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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. CYBER THREATS TO CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT 361 II. OLD LAW, NEW WEAPON 364 A. Offensive Cyber Operations in Armed Conflict 365 B. International Humanitarian Law, [...], Russia's use of offensive cyber operations to further its illegal war against Ukraine has prompted calls for a response to these cyber operations from the International Criminal Court. However, the International Criminal Court is an inadequate forum for adjudicating cyber conduct in armed conflict because cyber operations fit awkwardly into the traditional war crimes legal framework. Furthermore, the Rome Statute's strict substantive and procedural features provide strict limitations on the kinds of cyber conduct that might constitute a war crime against which the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court could bring an effective case. Because most cyber conduct does not produce kinetic effects, the established framework of international humanitarian law that the Rome Statute reflects does not comprehensively regulate the unique domain in which cyber operations occur. This Note argues that observers have overlooked a more promising way of addressing illegal cyber operations in armed conflict: the right to life under international human rights law. As a more malleable body of law that mutually reinforces international humanitarian law, human rights law--and the right to life, in particular--can capture more cyber conduct and hold armed actors accountable for their harmful effects on civilians. Addressing cyber operations through human rights law will also accelerate the development of the law governing cyber operations and encourage a more interdisciplinary approach to evaluating how the cyber domain is governed by complementary fields of international law.

Introduction I. General Principles of ICC Jurisdiction and the Rome Statute A. The Nuremberg Consensus B. The Rome Consensus C. Jurisdictional Principles Applicable to Other International Courts and Tribunals D. [...], After twenty years of operation, we know that the International Criminal Court (ICC) works in practice. But does it work in theory? A debate rages regarding the proper conceptualization of the Court's jurisdiction. Some have argued that the ICC's jurisdiction is little more than a delegation by states of a subset of their own criminal jurisdiction. They contend that when states ratify the Rome Statute, they transfer some of their own prescriptive or adjudicative criminal jurisdiction to the Court, meaning that the Court cannot do more than the state itself could have done. Moreover, they argue that these constraints are imposed by international law itself. This Article disagrees, contending that states "confer upon" or "accept" the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals like the ICC not to transfer a subset of their own power to those entities, but because they often want and need those courts and tribunals to do things that they cannot do in their national systems. International law not only allows them to do this: it encourages it. This is true for many international courts and tribunals created by treaties and by the United Nations; this Article contends that it is equally true for the ICC. This Article demonstrates that this theory of "collective conferral" supports the ICC's recent caselaw on jurisdiction and immunities, which is consonant with principles of general international law, the Rome Statute itself, and the values and concerns that drove states to establish the Court in 1998.

Women's wartime sexual violence experiences have largely been constructed as negative, leaving little room for women's resistance and strength-based outcomes. Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, this study examines women's resistance using semi-structured interviews with 13 ethnically diverse women victimized by sexual violence during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Using partial results from the study highlighting strengths that are both external and internal to the women, I show that women resist traditional discourses of victimization and gender stereotypes as they speak about the strengths they have acquired and retained after they were sexually victimized. Keywords: Wartime sexual violence, Bosnia and Herzegovina, women's resistance, outcomes, strengths. Les experiences de violence sexuelle vecues par les femmes en temps de guerre ont ete largement considerees comme negatives, ce qui laisse peu de place a la resistance des femmes et aux resultats fondes sur l'endurance. En utilisant l'analyse phenomenologique interpretative, cette etude examine la resistance des femmes a l'aide d'entretiens semi-structures avec 13 femmes de diverses ethnies victimes de violences sexuelles pendant la guerre en Bosnie-Herzegovine. En se servant des resultats partiels de l'etude mettant en exergue les forces qui sont a la fois externes et internes aux femmes, je montre que les femmes resistent aux discours traditionnels de victimisation et aux stereotypes de genre lorsqu'elles parlent des forces qu'elles ont acquises et conservees apres avoir ete victimes de violence sexuelle. Mots-cles : Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre, Bosnie-Herzegovine, resistance des femmes, resultats, forces., INTRODUCTION (1) Sexual victimization of women during conflicts or wars, or wartime sexual violence, has been used as a tool of war for centuries, but first garnered international attention in [...]

"The murdered are to be cheated out of the single remaining thing that our powerlessness can offer them: remembrance." - Theodore Adorno, Critical Models (1) "You can imagine that feeling [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 3 II. THE ICC: SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 8 III. THE OTP SHOULD EMLJRACE A POLICY OF OFFERING PLEA-WITH-COOPERATION DEALS TO LOWER- AND MID-LEVEL SUSPECTS 11 A. The Cooperation [...], After almost two decades in action, states and other commentators have begun to question whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) will ever achieve its lofty goals of ending impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. At present, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has successfully convicted only four defendants of crimes against humanity or war crimes charges. Further, none of the ICC's four convictions has been against a government actor--much less, a high-level government leader. The OTP has not ignored its mandate to prosecute government leaders who have committed serious international crimes (including Kenya's president and deputy president), but its efforts to bring that category of defendant to justice have, thus far, resulted in well-publicized defeats. This Article suggests that one way for the OTP to increase its chances of successfully prosecuting government leaders is to begin entering into pleawith-cooperation agreements with some lower- and middle-level defendants. As the OTP has acknowledged, in these complex cases, higher-level perpetrators typically keep "distance between themselves and the crimes committed using different mechanisms to hide their role. " Moreover, high-level government leaders not only control state machinery, but they also have powerful allies both in- and out-of-state who can help them frustrate the ICC's efforts to obtain custody over them or to gather sufficient evidence to prove their involvement in criminal activity. By entering into plea-with-cooperation agreements with some of these lower- and mid-level defendants, the OTP will have a better chance of having sufficient evidence and a stable of available witnesses that will be available to testify at trial against the leaders who orchestrate violence against their victims. Although this proposal is not uneontroversial, this Article argues that plea bargaining in this context is both ethical and necessary. States did not create the ICC so that it could pursue only rebels, and an ICC with a better "track record" cannot be the goal. The ICC must be able to bring justice to the many victims who suffer atrocities at the hands of their leaders when those same leaders are unwilling to prosecute their own.