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Die Universalität der Menschenrechte ist ausgehend von der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte Grundlage aller UN-Menschenrechtsabkommen, von denen alle Staaten mindestens eines oder mehrere völkerrechtlich bindend ratifiziert haben. Dennoch wird die internationale Debatte um die Universalität der Menschenrechte schon seit Jahrzehnten immer wieder und auch aktuell von einzelnen Staaten oder Staatengruppen geführt.

The "return of great power competition" between (among others) the US, China, Russia and the EU is a major topic in contemporary public debate. But why do we think of world politics in terms of "competition"? Which information and which rules enable states and other actors in world politics to "compete" with one another? Which competitive strategies do they pursue in the complex environment of modern world politics? This cutting-edge edited collection discusses these questions from a unique interdisciplinary perspective. It offers a fresh account of competition in world politics, looking beyond its military dimensions to questions of economics, technology and prestige.

This article focuses on the links between transatlantic relations - a structured array of markets, hierarchies, networks, ideas, and institutions - and broader elements of international structure and world order. It argues that the changing state of transatlantic relations reflects changes in the structure of the relations themselves, but also structural change in the global and domestic arenas and how such change shapes or reflects the actions of a wide variety of agents. The first part of the article briefly explores the importance of international structure in order to identify the global forces that shape the context for transatlantic relations. The article then examines the key mechanisms in transatlantic relations which interact to create forms of transatlantic order; these create spaces for a wide variety of agents, operating within broader elements of international and domestic structure, and the article illustrates this through the ways in which the EU's "new agenda for EU-US relations" sought to shape transatlantic interactions during the first year of the Biden presidency. The article examines the implications of transatlantic responses to the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, and concludes that despite the move to enhanced EU-US cooperation in the short term, the interaction of structures, mechanisms, and actors will contribute to continuing differentiation of transatlantic relations, at least in the medium term, whatever the preferences of US and EU policy-makers.

The increasing cooperation of Turkic Speaking States under the umbrella of the Organization of Turkic States attracted attention while the world was on the verge of a global change. The unity of the Turks was evaluated as "Pan Turkism" and "Turan". Some researchers interpreted the rise of Turkism as increasing competition in Eurasia against China and Russia. It is an important discussion topic how the Turk states should understand the development of cooperation. It is necessary to evaluate the geopolitical position of the Turk states in the Belt and Road Initiative and the global balance of power. This study evaluated the rise of Turkism in the 21st century and the role of the organization of Turkic states in the global order.

The world is at a turning point. The climate crisis, Covid-19, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are sounding the alarm. The governance of our global community is in need of new rules, models, and paradigms on a grand scale. This applies above all to the relations between the Global North and the Global South. Invisible walls, cemented by historic inequity, must fall. This working paper identifies push and pull factors. In the North, one of the key players is the Catholic Church’s reform wing; in the Americas, it is economists and ecologists embedded in indigenous traditions who question the status quo. The Buen Vivir (good life) philosophy of indigenous cultures which reunites man and nature and forms an essential part of the environmental movement in the North, could build a bridge between hemispheres. Anthropological research into pre-Columbian America provides new insights into a well-functioning indigenous civil society. These may be a valuable starting point for a new culture of dialogue and the foundation of a newly balanced world order with shifted normative standards, which is expected to be on the agenda at the 12th World Conference of Science Journalists in Medellín, Colombia in 2023.

China seems to strive to redefine the global order around sovereignty and a strong state. Yet is China engaging in a constitutive process shaped by the global economy; or is it an imperial power pursuing national sovereignty at any cost? In the West, there are very different answers to this question. This ambiguity is not by design but rather indicates that China lacks a coherent vision for the world. If the EU is to exploit this, it needs to understand why.

Russlands Vernichtungskrieg in der Ukraine wird die Weltlage grundlegend verändern. Auch wenn die Weltgemeinschaft die Invasion der Ukraine als eine Verletzung des Völkerrechts gebrandmarkt hat, hat die russische Regierung Fürsprecher durch wirtschaftlich und strategisch bedeutende Länder (wie China, Indien, Brasilien, Südafrika). In aller Welt werden die Bruchlinien größer. Der Westen, die USA, Europa, Japan, die OECD-Welt geraten in eine Abwärtsspirale. Dies zeigt sich wirtschaftlich und politisch - trotz der Anpassungsmaßnahmen der europäischen Länder, trotz der neugewonnen Einheit der NATO. Denn alles was Deutschland, Frankreich und die EU und die G7 tun, kommt vorerst zu spät.

