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OBJECTIVE: To assess the household secondary infection risk (SIR) of B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and non-Alpha lineages of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children. STUDY DESIGN: During January to April 2021, we prospectively followed households with a SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected questionnaires, serial nasopharyngeal swabs for reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing and whole genome sequencing, and serial blood samples for serology testing. We calculated SIRs by primary case age (pediatric vs adult), household contact age, and viral lineage. We evaluated risk factors associated with transmission and described symptom profiles among children. RESULTS: Among 36 households with pediatric primary cases, 21 (58%) had secondary infections. Among 91 households with adult primary cases, 51 (56%) had secondary infections. SIRs among pediatric and adult primary cases were 45% and 54%, respectively (OR, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.41-1.54). SIRs among pediatric primary cases with Alpha and non-Alpha lineage were 55% and 46%, respectively (OR, 1.52; 95% CI, 0.51-4.53). SIRs among pediatric and adult household contacts were 55% and 49%, respectively (OR, 1.01; 95% CI, 0.68-1.50). Among pediatric contacts, no significant differences in the odds of acquiring infection by demographic or household characteristics were observed. CONCLUSIONS: Household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from children and adult primary cases to household members was frequent. The risk of secondary infection was similar among child and adult household contacts. Among children, household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the risk of secondary infection was not influenced by lineage. Continued mitigation strategies (eg, masking, physical distancing, vaccination) are needed to protect at-risk groups regardless of virus lineage circulating in communities.

Ebola disease (EBOD) in humans is a severe disease caused by at least four related viruses in the genus Orthoebolavirus, most often by the eponymous Ebola virus. Due to human‐to‐human transmission and incomplete success in treating cases despite promising therapeutic development, EBOD is a high priority in public health research. Yet despite almost 50 years since EBOD was first described, the sources of these viruses remain undefined and much remains to be understood about the disease epidemiology and virus emergence and spread. One important approach to improve our understanding is detection of antibodies that can reveal past human infections. However, serosurveys routinely describe seroprevalences that imply infection rates much higher than those clinically observed. Proposed hypotheses to explain this difference include existence of common but less pathogenic strains or relatives of these viruses, misidentification of EBOD as something else, and a higher proportion of subclinical infections than currently appreciated. The work presented here maps B‐cell epitopes in the spike protein of Ebola virus and describes a single epitope that is cross‐reactive with an antigen seemingly unrelated to orthoebolaviruses. Antibodies against this epitope appear to explain most of the unexpected reactivity towards the spike, arguing against common but unidentified infections in the population. Importantly, antibodies of cross‐reactive donors from within and outside the known EBOD geographic range bound the same epitope. In light of this finding, it is plausible that epitope mapping enables broadly applicable specificity improvements in the field of serology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are limited data describing SARS-CoV-2–specific immune responses and their durability following infection and vaccination in nursing home residents. We conducted a prospective longitudinal evaluation of 11 consenting SARS-CoV-2–positive nursing home residents to evaluate the quantitative titers and durability of binding antibodies detected after SARS-CoV-2 infection and subsequent COVID-19 vaccination. The evaluation included nine visits over 150 days from October 25, 2020, through April 1, 2021. Visits included questionnaire administration, blood collection for serology, and paired anterior nasal specimen collection for testing by BinaxNOW™ COVID-19 Ag Card (BinaxNOW), reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and viral culture. We evaluated quantitative titers of binding SARS-CoV-2 antibodies post-infection and post-vaccination (beginning after the first dose of the primary series). The median age among participants was 74 years; one participant was immunocompromised. Of 10 participants with post-infection serology results, 9 (90%) had detectable Pan-Ig, IgG, and IgA antibodies, and 8 (80%) had detectable IgM antibodies. At first antibody detection post-infection, two-thirds (6/9, 67%) of participants were RT-PCR–positive, but none were culture- positive. Ten participants received vaccination; all had detectable Pan-Ig, IgG, and IgA antibodies through their final observation ≤90 days post-first dose. Post-vaccination geometric means of IgG titers were 10–200-fold higher than post-infection. Nursing home residents in this cohort mounted robust immune responses to SARS-CoV-2 post-infection and post-vaccination. The augmented antibody responses post-vaccination are potential indicators of enhanced protection that vaccination may confer on previously infected nursing home residents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zoonotic diseases represent a heavy global burden, causing important economic