Search

Metaphysicians of composite objects commonly distinguish two types of composite objects: wholes and sums. The former can survive some changes of parts, while the latter cannot. This paper investigates how the distinction between wholes and sums can be respected, while denying that a sum is an individual composite object. In particular, the view presented here identifies wholes with the fusions of (extensional) mereology – hence going against a common tendency to identify sums with mereological fusions – and identifies sums with the pluralities of plural logic. It is argued that this view better captures the ideas behind the whole/sum-distinction while also avoiding various challenges the other accounts face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Damiano Costa has recently offered a novel mereological definition of endurantism based on the idea that for an object to be wholly present at a time is for it to be a whole at that time. In this paper, I argue that Costa's is not a definition of endurantism, since the idea that every object is a whole at every time it exists can be accepted by endurantists and perdurantists alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Intrinsic properties are those which cannot be had or lacked in virtue of other things. Being a square is intrinsic, in this sense, whereas being next to a square is not. But what, exactly, counts as an “other thing” in this context? As it turns out, this is a surprisingly difficult question. I provide a critical assessment of three existing proposals (in terms of identity, mereology, and ontology), before developing my own, alternative account. Along the way, we highlight ways in which this project intersects with other philosophical issues, including debates over the nature of existence, the essentiality of origins, and the truth of priority monism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past half‐century critical historiographies of philosophy have challenged the exclusionist Eurocentric and masculinist presumptions of "history of philosophy," and we have witnessed the multiplication of philosophical worlds in the relation of indigenous to Western scholarship and in critical philosophical anthropologies. Does this mean that there is, or can be, no unity to the history of philosophy? In this article, I argue that these challenges are not incompatible with our thinking the unity of the history of philosophy, so long as we understand it to be an historical "distributive unity," constitutively related to other histories and to social, political, and institutional realities, and open to continuous transformation. The idea of a "critical history of philosophy" emerges from this. I argue that a critical history of philosophy proceeds via the problematizations of contemporary thought, which are then themselves challenged by that critical history and that it can and must include what remains marginal to its canonical history, working in conjunction with the theory and practices of other disciplines. These general claims are illustrated by showing how a critical history of philosophy could proceed in practice in relation to the contemporary problematization of the concept of "sex." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, 'Socrates is running', you begin by uttering the subject term Socrates, before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding thoughts also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard's account. I then present a series of arguments against Abelard, reconstructed from (sometimes fragmentary) manuscripts associated with Alberic's school. I conclude with an observation about present philosophy of language: this twelfth-century debate points to some undefended (and largely unstated) assumptions common to more recent thinking about propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grounding necessitarianism (GN) is the view that full grounds necessitate what they ground. Although GN has been rather popular among philosophers, it faces important counterexamples: For instance, A = [Socrates died] fully grounds C = [Xanthippe became a widow]. However, A fails to necessitate C: A could have obtained together with B = [Socrates and Xanthippe were never married], without C obtaining. In many cases, the debate essentially reduces to whether A indeed fully grounds C–as the contingentist claims–or if instead C is fully grounded in A+, namely A plus some supplementary fact S (e.g. [Xanthippe was married to Socrates])–as the necessitarian claims. Both sides typically agree that A+ necessitates C, while A does not; they disagree on whether A or A+ fully grounds C. This paper offers a novel defence of the claim that, in these typical cases, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C–thereby bringing further support to GN. First and foremost, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C because it fails to contain just what is relevant to do so, in two distinct senses–explanatory and generative relevance. Second, going for A, rather than A+, as a full ground undermines not just grounding necessitarianism, but modally weaker views which even contingentists may want to preserve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the conflation between world and planet in H. G. Wells's turn-of-the-century science fiction. Writing when "world=planet" was not a given, Wells actively participated in the formation of the world-planet vocabulary across a range of genres and throughout the first half of the twentieth century. In particular, I look into the planetary experiments of his early fiction, where the materially limited planet continually thwarts the writer's attempts to equate that planet to the world he wished to develop as the ultimate political unit. Emerging through such attempts is a divergence between world and planet that enables us to think about the individual, the world, and the planet all on a commensurate scale, in a manner that is strikingly—and perhaps also troublingly—similar to what recent environmental discourse asks of us today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There's a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh–eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Śrīgupta's 'neither-one-nor-many argument' against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses both semantic issues of countability in linguistics, and philosophical issues arising