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The act of criminalising conduct has been understood by many theorists as a form of communication. This paper proposes a model, based on speech-act theory, for understanding how that act of communication works. In particular, it focuses on analysing how and where wrongfulness can appear in this speech-act, if one were to argue, as many theorists do, that part of what is being communicated through criminalisation is the wrongfulness of the target conduct. I argue that the act of criminalisation is best understood as an indirect speech-act, which both asserts and declares normative facts, the utterance of which makes it the case that a conduct is now criminalised. Within this speech-act, wrongfulness can appear as an implicit assertion of the wrongness of the conduct, which has to be inferred by hearers from the context of utterance. The paper then briefly discusses the upshots of this model, mainly that it allows a clearer picture of how criminalisation conveys meanings, as well as leaving open the question as to whether it makes sense to think that the wrongfulness being conveyed is specifically of a moral kind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of the study is due to many social and legal factors. In modern conditions of the development and functioning of various systems for the protection of medical professionals and their patients, the concepts and grounds of medical professional liability are undergoing significant changes. The research of the conditions for the implementation of professional activities by medical professionals and their professional liability is determined by both scientific and practical considerations, since society needs orderliness and predictability of relations in areas of life directly related to the life and health of the patient on the one hand, and the business reputation of the medical professional on the other hand. With the emergence and expansion of professional activities types as integral attributes of social, economic and legal relations, a number of questions have arisen regarding a) improving the legal regulation of the professional activities of medical professionals; b) determining the goals of the medical professional liability; c) determining the medical professional liability grounds. The source base for the research is the valid legislation of Ukraine, laws and by-laws, research and comparison of which requires a systematic approach and various research methods, such as: dialectical, logical-legal, system-structural, forecasting and comparative law methods, as well as materials judicial practice. The article, first of all, concludes that the medical professional liability is applied to an individual entrepreneur (private practitioner) or a legal entity (health care institution) that provides medical services to the population, in accordance with a business license activities in medical practice, in case of causing harm to patients due to non-performance or improper performance of their professional duties, measures of government coercion in the form of sanctions (additional encumbrances) aimed at restoring the violated rights and interests of the patient. Secondly, it has been set that the medical professional liability shall arise only under the following grounds: wrongfulness of the medical professional, damage caused to the patient, causation and regardless of the medical professional guilt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Russian doctrine of tort law, the discussion of fault as a condition of tort liability is reduced to establishing its content by means of subjective or objective criteria. The first approach considers fault is a special mental attitude of a delinquent to illegal behavior and its consequences. According to the objective approach, fault lies in the failure of a delinquent to take the necessary precautions. However, scientists often abstract from identifying the genesis of these approaches. The article attempts to fill this gap. To achieve the goal, the author uses the historical method and refers primarily to Roman law. It allows, on the one hand, to indicate the causes of fault, on the other hand, to determine its content. The results of the study show that in classical Roman law, fault served as a fine-tuning tool when bringing a person to tort liability: in some cases, it expanded the limits of liability, in others, on the contrary, narrowed its scope. In addition, fault, defined in Roman law primarily by objective criteria, tended to coincide with wrongfulness. Some prerequisites for their separation can only be found in the Corpus Iuris Civilis. Significant changes occurred in the Middle Ages. By the 13th century, due to the influence of canon law, fault acquires a subjective content. This was largely due to the growing role of confession as the main element in the doctrine of the reconciliation of the sinner with God. Thus, the idea of the individual relation of the delinquent to the violation was formed, which contributed to strengthening the subjective approach. The article also reflects the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on human actions, thanks to which the subjective approach got into the studies of postglossators, as well as Hugo Grotius. By the 17th century, as a result of a complex process of interpenetration of legal and religious spheres, the subjective concept of fault finds its way into both criminal and tort law.