Discourses on multilateralism and liberal internationalism are replete with warnings about crises. However, theories often only address crises in pragmatic terms, as if they were discreet and isolated phenomena that have little to do with globalized structural tendencies and the specific limitations of knowledge production within the field of international relations (IR). This article initiates a process of reflection on the nature of the crisis of liberal internationalism and the multilateral world order with the help of the pedagogy of crises framework. It identifies the biases contained within IR research and knowledge production as integral to the crises themselves because of the limitations of their engagement with crises solely at the crisis management level. Acknowledging and situating these biases allows us to build a perspective around the notion of crisis of crisis management. This perspective entails a combination of the study of liberal internationalism and neoliberalism to better explain the nature and dynamics of the multilateral world order. This endeavour can offer a fresh take on analysing case studies related to developing countries and outlines a critical focus to inform further research. A brief review of the Chilean example is featured to support this argument, as it shows how the processes that unfold within the multilateral world order are articulated within a local context, and also points to the intimate relations between knowledge production and policy implementation. The article demonstrates the impossibility of understanding the multilateral world order without due consideration of the dialectical relationship between neoliberalism and liberal internationalism. Historically, analyses have focused on neoliberalism as something embedded within liberal internationalism while, in fact, processes of neoliberalisation have become a framework of reference in themselves. That is to say, liberal internationalism, and the study of it, are but a few

Against the backdrop of changes in the power structure of the international system at the end of the twentieth century, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) entered into a peace process with Israel in 1993. Initially characterized by the influence of a multilateral order and then by the unipolar order dominated by the United States, in addition to the asymmetry of power between the two parties, the process ended up failing. The heir to that political legacy, the Palestinian Authority (PA), has tried to compensate for this weakness - despite its dependency relationships - with an internationalization strategy the continued advance of which appears to be severely limited. Added to this is the setback brought about by the political and diplomatic offensive of the Trump administration (2017–2021), one of unilateral support for Israel and absolute Palestinian exclusion. However, the increasing reconfiguration of the world order, the arrival of the new Biden administration, and the receptiveness of the International Criminal Court to investigate war crimes in Palestine seem to indicate a new political juncture. In this situation, the PA could also try to counterbalance the power asymmetry by seeking greater involvement from countries such as Russia, which has returned to the region as a great power, and China, whose presence there is growing. In turn, the PA will have to deal with different issues (unity, elections, a renewal of leadership) and try to boost its political legitimacy and international alliances to three ends: the prominence and reactivation of the PA, the recognition of Palestine as a state with in situ results, and international protection from Israeli policies.

Russia, the European Union, and NATO still share some important common interests that need to be given greater attention. A return to strategic partnership is not conceivable without resolving the Ukraine conflict, but prudent management of the antagonism in order to keep open the prospect of a peaceful new normal is crucial. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the persistent volatility of the international environment could further complicate this already difficult process. This essay first discusses the two main problems that led to the break in the partnership between Russia and the West, namely the organization of international order in a multipolar world and the integration and security dilemma in Europe. It then goes on to address German policy, which plays a key role in this conflict. The essay concludes by presenting five proposals that could be suitable for achieving a new normality beyond managing the antagonism.

The book critically analyzes the ongoing changes in the regional, intra-regional, and global dynamics of cooperation, from a multi-disciplinary and pluralist perspective. It is based on the insight that in a post-hegemonic world the formation of regions and the process of globalization can be largely disconnected from the orbit of the US, and that a plurality of power and worldviews has replaced US hegemony. In spite of these changes, most existing analyses of current changes in the world order still rely upon Western-centered approaches, and Westphalian thinking. Against this backdrop, the book proposes to advance a truly global IR understanding of the post-hegemonic world, and weaves together the pluralist and multi-disciplinary perspectives of scholars located all around the world. The book explores different questions, for example the status and role of BRICS in the changing international order; how countries in the Global South can use regionalism to change the world order; the competing worldviews that manifest themselves in the institutional variety of regionalism; and, most importantly, how all these changes push International Relations as a field to become more global, or at least to go beyond Westphalian thinking - thus bringing the role of multilateralism back to the discussion.