losses, impacting animal health and production, and costing millions of human lives. The vaccination of animals and humans to prevent inter-species zoonotic disease transmission is an important intervention. However, efforts to develop and implement vaccine interventions to reduce zoonotic disease impacts are often limited to the veterinary and agricultural sectors and do not reflect the shared burden of disease. Multisectoral collaboration, including co-development opportunities for human and animal vaccines, expanding vaccine use to include animal reservoirs such as wildlife, and strategically using vaccines to interrupt complex transmission cycles is needed. Addressing zoonoses requires a multi-faceted One Health approach, wherein vaccinating people and animals plays a critical role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In October 2020, an investigation began in Canada on an outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium infections of the same strain as a concomitant outbreak in the United States (US) that was linked to pet hedgehogs. The objective of this article is to identify the source of the outbreak, determine if there was a link between the Canadian and US outbreaks and identify risk factors for infection to inform public health interventions. Methods: Cases were identified through whole genome sequencing of S. Typhimurium isolates. Information was collected on case exposures, including animal contact. Hedgehog and environmental specimens were tested for S. Typhimurium and a trace back investigation was conducted. Results: There were 31 cases in six provinces, with illness onset dates from June 1, 2017, to October 15, 2020. Median case age was 20 years and 52% were female. Isolates grouped together between 0–46 whole genome multi locus sequence typing allele differences. Of 23 cases with available exposure information, 19 (83%) reported contact with hedgehogs in the seven days prior to symptoms; 15/18 (83%) reported direct contact and 3/18 (17%) reported indirect contact. Trace back investigation did not identify a common source of hedgehogs but uncovered an industry with a complex distribution network. The outbreak strain was detected in samples collected from a hedgehog in one case’s home and from a hedgehog in a Québec zoo. Conclusion: Direct and indirect contact with hedgehogs was identified as the source of this S. Typhimurium outbreak. Public health communications aimed to increase awareness about the risks of zoonoses from hedgehogs and shared key hygienic practices to reduce disease transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leafy green vegetables are a common source of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157:H7 (STEC O157) foodborne illness outbreaks. Ruminant animals, primarily cattle, are the major reservoir of STEC O157. Epidemiological, traceback and field investigations were conducted to identify potential outbreak sources. Product and environmental samples were tested for STEC. A reoccurring strain of STEC O157 caused two multistate outbreaks linked to romaine lettuce in 2018 and 2019, resulting in 234 illnesses in 33 states. Over 80% of patients interviewed consumed romaine lettuce before illness. The romaine lettuce was sourced from two California growing regions: Santa Maria and Salinas Valley in 2018 and Salinas Valley in 2019. The outbreak strain was isolated from environmental samples collected at sites >90 miles apart across growing regions, as well as from romaine-containing products in 2019. Although the definitive route of romaine contamination was undetermined, use of a contaminated agricultural water reservoir in 2018 and contamination from cattle grazing on adjacent land in 2019 were suspected as possible factors. Preventing lettuce contamination from growth to consumption is imperative to preventing illness. These outbreaks highlight the need to further understand mechanisms of romaine contamination, including the role of environmental or animal reservoirs for STEC O157. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We describe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among US food manufacturing and agriculture workers and provide updated information on meat and poultry processing workers. Among 742 food and agriculture workplaces in 30 states, 8,978 workers had confirmed COVID-19; 55 workers died. Racial and ethnic minority workers could be disproportionately affected by COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meat and poultry processing facilities face distinctive challenges in the control of infectious diseases, including coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). COVID-19 outbreaks among meat and poultry processing facility workers can rapidly affect large numbers of persons. Assessment of COVID-19 cases among workers in 115 meat and poultry processing facilities through April 27, 2020, documented 4,913 cases and 20 deaths reported by 19 states (1). This report provides updated aggregate data from states regarding the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19, the number and demographic characteristics of affected workers, and the number of COVID-19-associated deaths among workers, as well as descriptions of interventions and prevention efforts at these facilities. Aggregate data on confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths among workers identified and reported through May 31, 2020, were obtained from 239 affected facilities (those with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case in one or more workers) in 23 states.