Polish and foreign case-law as well as legal doctrine sometimes present the opinion that in the law of torts a universally binding duty exists not to cause harm to others (the neminem laedere principle). Its breach is supposed to determine the wrongfulness of the tortfeasor's behaviour. The purpose of the article is to analyse whether this principle may be applicable to the protection of personality rights. Due to different ways of understanding in jurisprudence what this principle consists of, the potential application of two concepts was considered. Firstly, if in the legal system there is a general norm of behaviour prohibiting the infringement of another individual's personality rights. Secondly, if there is a general norm of behaviour not to cause others non-pecuniary damage (including immaterial harm - pain and suffering). The neminem laedere principle is not a general principle of Polish law and is also not applicable to the protection of personality rights. This principle can be regarded only as a moral imperative and a postulate for the harmonious coexistence of individuals in society rather than a legal duty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the issue of compensation for pure economic losses under Russian law. The category of pure economic losses came into the focus of Russian researchers relatively recently. Currently, the mainstream discussion of Russian scholars on the topic is based on the analysis of foreign cases and arguments related to them. Meanwhile, Russian case law has been enriched with precedents that can lead to a non-consistent way for resolving such kind of disputes. We propose the approach that the reimbursement of pure economic losses directly depends on the determination of the limits of tort liability or its conditions. Thereby, the comprehensive analysis of these conditions will make it possible to more clearly define the scope of the pure economic losses. Nevertheless, the conservatism of the Russian doctrine of tort law and the inconsistency of law enforcement does not always allow us to apply the usual conditions of tort liability as a method for analyzing pure economic losses under Russian law. Thus, we consider the arguments for and against the recovery of pure economic losses that have developed abroad and are often discussed by Russian scholars. Besides, the article deals with the most important cases in which the courts have granted claims for the recovery of the pure economic losses. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the courts does not always look satisfactory, since it has not always been supported by the strict analysis of conditions of tort liability. We also consider cases where courts' attention to factual circumstances prevails over their legal analysis. Although these cases reflect the current Russian political agenda, we posit that they provide with valuable material for legal discussion on the issue of recovery of pure economic losses. The coherent application of liability conditions would have removed the political context of these cases and led to the concentration of courts' attention on the legal details of the cases. As a result, the authors postulate the need to analyze the core of tort liability, i.e., its conditions. This will create a more subtle mechanism for setting up tort liability and develop immunity of tort law to exogenous factors related to the political context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contains analysis of several aspects of civil liability and the criteria of its application, by providing a point of view to such complicated concepts as defining fault and wrongful act and finding them in actions of persons. The article contains analysis and opinion about the meaning and the role of fault and its degree (negligence and intent) in the application of civil liability. Also, there is analysis about the doctrine of the foreseeability of infringement of rights, as well as a proposal to clarify the predominant approach in establishing civil liability in Latvia. The examined questions are analyzed from the standpoint of theoretical sciences, therefore allowing other legal scholars in Romano-Germanic states to use the conclusions given in the article in their scientific work as well.

This article evaluates the defence of violenti non fit inuiria in sport with specific reference to the principle of bonos mores or the “good morals” in society to tolerate injuries in sport. The increased prevalence of serious injuries in sport in the professional era, in which sportsmen earn their livelihood from sport, necessitate a review of the existing situation. The death of the Australian cricket player, Phil Hughes, as a result of fast, short-pitched bowling in cricket, has again put the spotlight on the aggressive and excessive use of "violence" in sport. The malicious intent in sport, to harm or even to kill an opponent, has made it necessary to ask if there should be any difference in the manner in which the perpetrator of violence in sport should be treated as against ordinary criminal law assault and murder offenders. A two-pronged approach is suggested in the article as a possible way of dealing with wrongfulness in cricket.