Recent studies of the liberal international order have tended to use a crisis-laden vocabulary to analyse US withdrawal from multilateral institutions and Chinese initiatives to create new institutions. In these analyses, the consequences of such a crisis for developing countries are largely overlooked because of the greater emphasis that is placed on the role of great powers in the international system. We argue that more attention should be paid to the position of developing countries in the liberal international order and that the effects of the presumed crisis for those countries should be studied. The articles in this thematic issue focus on a variety of topics related to the places occupied by developing countries in the international order.

In the 1990s, liberal optimism permeated the study and practice of international politics. International institutions were strengthened and the discourse and practice of global governance consolidated as a new approach to world affairs. Today, new powers are emerging in this institutionalized order. New powers have changed the power relations that underpinned global governance and are also economically, politically, and culturally different from established powers. Against this backdrop, this article investigates the impacts emerging powers are having on global governance. It presents six major trends and outlines their implications for the new global governance currently taking shape. Because new powers are emerging in an already institutionalized order, the emerging global governance order is gradually growing out of the existing one. Emerging powers are rendering parts of global governance dysfunctional, layering onto it, complicating it, but not overthrowing it.

In the coming legislative period, the Federal Government and the Bundes­tag will need to redefine the scope of Germany’s responsibility in world politics. The potential for action of German foreign policy cannot be prop­erly assessed without taking into consideration the new international constellations and the required changes. Shifts in international power, the loss of influence of Western positions, growing authoritarianism, the weakening of multilateral institutions, urgent global problems such as climate change - all of these challenges call for a realignment of German foreign policy. In doing so, it is impor­tant to adequately assess the limits of its capabilities but also the existing room for manoeuvre. This should guide its goals and priorities. German foreign policy is faced with increasingly intense competition for international influence and the authority to interpret norms and values. This competition takes different forms in the individual fields of foreign affairs. For this reason, Germany’s presence in international politics can only be influential if the ministries involved pool their efforts and resources. More room needs to be made available for forward-looking and medium-term approaches in foreign policy decision-making. In this way, it may be possible to overcome the tendency towards ad hoc decisions and to avoid predominantly reactive patterns of behaviour. Germany’s foreign relations must be guided by reliable partnerships and new forms of responsibility-sharing in various policy areas. How conflicting objectives are to be negotiated can only be determined through open and transparent dialogue. (author's abstract)

Die Bundesregierung wie auch der Bundestag stehen in der kommenden Legislaturperiode vor der Notwendigkeit, die Reichweite deutscher Verantwortung in der Weltpolitik neu zu bestimmen. Ohne eine Bestandsaufnahme, wie sich die internationale Arena verändert hat und welcher Wandel darüber hinaus geboten ist, können die Handlungspotentiale deutscher Außenpolitik nicht sachgerecht beurteilt werden. Internationale Machtverschiebungen, Positionsverluste des Westens, wachsender Autoritarismus, Schwächung multilateraler Institutionen und drängende globale Probleme wie der Klimawandel - all diese Herausforderungen erfordern eine Neuaufstellung deutscher Außenpolitik. Dabei gilt es die Grenzen der eigenen Leistungsfähigkeit, aber auch die gegebenen Handlungsspielräume richtig einzuschätzen. Ziele wie Prioritäten sollten sich daran orientieren. Deutsche Außenpolitik steht in einem sich verschärfenden Wettbewerb um internationalen Einfluss und die Deutungshoheit über Normen und Werte. In den einzelnen Feldern auswärtigen Handelns ist dieser Wettbewerb unterschiedlich ausgeprägt. Daher kann deutsche Präsenz in der internationalen Politik nur wirkungsmächtig sein, wenn die Ressourcen der involvierten Ressorts zusammengeführt werden. Im außenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozess müssen Freiräume für voraus­schauende und mittelfristige Ansätze geschaffen werden. Auf diese Weise kann es gelingen, die Neigung zu Ad-hoc-Entscheidungen auszugleichen und ein vorwiegend reaktives Verhaltensmuster zu vermeiden. Deutschlands Außenbeziehungen müssen an belastbaren Partnerschaften und neuen Formen der Verantwortungsteilung in den verschiedenen Politikfeldern ausgerichtet sein. Wie dabei auftretende Zielkonflikte zu regeln sind, kann nur in einer offenen und transparenten Diskussion aus­gehandelt werden. (Autorenreferat)