* COVID-19 was confirmed in 16,233 workers, including 86 COVID-19-related deaths. Among 14 states reporting the total number of workers in affected meat and poultry processing facilities (112,616), COVID-19 was diagnosed in 9.1% of workers. Among 9,919 (61%) cases in 21 states with reported race/ethnicity, 87% occurred among racial and ethnic minority workers. Commonly reported interventions and prevention efforts at facilities included implementing worker temperature or symptom screening and COVID-19 education, mandating face coverings, adding hand hygiene stations, and adding physical barriers between workers. Targeted workplace interventions and prevention efforts that are appropriately tailored to the groups most affected by COVID-19 are critical to reducing both COVID-19-associated occupational risk and health disparities among vulnerable populations. Implementation of these interventions and prevention efforts† across meat and poultry processing facilities nationally could help protect workers in this critical infrastructure industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of exposure to environmental pollutants, infectious agents, and genetic predisposition, companion animals develop respiratory illnesses similar to those in humans. Older dogs of smaller breeds develop canine infectious respiratory disease, chronic bronchitis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, with chronic lung infection, airway goblet cell hyperplasia and metaplasia, and mucus hypersecretion. Excessive mucus clogs airways, reduces gas exchanges, disables the mucociliary clearance, and reduces drug penetration. The Forkhead box protein A2 (FOXA2) is a key transcriptional regulator that maintains airway mucus homeostasis. Prior studies have shown that FOXA2 expression is frequently depleted in diseased human airways. Unfortunately, FOXA2 depletion has not been examined in dogs. Our current study indicated that both single bacterial infection by Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Bordetella bronchiseptica and polymicrobial infection by viral/bacterial pathogens depleted FOXA2 in canine airways, resulting in goblet cell hyperplasia and metaplasia and excessive mucus production. Furthermore, P. aeruginosa virulence factor pyocyanin activated the antagonistic STAT6 and epidermal growth factor receptor signalling pathways to inhibit FOXA2. Unravelling the mechanism of FOXA2 inactivation will hasten the development of non‐antibiotic therapeutics to improve mucociliary clearance of pathogens in canine airway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monkeypox virus (MPXV) can spread among humans through direct contact with lesions, scabs, or saliva; via respiratory secretions; and indirectly from fomites; via percutaneous injuries; and by crossing the placenta to the fetus during pregnancy. Since 2022, most patients with mpox in the United States have experienced painful skin lesions, and some have had severe illness. During 2021-2022, CDC initiated aircraft contact investigations after receiving reports of travelers on commercial flights with probable or confirmed mpox during their infectious period. Data were collected 1) during 2021, when two isolated clade II mpox cases not linked to an outbreak were imported into the United States by international travelers and 2) for flights arriving in or traveling within the United States during April 30-August 2, 2022, after a global clade II mpox outbreak was detected in May 2022. A total of 113 persons (100 passengers and 13 crew members) traveled on 221 flights while they were infectious with mpox. CDC developed definitions for aircraft contacts based on proximity to mpox cases and flight duration, sent information about these contacts to U.S. health departments, and received outcome information for 1,046 (68%) of 1,538 contacts. No traveler was found to have acquired mpox via a U.S. flight exposure. For persons with mpox and their contacts who had departed from the United States, CDC forwarded contact information as well as details about the exposure event to destination countries to facilitate their own public health investigations. Findings from these aircraft contact investigations suggest that traveling on a flight with a person with mpox does not appear to constitute an exposure risk or warrant routine contact tracing activities. Nonetheless, CDC recommends that persons with mpox isolate and delay travel until they are no longer infectious., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. Roisin McElroy reports payment from St. Joseph’s Health Centre/Unity Health Toronto, Toronto, Canada for provision of emergency medical clinical services. Mary-Margaret A. Fill reports receipt of travel funding from the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) for travel to CSTE Executive Board meetings and CSTE conference and unpaid service as member-at-large of CSTE’s Executive Board and the University of Tennessee’s One Health Committee. Catherine M. Brown reports receipt of travel support from CSTE for attendance at the CSTE annual conference and unpaid service as a CSTE Executive Board member. No other potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

We assessed mpox virus prevalence in blood, pharyngeal, and rectal specimens among persons without characteristic rash presenting for JYNNEOS vaccine. Our data indicate that the utility of risk-based screening for mpox in persons without skin lesions or rash via pharyngeal swabs, rectal swabs, and/or blood is likely limited., Competing Interests: Potential conflicts of interest . The authors received no specific funding for this work. The authors: No reported conflicts of interest. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest., (Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America 2023.)

