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The battle of Prokhorovka in July 1943 was undoubtedly a convincing Soviet victory, despite incurring heavy armored losses, the Red Army's supremacy in artillery, anti-tank defense, armored reserves, and tenacity ensured that the German advance on Prokhorovka was halted. Despite this, Western historians have tended to fixate on the lesser armored losses suffered by the Germans; often without placing these losses in the wider context of the battle. This theme is continued further when Tiger tank losses at Prokhorovka are dismissed as myth or fable. This article will reveal the contrary is true and that in reality, the final myth of the battle of Prokhorovka is that no Tiger tank losses occurred. Using original German sources throughout the article provides irrefutable evidence that a German Tiger tank was destroyed on the Prokhorovka battlefield in July 1943. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three armoured SS Sonderverbände (special units) Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf which constituted the II SS Panzer Korps played a key role during the battle of Kursk (5.7–23.8.1943), first during Operation Citadel (5–16.7.43) and then (minus the Leibstandarte) during the defence of Kharkov (3–23.8.43). For the first time, as a result of a recent archival discovery (complete armoured inventories for 20.7.43 and 1.8.43), this article can give the exact number of armoured losses the II SS Panzer Korps sustained during Operation Citadel, which included the supposedly crippling armoured battle of Prokhorovka (12.7.43). The article also establishes the actual number of operational AFV that was available to the II SS Panzer Korps before, during and after Operation Citadel. Taken together this information allows for a detailed examination of Hitler's strategy preceding the defence of Kharkov, including his decision to send the II SS Panzer Korps to the Mius Front (30.7–2.8.43). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to chart the ultimate fate of each German tank, assault gun and tank destroyer of the SS Panzergrenadier Divisions Leibstandarte and Das Reich that participated in the battle of Prokhorovka on 12.7.43 against the Soviet Union's 5th Guards Tank Army. The central question of the article being; If large numbers of German Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) did not meet disaster on the 'tank fields' southwest of Prokhorovka (as was claimed for many decades by both Soviet and Western historiography), then when exactly did those participating German AFV of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich finally succumb to the Red Army? How long did they survive on the Eastern Front against an ever more sophisticated and skilled opponent? By determining the ultimate fate of these German AFVs in the autumn and winter of 1943/44, it is possible to get a fuller understanding of the battle of Prokhorovka itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Where does British open source intelligence (OSINT) fit into the intelligence debate surrounding Allied knowledge of the Holocaust? In particular what can this source of intelligence tell us in regards to the opening of the extermination phase of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union? Were the Allies conclusions being falsely influenced by their own OSINT analysts? Or conversely did OSINT provide further evidence (alongside SIGINT decodes) that the Nazis were now committing mass genocide. This article explores these questions by examining the FRPS/FORD OSINT reports from the civilian ruled territories of (and those intended for) the Reichskommissariate Ostland and Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information about anti-assignment clause found in construction contracts.

The article examines the career of Ronald Sydney Seth as a spy for Great Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) in World War II. Seth's capture by Germany on a mission to Estonia in late 1942 and his subsequent actions as a double agent for both countries is examined. A postwar investigation of Seth by British security services concluding he was a security risk and Seth's subsequent authorship of spy stories are discussed.

Disease management programs are designed to contain costs by improving health among the chronically ill. More than 20 states are now engaged in developing and implementing Medicaid disease management programs for their primary care case management and fee-for-service populations.