1. Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
- Author
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Mihalák, Matúš, Penna, Paolo, and Widmayer, Peter
- Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory - Abstract
Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome. This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains., Comment: Extended abstract accepted to SAGT 2016. This ArXiv version corrects typos in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Claims 28-29 of prior ArXiv version
- Published
- 2015