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The concepts such as rights, contracts, and client satisfaction for welfare rec ipients of workless are examined. The administrative failure in implementing basic income guarantee in United States is observed.

The residents of public housing who are offered counseling together with housing vouchers that can only be redeemed in low-poverty areas find that their welfare receipt is reduced when compared to people with unrestricted housing vouchers without additional counseling. The effect is independent of the earnings or employment rates.

A study on the development of children from households where the mother is a recipient of welfare benefits is furnished. It is observed that there is a negative relation between the two.

A model of participants' take-up of welfare benefits is developed using welfare fraud and welfare stigma as reference points. Results of the model showed stigma as the significant factor that determines participation in a welfare program, underscoring the effects of informal controls, even under conditions of differing stigma perception and honesty characteristics of participants. The result implies that informal controls can be used in the formulation of effective screening strategies to ensure that the qualified needy enters the welfare program.

The intergenerational nature of welfare has always been a heated topic. A study of data regarding American homes shows that 3/4th of the individuals receiving welfare were not brought up in homes that received welfare. However, children brought up in welfare-receiving homes are more likely to need welfare as adults than those that are not brought up in such homes. This is because these children are not able to receive proper education and not because they have been brought up to think that getting welfare benefits is the easy way of life.

The belief that state welfare programmes are justified because they enable many people to do what they could not otherwise have done is attractive. This article examines the claim that this belief flows logically from a particular account of what it means to have a right to do something. This enabling model of rights holds that rights can be violated in two ways: by interfering with people doing something they have a right to do and depriving the right-holders of the resources actually needed to do what they have a right to do. Having certain rights to do things can justify state action designed to provide people with the resources that enable them to do what they could not otherwise have done. However attractive this model of rights might be, it is unable to accommodate the possibility that an individual can have the right to do something which is the morally wrong thing to do.