This article provides an analysis of the Dutch Supreme Court judgment in the Mothers of Srebrenica case, placing it in its context, and comparing it with earlier and related decisions, in particular the judgments in the cases of Nuhanović and Mustafić. The Mothers of Srebrenica is a foundation established to represent the interests of the approximately 6000 surviving relatives of the victims of the fall of Srebrenica during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (1995). The foundation holds the Netherlands responsible for not having done enough to protect the victims of the Srebrenica genocide. This contribution addresses the attribution of the conduct of the United Nations peacekeeping contingent to the troop-contributing State (the Netherlands), followed by the wrongfulness of the peacekeepers' conduct and the State's attendant liability for damages suffered by the victims. It is argued that the Dutch State's international responsibility was only engaged because of the exceptional circumstances present in Srebrenica at the time. In the ordinary course of events, the liability of troop-contributing States is unlikely to be engaged if the Supreme Court's review standard were to be applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aims to examine crime seriousness perceptions by scrutinising their key components – perceived wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime. It also seeks to examine the extent to which these concepts are related to sociodemographic characteristics, conservation values, legal cynicism, religiosity, and exposure to media coverage of crime. A survey was administered to 408 residents in Portugal containing vignettes pertaining to two seriousness levels of both conventional and white-collar crime. The twenty resulting offence scenarios were grouped into four groups: heavier scenarios of conventional crimes, lighter scenarios of conventional crimes, heavier scenarios of white-collar crime, and lighter scenarios of white-collar crime. The results show that only legal cynicism has a consistent influence on crime wrongfulness perceptions for the four crime groups and some influence on crime harmfulness perceptions for lighter scenarios of conventional crimes. As for conservation values and religiosity, the only effects observed are on the perceived wrongfulness and perceived harmfulness of heavier scenarios of conventional crimes. Exposure to media coverage of crime does not seem to have an impact on the assessment of these two perceptual variables. Sociodemographic characteristics and victimization experiences explain only minor differences in the assessment of the seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness of crimes. • Perceived harmfulness the main determinant of crime seriousness perceptions. • Conservative people perceive heavier conventional crimes as less wrongful. • Religiosity only affects harmfulness perceptions for heavier conventional crimes. • Legal cynicism: most consistent attitudinal predictor across different crime groups. • Media exposure does not influence perceived wrongfulness and harmfulness of crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: to identify and resolve conflicts between the norms of constitutional and criminal law which regulate the issue of legal liability of senior officials of the state.Methods: formal-logical, systematic, comparative-legal.Results: the article analyzes the embodiment of the principle of citizens’ equality under the law regarding the criminal responsibility of the President of the Russian Federation as one of the segments of the elite right; other criminal and legal conflicts are considered, associated with the creation of conditions for derogation from the principle of equality. Basing on this analysis, the means of overcoming collisions between the norms of constitutional and criminal law are formulated.Scientific novelty: in the article for the first time it has been shown that in the Russian criminal law there are exceptions to the principle of citizens’ equality under the law relating to the President of the Russian Federation; the conflicts are identified between the norms of constitutional and criminal law, regulating the issue of legal liability of senior officials of the state; ways of overcoming conflicts are suggested.Practical significance: the main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used in research and teaching in the consideration of issues of senior state officials’ criminal liability.

Bereavement can be a precipitating and perpetuating factor for various psychiatric injuries. However, the normal experience of bereavement also causes significant disruption and stress in an individual's psychosocial functioning. Both in the Netherlands and in South Africa, a clear distinction is drawn between sadness and psychiatric injury. Dutch law until recently did not make provision for compensation for sadness, but only for psychiatric injury. This has changed with the coming into operation of the Wet Affectieschade on 1 January 2019. In terms of South African law, there is no claim for compensation for sadness or bereavement. The authors are of the opinion that bereavement, sadness or grief resulting from bereavement causes significant distress and a continuum exists between normal and complex bereavement where a clear distinction does not exist. South African courts should, therefore, bear this is mind in actions for compensation for non-patrimonial loss for bereavement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the qualification of insignificance of act problematic issues, the impact of judicial discretion in the formation of judicial practice on the assessment of insignificance is reflected. The basic signs of insignificance are described, the conditions for recognition insignificant acts are defined. The authors come to the conclusion to exclude part 2 of Art. 14 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and amend it by the article "Exemption from the criminal liability in connection with acts of insignificance", limiting the range of categories of such acts only to minor offenses committed by first time.

This paper examines the concept of externalities using the concepts of rights and corrective justice as an alternative to utilitarianism and efficiency. Specifically, standard treatments of externalities in welfare economics do not consider the role of wrongfulness in the harms that economists and policymakers aim to optimize. I argue that if a harm is wrongful, involving the violation of a valid legal right, then it can be addressed through the existing system of tort law without necessarily involving mechanisms of policy or regulation. If a harm is not wrongful, however, then it should be considered an incidental and ordinary effect of interactions within a world of scarcity, which does not justify any government intervention, especially if the activity that led to the nonwrongful harm involved an exercise of the injurer’s valid rights.