During May 10-December 31, 2022, a total of 29,980 confirmed and probable † U.S. monkeypox (mpox) cases were reported to CDC, predominantly in cisgender adult men reporting recent same-gender sexual partners (1). Urban-rural differences in health (2) and diagnosis of HIV (3,4) and other sexually transmitted infections (5) are well documented nationally. This report describes urban-rural differences in mpox incidence (cases per 100,000 population) among persons aged 15-64 years, by gender and race and ethnicity. Urbanicity was assessed using the 2013 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Urban-Rural Classification Scheme for Counties (2). Substantial differences in incidence by urbanicity, gender, and race and ethnicity were observed; most (71.0%) cases occurred in persons residing in large central urban areas. Among the cases in large central urban areas, most (95.7%) were in cisgender men. The overall incidence of mpox in the United States was 13.5 per 100,000 persons aged 15-64 years and peaked in August in both urban and rural areas. Among cisgender men, incidence in rural areas was approximately 4% that in large central urban areas (risk ratio [RR] = 0.04). Among cisgender women, incidence in rural areas was approximately 11% that in large central urban areas (RR = 0.11). In both urban and rural areas, incidence among non-Hispanic Black or African American (Black) and Hispanic or Latino (Hispanic) persons was consistently higher than that among non-Hispanic White (White) persons; RRs between Black and White persons were highest in rural areas. Support and maintenance of mpox surveillance and prevention efforts including vaccinations should focus on urban areas with the highest incidence of mpox during the 2022 outbreak; however, surveillance and prevention efforts should include all genders, persons of color, and persons residing in both urban and rural areas who are at increased risk for mpox., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. Siobhán O’Connor reports patent applications for kits and methods for determining physiologic levels, ranges of hemoglobin, and disease state, unrelated to the current work. No other potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Monkeypox (mpox) is a disease caused by infection with Monkeypox virus (MPXV), an Orthopoxvirus (OPXV) in the same genus as Variola virus, which causes smallpox. During 2022, a global outbreak involving mpox clade IIb was recognized, primarily among gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men.* Most affected patients have been immunocompetent and experienced ≤10 rash lesions (1). CDC has recommended supportive care including pain control. † However, some patients have experienced severe mpox manifestations, including ocular lesions, neurologic complications, myopericarditis, complications associated with mucosal (oral, rectal, genital, and urethral) lesions, and uncontrolled viral spread due to moderate or severe immunocompromise, particularly advanced HIV infection (2). Therapeutic medical countermeasures (MCMs) are Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-regulated drugs and biologics that are predominantly stockpiled by the U.S. government; MCMs developed for smallpox preparedness or shown to be effective against other OPXVs (i.e., tecovirimat, brincidofovir, cidofovir, trifluridine ophthalmic solution, and vaccinia immune globulin intravenous [VIGIV]) have been used to treat severe mpox. During May 2022-January 2023, CDC provided more than 250 U.S. mpox consultations. This report synthesizes data from animal models, MCM use for human cases of related OPXV, unpublished data, input from clinician experts, and experience during consultations (including follow-up) to provide interim clinical treatment considerations. Randomized controlled trials and other carefully controlled research studies are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of MCMs for treating human mpox. Until data gaps are filled, the information presented in this report represents the best available information concerning the effective use of MCMs and should be used to guide decisions about MCM use for mpox patients., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