from the problem of the many. I argue (i) that the problem of the many is orthogonal to vagueness and we should look to the semantics of count nouns and numerals for its solution; (ii) that the problem of the many is a challenge for contemporary mereological analyses of count nouns in semantics; but (iii) that the count criterion in these theories can be weakened to avoid the problem. Specifically, weak quantization is proposed as the criterion: a sum, x, counts as nPs if and only if x has n disjoint parts, each of which is in the extension of P, but where the sum of no two of them is also in the extension of P. I show how importing this idea into the semantics of numerals provides a semantic means of dissolving the paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main problem in making sense of Mitsein as an aspect of Dasein in Being and Time concerns the sense in which individual Dasein is an ‘I’, given that it can be either an ‘anyone-self’ or an ‘authentic self’. Though it is clear that the anyone-self relates directly to das Man, the relation of the authentic self to others is debatable. In this paper, I reexamine the relations between self and others by making sense of the referent of each mode of selfhood, with special attention to the problem of explaining the relations between the two. The problem, I claim, can be solved by bringing into relief a certain conception of mereology (theory of parthood relations) that underlies Heidegger’s arguments. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger uses a mereological terminology that appropriates Husserl’s logic of parts and wholes from the Logical Investigations. In view of this, I suggest understanding individual Dasein, both qua anyone-self and qua authentic self, as a moment, i.e. a dependent part of an open-ended whole. The apparent gap between anyone-self and authentic self can be better understood as a shift of focus between two different aspects of being the same type of dependent part of a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I defend Spinoza's claim that extension is an attribute that an indivisible substance, such as God, could have. However, in order to explain why, we must abandon two long held orthodoxies in Spinoza scholarship. First, Spinoza acknowledges only parts that do not depend on their whole. Second, God, considered as natura naturans, has no parts of any kind. Against these orthodoxies, I show that having parts which depend on their whole, for Spinoza, does not entail divisibility and that God, considered as natuara naturans, must have such parts in order to be extended. Along the way, we will have a closer look at Spinoza’s mereology and address apparently conflicting statements that Spinoza makes about the relation of part and whole that have long vexed commentators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of what constitutes an apt interpreted model for the purpose of analyzing causation. I first collect universally adopted aptness principles into a basic account, flagging open questions and choice points along the way. I then explore various additional aptness principles that have been proposed in the literature but have not been widely adopted, the motivations behind their proposals, and the concerns with each that stand in the way of universal adoption. I conclude that the remaining work of articulating aptness for a SEM analysis of causation is tied up with issues to do with modality, ontology, and mereology. Continuing this work is therefore likely to shed light on the relationship between these areas and causation more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the role that can be played by philosophy education in terms of addressing the crisis of subjectivity and modernity in Africa. Philosophy education in Africa can play the function of liberating Africans from alien modalities of existence and ways of being, and in return embarking on a new journey of self-invention. Without succumbing to a reactive epistemic nationalism that identifies the totality of European philosophy with the ideologies of colonialism, there is a need to develop a form of philosophy education that is cognisant of the troubled path within which the African mode of individual existence and modernity are constituted within. This contributes to the development of a vision of an African future that is founded on collective histories and struggles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2013, Bennett proposed a mereological theory in which the parthood relation is defined on the basis of two primitive relations: a is a part of b iff a fills a slot owned by b. However, this theory has issues counting how many parts an entity has. We explore the various counting problems and propose a new theory to solve them. Keeping the core idea of Bennett's slots, this theory introduces mereological relations between slots. This theory enables us to solve all known counting problems and to go beyond the limits of Bennett's theory by theorising expected features of mereological theories: supplementation principles and mereological sum and fusion. The theory is illustrated on ontological issues on the nature of structural universals and informational entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Julius Nyerere was one of the founding fathers of an independent African state, namely, Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika). Like other African leaders of new African states, such as Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and Kenneth Kaunda, he worked tirelessly to transform his country and obliterate colonial vestiges. Furthermore, like his contemporaries, he dreamed of bringing forth a new Africa that would reflect the Pan-African ideals that he cherished. This conceptual article revisits Nyerere's philosophy and examines its relevance to Africa today. In the past decade, there have been continuous debates in South Africa as to how institutions can be decolonized, and Nyerere was among the first to talk about decolonization of higher education institutions in Tanganyika, as well as Africanization of public services. The article examines how his philosophy draws from Pan Africanism, education, African socialism, and African Renaissance. As the article examines these, it reveals how a transforming Africa can glean from Nyerere's principles. The article's conclusions demonstrate that there is still much that can be extracted