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In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that the core issue of Philosophy concerns the very nature of the proposition. Later on, after rejecting this claim, Wittgenstein also reconsiders his view on logical necessity, which was implied by his earlier thoughts. From this revised standpoint, a new account on logical necessity is provided, by means of which it is acknowledged that some propositions gain the status of being necessary on a praxis base. Accordingly, this leads Wittgenstein to give a whole new flavour to the traditional synthetic-analytic distinction. Wittgenstein’s work reconcile the revisable character of logical certainty with the objective nature of the expression of experience, preserving the logical character of certainty in a context where necessity is characterized in terms of the absence of reasons. No tempo do Tractatus, Wittgenstein compreendia ser a questão cardeal da filosofia a natureza da proposição. O abandono dessa questão torna possível pensar a necessidade lógica não mais por referências à natureza de determinadas proposições, mas com relação à função orientadora das práticas judicativas exercida por determinadas proposições. Isso conduz a obra de Wittgenstein a relativizar a distinção analítico/sintético fundamental ao logicismo. A questão é como a obra de Wittgenstein é capaz de conciliar o caráter revisável da necessidade lógica com a natureza objetiva da expressão da experiência e, além disso, preservar o caráter lógico da certeza num contexto em que a necessidade caracteriza-se pela ausência de fundamentos. &nbsp

A pesquisa buscou compreender em que medida se pode identificar o modo como Wittgenstein aborda temas relativos à subjetividade em sua obra “madura”, investigando as passagens em que os termos “subjetivo” e “subjetividade” aparecem,bem como termos familiares a eles, como os de “anímico” e “interior”.

Este trabalho teve como principal interesse estudar sobre o potencial do controle exercido por meio das paixões no comportamento humano. Sendo assim, buscou-se investigar suas influências no comportamento do ser humano tratando-as como uma forma de controle, o que ensejou pesquisar sua atuação, de tal modo que a atribuição de sentido da vida de um sujeito estivesse diretamente conectada com a satisfação de outrem ou, de maneira mais geral, satisfação social.

RESUMO: O projeto epistemológico do positivismo lógico é claramente inspirado na análise proposicional feita pelo Tractatus. Em certo sentido, esse projeto é uma exploração da identificação da distinção fato/valor com a distinção necessidade/contingência, da qual resulta o veredito segundo o qual a linguagem não abarca a expressão de valores. O Tractatus está de acordo com esse diagnóstico, mas reserva um lugar especial para o transcendente, ao contrário do positivismo lógico que apenas o extirpa do âmbito da expressão significativa.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Wittgenstein, positivismo lógico, lógica, ética, estética.ABSTRACT: The epistemological project of logical positivism is clearly inspired by the propositional analysis carried out by the Tractatus. In a certain sense, this project identifies the fact/value distinction with the necessity/contingency distinction, which grounds the vindication that language does not convey the expression of values. The Tractatus is in accordance with this vindication, granting a special place for the transcendent as opposed to the logical positivism, which is limited to exclude it from the scope of meaningful expression.KEYWORDS: Wittgenstein, logical positivism, logic, ethics, aesthetics.

This is a review of VENTURINHA, Nuno. Description of Situations: an Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. Cham: Springer, 2018. Trata-se de resenha do livro VENTURINHA, Nuno. Description of Situations:an Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. Cham: Springer, 2018.

For dropping the incommensurability idea elaborated at the time ofThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn dismisses the concept of “revolution”. The incommensurability involved the incomparability of theories. In this new environment, the revolution is replaced by conceptual reformulation and the incommensurability becomes occasional. The linguistic turn in Kuhn’s thought involves conceptual changes whose aim is to get around the accusation of relativism that the former notion of incommensurability arouses. The most fundamental effect of these conceptual reformulations is the commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. It changes the comprehension of the historical and social nature of the foundations of the changes that scientific knowledge goes through. The comparison between the answer to the problem of paradigm priority attributed by Kuhn to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein by himself shows that the basis of the normative nature of paradigm commitment is an essentialist concern. In the second half of this paper, I will evaluate Kuhn’s manner of getting around the problems of incommensurability in contrast to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy dealing with similar issues inOn Certainty. This enables one to essay answers to the problems of incommensurability without relativism or any commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. These contrasts show how far Kuhn’s new theory of science departs from the Wittgensteinian inspiration and abandons the point of view ofThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions.The development of these two halves makes it possible to indicate reasons to believe that questions concerning the theory and history of science can benefit largely from a grammatical exploration, which gives rise to a theory of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s thought, as Mauro Condé suggests.