Litigation involving social media is still very new in South Africa and only a few reported cases can be found. In this case discussion, a brief overview is given of the few cases already reported, but in the main the case of Isparta v Richter 2013 6 SA 4529 (GP) is discussed. In this case a South African court for the first time awarded damages to the plaintiff for defamatory comments made on Facebook. The questions that confronted the judge were whether the alleged defamatory statements did indeed relate to the plaintiff and whether the comments, individually or collectively, could be considered defamatory. The issue whether the "tagging" of another user of Facebook makes that user liable for the defamatory comments of the tagger is also addressed in the case. The case discussion concludes with a reference to other issues that could play a role in litigation involving Facebook, namely the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 and foreign law.

the contents and the structure of wrongdoing have been subject to an intense dogmatic debate throughout time. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and evaluate the main theories on that subject in the current Spanish and German dogmatic debate, as well as their connection to the punishment of the attempted crime, especially of the so-called "unsuitable attempt". Finally, I will defend a dualist conception of wrongdoing (based as a general rule on an objective and subjective wrongful conduct and a wrongful result), in which, however, some exceptions without the latter are allowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates the defence of violenti non fit inuiria in sport with specific reference to the principle of bonos mores or the "good morals" in society to tolerate injuries in sport. The increased prevalence of serious injuries in sport in the professional era, in which sportsmen earn their livelihood from sport, necessitate a review of the existing situation. The death of the Australian cricket player, Phil Hughes, as a result of fast, short-pitched bowling in cricket, has again put the spotlight on the aggressive and excessive use of "violence" in sport. The malicious intent in sport, to harm or even to kill an opponent, has made it necessary to ask if there should be any difference in the manner in which the perpetrator of violence in sport should be treated as against ordinary criminal law assault and murder offenders. A two-pronged approach is suggested in the article as a possible way of dealing with wrongfulness in cricket. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attempt to analyze one of the necessary conditions determining the obligations to compensate for damage caused by the judiciary is made in the article. The author focuses on the wrongfulness of a court’s decisions, acts and/or omissions as a condition of such obligations. It is emphasized that the category “miscarriage of justice” is used as a generic term for the aforementioned forms of wrongful behavior under the provisions of some international instruments and the legislation of some foreign countries. Meanwhile, the author shows that the incorporation of such an approach into national legislation is inappropriate. It is concluded that the problem of extending the list of wrongful actions of judicial bodies and their officials is particularly relevant for Ukraine, considering the practice of the ECHR. Special attention is given to the case of compensation for damage caused to an individual or legal entity as a result of a court rendering an illegal decision in a civil case.