from Nyerere's philosophy; the unity he talked about, as a strategy of uniting Africa by utilizing his Pan Africanist ideals; the critical consciousness in education; the idea of community in society; as well as a need for Africanizing public institutions for better service. More than five decades after he first raised this philosophy, the decolonial debates resonate with his ideas. In fact, all African states should explore how they could revive Julius Nyerere by living his philosophy. His philosophy embraced strategies of not only building a new society but living and preparing for an African Renaissance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I present the core arguments of my book True Purposes in Hegel's Logic. In particular, I develop Hegel's case for teleology as the truth of mechanism, which is central to his discussion of teleology and the objectivity of purposiveness in his philosophical logic. I briefly relate Hegel's views to contemporary approaches to mechanism and mechanical explanation in order to facilitate a fair evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently mereological hylomorphism, the theory in which form and matter are considered to be proper parts of objects, has become very important among contemporary metaphysicians. The present work aims to analyse and dismantle Bennett's criticism regarding the existence of formal proper parts. To do this, I will start by presenting Koslicki's mereological hylomorphism. Next, I will focus on Bennett's critique which seeks to deny the existence of formal proper parts. Finally, I will analyse critically the Bennett's criticism focusing on the scenario of lump of clay and statue. I will show Bennett's proposal is not explanatorily better than Koslicki's hylomorphism because she needs to accept a counter-intuitive thesis. Therefore, we should prefer Koslicki's mereological hylomorphism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we want to present the genesis of Stanisław Leśniewski's mereology. Although 'mereology' comes from theword 'part', mereology arose as a theory of collective classes. That is why we present the differences between the concepts of being a distributive class and being a collective class. Next, we present Leśniewski's original mereology from 1927, but with a modern approach. Leśniewski was inspired to create his concept of classes and their elements by Russell's antinomy. To face it, Leśniewski had to define the concept of being an element of based on the concept of being part of. Leśniewski showed that in his theory, there is no equivalent to Russell's antinomy. We will show that his solution has nothing to do with the original approach because, in both cases, we are talking about objects of a different kind. Russell's original antinomy concerned distributive classes, and Leśsniewski's considerations concerned collective classes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not sufficient to establish an obligation. I consider the extent to which partial reasons are reasons, and why they cannot be reduced to or identified with pro tanto reasons. I lay out two approaches to the content of reasons, the flat theory and the structured theory. I argue that parts of reasons are not partial reasons, by showing that natural ways to represent parts of reasons in the flat theory and the structured theory lead to overgeneration problems with regard to partial reasons. I then formulate two notions of partial reasons: one based on a notion of partial support, which is in turn captured by the notions of full support and partial content, and one based on the notion of in exact verification. I show under which conditions the two notions of partial reasons (based on partial content, and based on inexact verification) coincide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we are concerned with the development of a general set theory using the single axiom version of Lesniewski's mereology. The specification of mereology, and further of Tarski's geometry of solids will rely on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC). In the first, part we provide a specification of Lesniewski's mereology as a model for an atomless Boolean algebra using Clay's ideas. In the second part, we interpret Lesniewski's mereology in monadic second-order logic using names and develop a full version of mereology referred to as CIC-based Monadic Mereology (λ-MM) allowing an expressive theory while involving only two axioms. In the third part, we propose a modeling of Tarski's geometry of solids relying on λ-MM. It is intended to serve as a basis for spatial reasoning. All parts have been proved using a translation in type theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0034-8244) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Plotinus criticizes the view that individual human souls are parts of the world-soul arguing that they would lack individual agency since their alleged actions would have to be attributed to the whole they are parts of (III.1.4). He nevertheless holds that individual souls are parts of a larger whole, the so-called hypostasis soul, a soul that does not ensoul any body but encompasses and produces all individual souls including the world-soul (IV.3.4.14–21; IV.8.36–12; IV.9.5). In this paper, I ask whether Plotinus, in the face of his own arguments, can consistently attribute agency to individual souls and hold that they are parts of the hypostasis soul. I argue that Plotinus' model of intelligible mereology (VI.2.20) allows individual souls to depend on the hypostasis soul as parts in a way that grounds their agency by providing them with the capacity for rational thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what selftransformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I characterize self-transformative processes in terms of composition (using a non-classic mereology) and in terms of functionality (by developing the concept of self-modulating variables). Finally, I apply self-transformative processes to explain consciousness. Traces of self-transformativeness can be found in many theories of consciousness, particularly when they are stressed about their internal mechanisms. Here, I focus on Integrated Information Theory as a paradigmatic example of a mathematically well-described theory, and I demonstrate that quantitative selftransformativeness is a requirement at the very core of the integration of the