz to 500 kHz pass-band from both first and subsequent return strokes at ranges generally between 100 and 200 km. The differences among waveforms of the same stroke received at stations in different directions from the lightning channel are often obvious. These differences are illustrated and interpreted in the context of channel tortuosity and branches.