On August 29, 2021, the United States government oversaw the emergent establishment of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS), to safely resettle U.S. citizens and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan to the United States. Evacuees were temporarily housed at several overseas locations in Europe and Asia* before being transported via military and charter flights through two U.S. international airports, and onward to eight U.S. military bases, † with hotel A used for isolation and quarantine of persons with or exposed to certain infectious diseases. § On August 30, CDC issued an Epi-X notice encouraging public health officials to maintain vigilance for measles among Afghan evacuees because of an ongoing measles outbreak in Afghanistan (25,988 clinical cases reported nationwide during January-November 2021) (1) and low routine measles vaccination coverage (66% and 43% for the first and second doses, respectively, in 2020) (2)., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Carbapenems are antimicrobial drugs reserved for the treatment of severe multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacterial infections. Carbapenem-resistant organisms (CROs) are an urgent public health threat and have been made reportable to public health authorities in many jurisdictions. Recent reports of CROs in companion animals and veterinary settings suggest that CROs are a One Health problem. However, standard practices of U.S. veterinary diagnostic laboratories (VDLs) to detect CROs are unknown. We assessed the capacity of VDLs to characterize carbapenem resistance in isolates from companion animals. Among 74 VDLs surveyed in 42 states, 23 laboratories (31%) from 22 states responded. Most (22/23, 96%) included ≥1 carbapenem on their primary antimicrobial susceptibility testing panel, and approximately one-third (9/23, 39%) performed phenotypic carbapenemase production testing or molecular identification of carbapenemase genes. Overall, 35% (8/23) of VDLs across eight states reported they would notify public health if a CRO was detected. Most (17/21, 81%) VDLs were not aware of CRO reporting mandates, and some expressed uncertainty about whether the scope of known mandates included CROs from veterinary sources. Although nearly all surveyed VDLs tested for carbapenem resistance, fewer had the capacity for mechanism testing or awareness of public health reporting requirements. Addressing these gaps is critical to monitoring CRO incidence and trends in veterinary medicine, preventing spread in veterinary settings, and mounting an effective One Health response. Improved collaboration and communication between public health and veterinary medicine is critical to inform infection control practices in veterinary settings and conduct a public health response when resistant isolates are detected.

Leafy green vegetables are a common source of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157:H7 (STEC O157) foodborne illness outbreaks. Ruminant animals, primarily cattle, are the major reservoir of STEC O157. Epidemiological, traceback and field investigations were conducted to identify potential outbreak sources. Product and environmental samples were tested for STEC. A reoccurring strain of STEC O157 caused two multistate outbreaks linked to romaine lettuce in 2018 and 2019, resulting in 234 illnesses in 33 states. Over 80% of patients interviewed consumed romaine lettuce before illness. The romaine lettuce was sourced from two California growing regions: Santa Maria and Salinas Valley in 2018 and Salinas Valley in 2019. The outbreak strain was isolated from environmental samples collected at sites >90 miles apart across growing regions, as well as from romaine-containing products in 2019. Although the definitive route of romaine contamination was undetermined, use of a contaminated agricultural water reservoir in 2018 and contamination from cattle grazing on adjacent land in 2019 were suspected as possible factors. Preventing lettuce contamination from growth to consumption is imperative to preventing illness. These outbreaks highlight the need to further understand mechanisms of romaine contamination, including the role of environmental or animal reservoirs for STEC O157.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4)., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.