information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines several intended topological features of the Region Connection Calculus (RCC) and argues that they are either under-determined by the formal theory or given by the complement axiom. Conditions are identified under which the axioms of RCC are satisfied in topological models under various set restrictions. The results generalise previous results in the literature to non-strict topological models and across possible interpretations of connection. It is shown that the intended interpretation of connection and the alignment of self-connection with topological connection are underdetermined by the axioms of RCC, which suggests that additional axioms are necessary to secure these features. It is also argued that the complement axiom gives RCC models much of their topological structure. In particular, the incompatibility of RCC with interiors is argued to be given by the complement axiom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the term "sea" (hai) in the four-character Chinese idioms according to conceptual metaphor and metonymy theory, attempting to illustrate their conceptualization, determine their possible underlying motivations, and explore Chinese maritime thought and culture. Based on idiomatic expressions, three types of conceptual metaphors are identified: abstract qualities of concrete entities are the sea, abstract entity is sea, and a certain aspect of a human being is sea. Moreover, the four types of conceptual metonymies are the part for the whole, the whole for the part, the place for the product, and the place for the responsible deities or goddesses. They are motivated by a culture of worship of and accordance with nature, the pursuit of achievements in traditional Chinese literature, "man paid, nature made" as the attitude towards the ups and downs of life, and a self-centered conceptualization of the world. The maritime culture represented in these conceptualizations comprises fear of and respect for the sea, harmony between humans and the sea, and static–dynamic integrations of river, land, and sea. The findings show that the motivations of these conceptualizations do not only originate from the embodiment and Chinese philosophy of the unity of heaven and humanity but are also constrained by the most influential talent selection mechanism, the Imperial Examination System, as well as by agriculture, the foundation of the economy in ancient China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been proposed in the literature and thereby avoids the charge of obscurity put forward by Sider against the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Análisis Filosófico is the property of Sociedad Argentina de Analisis Filosofico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is the macro grounded in the micro? That is, is every truth about a macroscopic object fully grounded in a truth wholly about its microscopic parts? In a recent interesting paper, Martin Glazier argued for a negative answer. Following him, call the position that the macro is grounded in the micro 'priority micro pluralism' ('pluralism' for short). In this discussion note, I propose a way out for the pluralist. In brief, it consists in the recognition that some metaphysical positions, including pluralism, are best expressed by fundamentally de dicto grounding claims. In that these claims have a distinctive modal force, this recognition has far-reaching consequences that go beyond a defence of pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By attending to how people speak about their gender, we can find diverse answers to the question of what it is like to have a gender identity. To some, it is little more than having a body whereas others may report it as more attitudinal or dispositional—seemingly contradictory views. In this paper, I seek to reconcile these disparate answers by developing a theory of how individual gender identity comes about. In the simplest possible terms, I propose that gender identity is how we make sense of our gender subjectivity, the totality of our gendered experiences of ourselves. Gender identity is constituted by gender subjectivity, but this constitutive relationship is underdetermined. While gender subjectivity may narrow the range of inhabitable gender identities, it is always compatible with more than one. To arrive at a gender identity, we arrange gender subjectivity like building materials. My theory helps us understand how different people offer seemingly incompatible accounts of their gender identity without questioning their authenticity or validity. They simply arrange similar building materials differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article's purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls "Serious Metaphysics" and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Late Lowe's metaphysics of material objects is an interesting multi-thingist theory that still attracts interest from various authors. The core idea is that if x materially constitutes y, the x is a proper part of y. I discuss some mereological issues that arise from the approach and propose a revision of the mereology associated. Particularly, I examine the tenability of a number of supplementation principles and conclude that just one may serve the theory adequately. Still, the endorsement of such a principle does not come for free. Successively, I address the derivability of an important extensionality theorem and conclude that the theorem must be taken as an axiom in the mereology at stake. Lastly, I discuss two notable definitions of mereological fusions to assess which one best suits the present theory. The result is that authors sharing Lowe's multi-thingist conception of material objects can still enjoy a moderately strong mereology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I touch on the holotic structure of the ideas of unity, identity and finality, using the word "holotic" to refer to a theory that includes both partonomic (or mereological) wholes and taxonomic (or diairological) wholes. In the second section, I expound on two classifications of wholes and two classifications of the types of parts I deem relevant to the ideas of unity, identity and finality. