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I present a merger model where a merged entity is assumed to acquire the market leadership from a linear, symmetric, simultaneous, homogeneous good, quantity-setting oligopoly and where efficiency gains are ruled out. If firms cannot merge to monopoly, mergers occur in waves, and for each number of pre-merger firms, I endogenize: (i) the number of mergers in a wave; (ii) the number of firms involved in each merger; and (iii) the order in which the mergers take place. If monopolization is allowed, in the majority of cases, all firms prefer to merge into a single entity. This suggests the strategic nature of merger waves as a response to the prohibition of monopolization. Finally, in sharp contrast with the existing results on horizontal mergers under simultaneous quantity competition without efficiency gains, and in line with empirical findings, profitability is ensured even if mergers involve a small number of firms.

I study a merger model among symmetric Cournot firms where—before a merger occurs—firms choose output simultaneously and in which a merged entity acquires the market leadership. I find conditions under which a single or multiple mergers are profitable and solve the free-riding problem. The model connects to Liu and Wang (Econ Lett 129:1–3, 2015), who show that a single leading entity can profitably merge with an arbitrary number of firms. The current paper extends their results in two directions: first, I find the conditions under which the free-riding issue is solved; second, I study the implications of multiple mergers, in which the merged entities are allowed to be heterogeneous in the number of merging firms. A welfare analysis shows that mergers may be welfare-enhancing—even without efficiency gains. Moreover, the set of welfare-enhancing mergers is the same irrespective of the measure that is used: consumer surplus only, or the sum of consumer surplus and industry profits. This suggests caution for the antitrust authorities in evaluating the overall effect of these mergers.

This paper considers a vertically related industry where an upstream supplier simultaneously negotiates with two downstream retailers endowed with (possibly) asymmetric bargaining powers, over the purchase of an input. Downstream firms have asymmetric capacities and downstream competition has a price leadership structure. Under linear tariffs, an increase in the upstream supplier's bargaining power towards the large firm induces a positive externality on the small firm's tariff. Under two-part tariff, instead, cross effects vanish. In both regimes, we obtain that, a priori the small firm may end up i) demanding a larger stock of the input and ii) paying less for it. Our model also proves useful to show that the well-known countervailing buyer power hypothesis may not hold because an integrated downstream firm might negotiate a better input price without any pass-through to the final consumers. We mainly relate our analysis to the UK grocery market and to the recent empirical evidence regarding its functioning.

The Italian Neutron Experimental Station (INES) located at the ISIS pulsed neutron source (Didcot, United Kingdom) provides a thermal neutron beam mainly used for diffraction analysis. A neutron transmission imaging system was also developed for beam monitoring and for aligning the sample under investigation. Although the time-of-flight neutron diffraction is a consolidated technique, the neutron imaging setup is not yet completely characterized and optimized. In this paper the performance for neutron radiography and tomography at INES of two scintillator screens read out by two different commercial CCD cameras is compared in terms of linearity, signal-to-noise ratio, effective dynamic range and spatial resolution. In addition, the results of neutron radiographies and a tomography of metal alloy test structures are presented to better characterize the INES imaging capabilities of metal artifacts in the cultural heritage field. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

I set up an endogenous merger model in which, whenever fi rms agree to join in a coalition, the new entity acquires the leadership in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. I first explore the case of a single merger and show that, despite being such merger pro table irrespective of the number of participants, only two endogenous equilibria are possible: either a bilateral coalition or an n - 1-fi rm coalition. I then allow for multiple coalitions and show that merger waves often occur as a fi rms' response to the exclusion of monopolization. In other cases, even if monopolization is allowed, the grand coalition does not form and at least one fi rm prefers to act as a follower. The model provides an explanation of why bilateral mergers are observed in almost every industry, even where synergies are unlikely and why it is possible to observe a single large entity behaving as a market leader. Furthermore, it provides a justi fication of the strategic nature of merger waves as a response to the exclusion of monopolization. I also check how my results vary with different ex-ante merger policies. Moreover, it is shown that bilateral mergers between identical fi rms generating no synergies can be bene ficial to both consumers and producers.

We show that in an infinitely repeated Cournot game when firms adopt stick and carrot strategies exogenous horizontal mergers are profitable regardless the size of the merged entity. We characterize an equilibrium in which the new entity maximizes its discounted intertemporal profit under the constraint that each outsider produces just enough to be better off after the merger. Once the merger has occurred each insider gains more than each outsider, therefore the insider's dilemma is completely solved.

Introduction: X-ray computed tomography (CT) is now used in the cultural heritage field because it is non-invasive and it can give a large amount of information on the inner structure of the object under study. Until recently mainly medical CT scanners or micro-CT setups have been used, limiting the analysis to relatively small artworks or requiring multiple acquisition and difficult image-joining for objects larger than detector dimensions. Results: To overcome the limitations of ordinary CT devices, a facility for the X-ray tomography of large size artefacts has recently been designed and installed in a protected area of the Fondazione Centro Conservazione e Restauro “La Venaria Reale”, a Centre for Preservation and Restoration. This facility, based on a X-ray source, a linear X-ray detector and a high precision mechanical system, has been and will be used to gather information on materials, manufacturing techniques and conservative conditions of artworks undergoing the restoration process. In this paper the results of the tomography of the first analyzed large artistic object are presented, giving an idea of the wealth of information obtained from the CT scan. The presented artwork is the writing cabinet called “doppio corpo”, a masterpiece of furniture more than 3 m high, inlaid for Savoy Residences by Pietro Piffetti, the most famous cabinet-maker in Piedmont in the XVIII century. The artwork is now housed in the Quirinale Palace, the official residence of the Italian President in Rome. Conclusions: The CT analysis permitted us to obtain valuable information about the conservative conditions, the presence of previous interventions, the distribution of various materials and the dimensions and arrangement of several wooden pieces, thus allowing for interesting hypotheses about the building technique of this masterpiece.

The neu_ART project aims at developing state of the art transmission imaging and computed tomography techniques, applied to art objects, by using neutrons as well as more conventional X-rays. In this paper a facility for digital X-ray radiography of large area paintings on canvas or wooden panels and for the X-ray tomography of large size wooden artifacts, recently installed in a protected area, is presented. The results of a K-edge radiography facility that will soon be installed in the same area are also shown.