US-Präsident Biden ist noch keine 100 Tage im Amt, und schon ist klar, dass zwar ein zivilisierterer Stil im internationalen Umgang zurückgekehrt ist, aber der grundlegende Wandel der Weltordnung keinen Rückwärtsgang einlegt. Die Monopolstellung des Westens mit seinen Regeln und Institutionen wird schon länger in Frage gestellt. Viele Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer verzeichnen hohes Wirtschaftswachstum und haben ihre Süd-Süd-Kooperation vertieft. Dadurch sind neue Konstellationen in der Weltordnung im Anmarsch. In dieser Dynamik muss die EU ihre Rolle finden.

Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner. Structural incentives as well as recent developments militate in favour of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral dependence, even among friends, comes at a price. This timeless incentive is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or without Trump; China's twofold challenge; an emerging Sino-American rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron's offer to his European partners. European self-defence has to meet four key requirements: broader and greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective strategy, and political leadership. Defence autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. In the case of the EU, neither primary deterrence, reserved for a single state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, would be adequate. Instead, Europe would have to create a novel type of "integrated deter­rence". Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this would be based on French nuclear forces, with the French president main­taining exclusive decision-making authority. Germany and France would have to seize the initiative by "taking their bi­lateral relations to a new level", as stated in the Aachen Treaty of January 22, 2019. They would have to lead by example, bring about the progressive integration of their armed forces and an alignment of their strategic cultures. This would demand a great deal of Germany in terms of defence spending and redefining its "culture of military restraint". To initiate such a process of rethinking and repositioning will require an open-minded debate on the role of the military for a Europe that "takes its fate into its own hands" (Chancellor Angela Merkel). (author

Die Wahl Joseph Bidens zum 46. Präsidenten der USA bedeutet nicht, dass die trans­atlantischen Beziehungen einfach zum Status quo vor 2017 zurückkehren werden. Zu sehr hat sich inzwischen das internationale Umfeld verändert, zu stark ist der Wett­bewerb großer Mächte zum strukturbildenden Merkmal der internationalen Ordnung geworden. Europa wird stärker als bislang verdeutlichen müssen, welche Politik man von Washington erwartet, aber auch, was man selbst zu leisten bereit ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund sollten Berlin und Brüssel gegenüber der Regierung Biden fünf Prioritäten als Grundlage einer erneuerten transatlantischen Agenda verfolgen. Unter anderem sind demnach gemeinsame Regelwerke zur Bekämpfung politischer Des­information und eine transatlantische Impfstoff-Allianz anzustreben. (Autorenreferat)

Although Joseph Biden has now been elected 46th president of the United States, transatlantic relations do not automatically revert to their pre-2017 status quo. Too much has changed in the international sphere, too central has great power competition become to the international order. Europe will have to be much more clear than in the past about what it expects from Washington - and what it is prepared to contribute. Berlin and Brussels should work toward a new transatlantic agenda with the Biden administration, with five priorities including joint action against political disinformation and a transatlantic vaccine alliance. (author's abstract)

The rise of China raises fundamental questions about the future of the liberal international order (LIO) at a time when it is under ever more strain. Although China’s focus for some years was on joining and participating in existing multilateral institutions, today China is increasingly building its own. Prominent among them is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), launched in late 2014. Against the background of contending theoretical expectations, this article examines the extent to which the AIIB either reinforces or challenges the LIO and highlights what this tells us about China’s broader relationship with the LIO. We provide a definition of the LIO that is based on its social purpose rather than on its formal characteristics. State-centric approaches offer insights into China’s decision to engage in new institution building via the AIIB, but we argue that a focus on social purpose is necessary to assess the AIIB’s broader implications for the LIO. We find that, while conforming in large measure to existing institutional models, the AIIB promotes China’s integration into global social networks, strengthens state-led development pathways, and is associated with the Chinese norm of non-interference. The AIIB, thus, foreshadows the possibility of an institutionalised international order indifferent to liberalism. In sum, the AIIB reflects the tensions between the socialising effects of the LIO and China’s growing externalisation of its own non-liberal, state-led model of political economy.