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Decision-making capacity (DMC) is normally taken to include (1) understanding (and appreciation); (2) the ability to deliberate or weigh up; and (3) the ability to express a choice. In an article published recently in PPP, Jacinta Tan and her colleagues (2006) suggest that DMC requires also (4) the absence of 'pathological values' (i.e., values that arise from mental disorder). In this paper, I argue that although (1)-(3) might be necessary for DMC, (4) is not necessary (barring cases where pathological values interfere with (1)-(3)). My argument will simply be that (4) fails to be supported by the empirical data provided by Tan et al., which I claim supports the view that people with pathological values do often have DMC. I also consider but reject the claim that pathological values entail incapacity because they are not 'authentic' to the person. I conclude that the absence of pathological values does not constitute an additional element of DMC and that we cannot justify compulsory treatment of people who have (1)-(3), but not (4), on the grounds they lack DMC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I challenge the popular belief shared by cognitive-minded theorists and therapists that the treatment of ‘inappropriate’ or ‘dysfunctional’ emotion should primarily be about challenging the eliciting cognitions. Although I acknowledge that sometimes therapy should proceed in this way, I point out that in some cases it is clearly the case that therapy should not proceed in this way-namely, in those cases where there are no eliciting cognitions, or in those cases where our concern lies with the kinds of emotions that are being elicited, and not with the eliciting cognitions. I also consider, and reject, two responses that might be made to the arguments that I outline in the paper, and I conclude by describing what I believe to be some of the important practical or clinical implications of the arguments that I make. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses various ways where one can comment on his paper "Why Treating Problems in Emotion May Not Require Altering Eliciting Cognitions." According to the author, it can be claimed that amending problems in emotion should be about altering cognitions. Another one is to concede that emotions are noncognitive in nature. In addition, one can respond to the argument by claiming that a person's emotions may be a defective response to the person's representation.