People's reactions to offenders and victims of crime follow different rationales. Whereas the punishment of the offender is primarily determined by the severity of the crime (which includes its foreseeable harmful consequences), the actual harm that is experienced by the victim drives the need for his or her support and assistance. With the introduction of the Victim Impact Statement (VIS), in which victims are allowed to express the (harmful) consequences of the crime on their lives, the question is raised whether allowing such victim input during criminal proceedings would influence the offender's sentence. The main goal of the current research is to disentangle how a crime's wrongfulness and harmfulness influence people's reactions to offenders and victims. We show that, whereas people's perceptions of the offender (and the outcome of the trial) are influenced by the severity of the crime, people's judgements related to the victim are more likely to be influenced by an interaction between the severity of the crime and the experienced harm of the crime. That is, in this study no support was found for the argument that the delivery of a VIS would lead to a violation of the proportionality principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose Although the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of criminal conduct and to distinguish it from childish mischief forms the basis of Age of Criminal Responsibility ( ACR) legislation in many countries, empirical research on the extent to which children possess this ability is limited. It was the aim of this study to investigate this issue. Methods A total of 132 males and females from four age groups (8, 12, and 16 years and adults) participated in the study. Participants listened to a series of vignettes which described a person committing a transgression. The seriousness of the transgressions varied across vignettes. Participants then provided ratings on the wrongfulness and outcome expectations associated with the conduct described in the vignette. Results Participants from all age groups evaluated criminal conduct more negatively than mischievous conduct. Participants from all age groups also anticipated more negative self-reactions, more negative reactions from peers, and more severe legal sanctions for criminal conduct. Conclusions Eight-year-olds from the study sample demonstrated that they meet the current cognitive standard associated with achieving the ACR. These 8-year-olds also provided evidence that they were comparable to older children and adults in terms of their understanding of the wrongfulness of criminal behaviour and the ability to distinguish it from mischievous behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between 'the harms' and 'the wrongs' of the authors' title. I begin by comparing the authors' version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors' account of 'harm' is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one's character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors' account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contains analysis of several aspects of civil liability and the criteria of its application, by providing a point of view to such complicated concepts as defining fault and wrongful act and finding them in actions of persons. The article contains analysis and opinion about the meaning and the role of fault and its degree (negligence and intent) in the application of civil liability. Also, there is analysis about the doctrine of the foreseeability of infringement of rights, as well as a proposal to clarify the predominant approach in establishing civil liability in Latvia. The examined questions are analyzed from the standpoint of theoretical sciences, therefore allowing other legal scholars in Romano-Germanic states to use the conclusions given in the article in their scientific work as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two recent decisions the Dutch Supreme Court confirmed a decision of the Court of Appeal that the acts of Dutchbat in sending three Bosnian men, who were subsequently murdered by the Bosnian-Serb armed forces, away from its compound in Srebrenica in 1995 were attributable to the State. In addition, the Court confirmed that the State acted wrongfully in expelling the men from the compound. These decisions mark the first time an individual government has been deemed responsible for the conduct of its troops involved in a peacekeeping mission. Central to the decision were the issues of the attribution of responsibility, including the question of effective control in peacekeeping operations, and the wrongfulness of the peacekeepers' actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper responds to Antje du-Bois Pedain's discussion of the wrongfulness constraint on the criminal law. Du-Bois Pedain argues that the constraint is best interpreted as stating that φing is legitimately criminalised only if φing is wrongful for other-regarding reasons. We take issue with du-Bois Pedain's arguments. In our view, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is wrongful in du-Bois Pedain's sense. Rather, it is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is what we call bare wrongful-that is, that the reasons in favour of φing are defeated by the reasons against. Though du-Bois Pedain is critical of this view, we argue that her criticisms do not convince. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas liberals tend to emphasize harm as the decisive criterion for legitimizing criminalisation, moralists take a qualified notion of wrongfulness as sufficient even when no harm is at hand. This comment takes up Andreas von Hirsch's 'dual element approach' requiring both harm and wrongfulness as necessary conditions for criminalisation and argues that Joel Feinberg's account of harming as violation of moral rights is perfectly compatible with it. Subsequently, two issues from the liberalism-moralism debate on criminalisation are examined: The difficulty of how to determine wrongfulness beyond the scope of harming, and the so far disregarded question of whether the democratic legislator is free within the framework of constitution to criminalise whatever conduct he wants to prevent irrespective of philosophical constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If conduct must be wrongful in order to be justifiably criminalised, how should its wrongfulness be established? I examine a conception of wrongfulness put forward by A. P. Simester, which makes wrongfulness turn on whether the reasons favouring the performance of an action are, all things considered, defeated by the reasons against its performance. I argue