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Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a natural process where microbes develop the ability to survive the antimicrobial drugs we depend upon to treat and prevent deadly infections, such as antibiotics. This microscopic evolution is further propelled by human activities, where each use of an antimicrobial drug potentially induces AMR. As microbes can spread quickly from animals to humans and travel around the world through humanity's global circuits of movement, the use of any antimicrobial drug has potentially global consequences. As human-induced AMR occurs, mortality and morbidity increase due to increasingly or sometimes completely ineffective antimicrobial treatments. This article considers AMR as a product of the evolving and complex interplay between human societies and invisible microbial worlds. It argues that as a political challenge, AMR requires robust institutions that can manage human–microbial interactions to minimize the emergence of drug resistance and maximize the likelihood of achieving effective antimicrobial use for all. Yet, current governance systems for AMR are ill-equipped to meet these goals. We propose a conceptual paradigm shift for global AMR governance efforts, arguing that global governance could better address AMR if approached as a socioecological problem in need of sustainable management rather than solely as a medical problem to be solved. In biodiversity governance, institutions are designed to fit the biological features of the ecosystems that they are attempting to manage. We consider how a similar approach can improve global AMR governance. Employing the concept of ecological fit, which is defined as the alignment between human social systems and biological ecosystems, we diagnose 18 discrepancies between the social institutions that currently govern AMR and the ecological nature of this problem. Drawing from lessons learned in biodiversity governance, the article proposes five institutional design principles for improving the fit and effectiveness of global AMR governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) causes over 1.27 million deaths annually, making it one of today's most urgent health threats. Given its urgency, there are often calls for large‐scale global initiatives to address AMR. However, theories of collective action have yet to be applied to the problem in a systematic and holistic manner. Fuller engagement with collective action theory is necessary to avoid three risks, namely: mischaracterizing the kinds of challenges that AMR presents; over‐simplifying the problem by reducing it to a single type of collective action problem while ignoring others; and overstating the ability of collective action theory to formulate effective solutions. This article relies on the work of Elinor Ostrom to develop an analytical framework for collective action problems around public and common goods. When analyzed through this framework, we find that AMR poses at least nine distinct collective action problems. This more granular framing of AMR provides, in our view, a better basis to develop policy solutions to address this multifaceted challenge. We conclude with proposals for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2015, 196 countries boldly committed to address global antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Now, five years later, progress reports suggest the implementation of AMR activities is vastly below what was initially promised. The challenge of overcoming the 'commitment-compliance gap' is not unique to AMR and is common in other areas of international politics. Global health policymakers can therefore learn from theories of international relations and experience in other sectors. We reviewed international relations scholarship to generate five hypotheses for why states might comply or not comply with their global commitments. We then conducted a public policy analysis of three past international agreements on biological diversity, climate change, and nuclear weapons to test these hypotheses and identify lessons for encouraging country compliance with global health agreements, with specific application to global AMR policies. To bridge the commitment-compliance gap, international leaders should: (1) frame incentives to maximise interests for action; (2) pursue enforcement mechanisms to induce state behaviour; (3) emphasise building a culture of trust by providing mutual assurance for action; (4) include mechanisms for managing poor performers; and (5) find opportunities for continual social learning. Agreements should be designed with flexibility, data sharing, and dispute settlement mechanisms and provide financial and technical assistance to states with less capacity to deliver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines the use of national border closures at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. After explaining why targeted border closures generally do not work and how they violated international law at the time, we examine the unprecedented case of total border closures. Positing that since the current instruments and institutions of global health governance did not anticipate this phenomenon, the legality of total border closures rests on less certain grounds. Then, after asking why nearly every government implemented some form of border closure in March 2020 if neither science nor law provided adequate motivation for their use, we conclude that in the face of a global health emergency, border closures represent an opportunity for political leaders to show determined action, redirect blame to other jurisdictions, and reinforce nationalism. We proceed to argue that both targeted and total border closures have profound legal, epidemiological, and political significance as performances that contradict global realities while undermining notions of global solidarity. Such political theatre means that citizens must weigh these consequences against any perceived benefits of border closures as they would any other politically driven government action, and contest and challenge them appropriately. Citizens must not unduly defer to scientists or lawyers on early COVID-19 border closures because these were primarily political-not scientific or legal-decisions. In this vein, we conclude with some guiding political considerations for scrutinizing government decisions to close borders and observations for the future of global health cooperation during infectious disease outbreaks., Competing Interests: The author(s) declared the following potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: SJH serves as vice-president for Data & Surveillance at the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC). The academic views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of PHAC, CIHR, or the Government of Canada. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Government of Canada, Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR)., (© The Author(s) 2022.)