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BackgroundA learning style is the complex manner to learn material most efficiently and effectively and also a good predicator of their preferred learning behaviors. This study explored the status of new medical students’ learning patterns between application and entrance examination.MethodsThis is a cross sectional analysis of learning styles among newly enrolled first year medical students in each first academic year from September 2015 to September 2017. The Memletic Learning Style Inventory was applied as instrument for assessment. Latent class analysis was applied to classify different classes among medical students. Result98 students underwent a national college entrance examination, and 150 students was enrolled through application. All medical students could be assigned into 4 classes according to learning styles, including logical type, solitary type, mix aural-verbal-visual type, and social type. Both gender and admission routes were strong predictors of latent class of learning styles. ConclusionThrough the interview process, we can screen out students with mix aural-verbal-visual class of learning styles through interview in application process. While examination route can select students with logical type and solitary type learning style. This study can improve our understanding of student learning patterns to design learner-specific courses and effective curricula.

This study examines whether local leads benefit bank loan contracting. Based on 2019 loans from emerging markets in 2000–2010, we find significant differences in the lending behaviors between foreign and local lead banks. Foreign lead loans contain significantly higher spread and more financial covenants than those led by all local banks. The inclusion of local banks to colead loans deliver contracting benefits as we find mixed lead loans offer lower spread and prescribe substantially more financial covenants than all foreign lead banks. Local bank involvement reduces information asymmetry between foreign lenders and local borrowers, resulting in less rigorous contracting terms.

This study examines the effects of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the contract terms of bank loans in a global setting. Using a difference-in-differences design based on 26,474 bank loans in 31 countries during the 2000–2011 period, we find that borrowers who mandatorily adopt IFRS experience an increase in interest rates, a reduction in the use of accounting-based financial covenants, an increase in the likelihood that a loan is collateralized, a reduction in loan maturity, and an increase in the fraction of a loan retained by lead arrangers. These findings are robust to the removal of the 2008 financial crisis from our analysis, as well as to the matching of IFRS and non-IFRS borrowers on various country- and firm-level characteristics. Furthermore, we find that these changes are more pronounced for borrowers with greater financial reporting changes, as well as those with poorer accounting quality after IFRS adoption. JEL Classifications: G15; G21; F34; M41.

SYNOPSIS The PCAOB has recently issued two concept releases that seek feedback on a proposal that requires audit firms to disclose the name of the engagement partner in the audit report. This paper provides evidence about the efficacy of this proposal by examining whether industry audit experts at the partner level are valued by stakeholders—lenders in the syndicate loan market. Our paper is based on the unique data in Taiwan, where the audit report is issued in the name of two signing auditors, as well as the audit firm. Prior research suggests that lead arrangers prefer to hold a lower share of the loan and to have a larger number of other lenders. First, we find no evidence that Big 4 audit firms are related to the lower share of a syndicated loan held by the lead arrangers, after controlling for industry audit expertise; we also find no evidence that firm-level expertise alone is associated with the share held by lead arrangers. However, we do find that partner-level industry audit experts, either alone or in conjunction with a firm-level industry audit expert, are associated with the lower share of syndicated loans held by lead arrangers. Second, we find that the number of lenders in general (or the number of foreign lenders in particular) in a loan is the largest when borrowers retain industry audit experts at both the firm and partner levels.