that such a view can only generate appropriate substantive constraints in the context of criminalisation if it can distinguish between the sorts of reasons that a verdict of wrongfulness, as a concept distinct from stupidity or selfishness, should attend to, and the sorts of reasons it should leave out. Assuming that this conception of wrongfulness should operate as a constraint on criminalisation in a liberal-democratic state, the only reasons it should include are other-regarding reasons. What matters is whether the agent commits an other-regarding wrong. This conception of wrongfulness helps us further to resolve fundamental questions concerning mala prohibita and the legitimate reach of any duty to obey the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary theories of criminalisation address, with varying emphasis, themes concerning the harmfulness and the wrongfulness of the conduct. In his article for the present issue, Antony Duff relies chiefly on notions of wrongfulness as the basis for his proposed criminalisation doctrines; whereas in their 2011 volume on criminalisation, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch invoke both wrongfulness and harmfulness as prerequisites for prohibiting conduct. The present article assesses the comparative merits of these approaches, and argues in favour of the latter, two-element perspective. In this article, the author puts forward a number of reasons suggesting why the two-element approach (of wrongfulness and harm) is preferable. These reasons include, firstly, an inductive argument-that the kinds of wrongful conduct for which criminalisation seems a plausible response are those that include an element of harm or risk of harm. Secondly, a defining role for the state is one of resource-protection: of safeguarding the means and resources through which citizens can live good lives. Thus the concept of citizens' living resources-and the related conception of harm-should be made a constitutive and explicit element of criminalisation theory, rather than subsuming resource-protection under a general rubric of wrongfulness. Thirdly, a two-element approach provides reciprocal limiting principles concerning the scope of criminalisation. One can, for example, employ wrongfulness requirements to limit the criminalisation of conduct that has remote harmful consequences; and, conversely, use a harmfulness requirement as means for restricting the criminalisation of wrongful acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the M'Naghten Standard originated in the mid-nineteenth century, courts across the United States have continued, even up to recent times, to help clarify this commonly used definition for legal insanity. Since the reintroduction of the M'Naghten Standard in California in the early 1980s, much attention has been paid to it by the courts, especially in regard to the definition and interpretation of wrongfulness and, principally, moral wrongfulness. In order for forensic evaluators in California, as well as in other states utilizing similar definitions, to provide appropriate evaluations of mental status at the time of the offense, it is ethically necessary for them to understand and apply the relevant legal definitions developed over time through case law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to freedom of speech or expression of the press and other media and the personality rights to a good name, dignity, privacy and identity -- which are particularly prone to infringements by the mass media -- are recognised and protected both at common law and constitutionally in the Bill of Rights. Because freedom of speech and the personality rights concerned are often diametrically opposed, a careful weighing up of the conflicting rights is required. In this regard the common law succeeded in achieving a workable balance between maintaining freedom of speech on the one hand, and the protection of the relevant rights of personality on the other. In the present field this applies particularly to the rules which have been developed with regard to the grounds of justification in order to provide the media with the right to limit the protection of the personality interests involved within delimited, legally acceptable boundaries, as well as to the acceptance of negligence liability of the mass media for defamation. The entrenchment of all these rights in the Bill of Rights nevertheless brought about a new dimension which must now thoroughly be taken into consideration in the weighing-up process. In fact, the courts have a duty to rectify the common law where it deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. But this will not readily be done, since the common law was developed on the basis of contemporary (entrenched) rights that already existed in the pre-constitutional era, and the Bill of Rights therefore merely emphasises the principles already at play in the common law. In dealing with the protection of the four personality rights vis-à-vis the right to freedom of speech, first of all a description is provided of the requirements for an actionable infringement of each personality right by the mass media. Next, the wrongfulness of the violation of each right is examined, emphasising that a factual infringement of the personality interest involved (except in the case of the right to a good name) must simultaneously also be in conflict with the legal convictions of the community (boni mores), sometimes expressed as the opinion, notional understanding and reaction of a reasonable person with normal intelligence and sensibilities. Where this is the case, the infringement is prima facie (seemingly) wrongful but the media defendant may rebut such wrongfulness by proving the existence of a ground of justification for the publication complained of. The relevant grounds are the reporting of proceedings of courts, parliament and public bodies, publishing remarks that are true and in the public interest, fair comment on facts that are true and in the public interest, the reasonable publication of false allegations, the reasonable publication of (false) allegations in the political field, and the publication of personal information that is in the public interest. These grounds of justification do not constitute a closed number, and new grounds may therefore be recognised where legal policy considerations demand that the maintenance of freedom of speech be extended. On the other hand, negligence liability, as damper on freedom of speech, should, as with defamation and for the same considerations, also be applicable to the infringement by the mass media of the other three rights of personality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]