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss how these three ideas acquire different significance depending on the type of totalities and parts involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the introduction to the first chapter of his third logical investigation, Husserl introduces his mereological theory as a fundamental component of a pure theory of objects. Husserl's mereology is concerned with the relationship between independent and non-independent objects, which leads to the concept of foundation as the central core. Husserl presents six theorems summarizing part-whole relations that are derived from this distinction. Surprisingly, despite their fundamental importance, Husserl does not provide any formal proof of these theorems. The purpose of this article is to present these theorems, my proposed logical translation, existing logical translations, and relevant conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article departs from a mereological conceptualization of the Daoist metaphysical system in the Daodejing 道德經. I discuss what parthood status applies to dao 道. Whereas it is quite intuitive that you 有—the region of concrete objects—has parthood relationships and compositions (entities made from parts), the other, undifferentiated region, dao, poses a considerable problem. This problem can be characterized in the following way: (a) dao cannot be characterized as a particular composition, which entails that it does not include parts. However, (b) dao underpins compositions in you, which entails that it contains compositions or at least parts that make compositions in you. This generates a problem of how compositions are possible with an undifferentiated ontological foundation. I focus on one possible approach to this problem––mereological nihilism, according to which no composition is possible. Assuming nihilism entails dao composed of mereological simples––fundamental entities, which are not parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Standard principles of mereology, such as the transitivity and asymmetry of proper parthood, have been questioned, using various multi-location scenarios. The most famous of these is Borges's Aleph, although the literature is rife with other examples that allegedly show that some mereological principle is at odds with some form of multi-location. However, the scenarios only support this conclusion given various bridge principles that link location to parthood. I argue that the bridge principles that guarantee the desired conclusion are controversial partly because they give the wrong result in other situations, in particular cases of co-location. Moreover, less controversial bridge principles do not provide an incompatibility result between standard mereological principles and multi-location. Hence, multi-location does not threaten any standard mereological principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality problem. First, the original argument only shows a disjunctive thesis: either extended simples are possible, or unextended complexes are possible. In order to reach the desired conclusion, some additional premise is needed. Yet, even though we agree that the Disjunction problem can be met, we argue that the Humean argument fails to establish the possibility of extended simples, for two reasons: the first comes from compositional pluralism, and the second is about the definition of accidental properties. We contend that the latter two problems put the proponents of the Humean argument in serious difficulty. Thus, metaphysicians who hold that there are extended simples should find better arguments for this view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the axiomatic treatment of intuitionistic mereology introduced in Maffezioli and Varzi (Synthese, 198(S18), 4277–4302 2021) by examining the behavior of constructive notions of overlap and disjointness. We consider both (i) various ways of defining such notions in terms of other intuitionistic mereological primitives, and (ii) the possibility of treating them as mereological primitives of their own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose a new theory of mereology based on a mereological reflection principle. Reflective mereology has natural fusion principles but also refutes certain principles of classical mereology such as Universal Fusion and Fusion Uniqueness. Moreover, reflective mereology avoids Uzquiano's cardinality problem–the problem that classical mereology tends to clash with set theory when they both quantify over everything. In particular, assuming large cardinals, I construct a model of reflective mereology and second-order ZFCU with Limitation of Size. In the model, classical mereology holds when the quantifiers are restricted to the urelements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical mereology is a particularly strong theory about the part–whole relation. Not only does it ensure that any collection of entities composes a whole, or 'fusion', it also states that this object is unique: no two entities have the same parts. Recently, Claudio Calosi (dialectica 68(1):121–139, 2014) has argued that this extensional aspect makes classical mereology incompatible with multilocated entities. Calosi's argument is arguably the most precise one from a whole battery of arguments to the effect that some mereological principle is at odds with multilocation. Still, I show that Calosi's arguments fail and that classical mereology is a safe space for multilocation. Moreover, I argue that the question of extensionality is orthogonal to the question of multilocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What grounds facts of the form < x = x >? One promising answer is: facts of the form < x exists>. A different promising answer is: x itself. Isaac Wilhelm has recently argued that the second answer is superior to the first. In this paper, I rebut his argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Filozofija i Drustvo is the property of University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy & Social Theory and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Consider the following two metaphysical questions about pregnancy: (1) When does a new organism of a certain kind start to exist? (2) What is the mereological and topological relationship between the pregnant organism and with what it is pregnant? Despite assumptions made in the literature, I take these questions to be independent of each other, such that an answer to one does not provide an answer to the other. I argue that the way to connect them is via a maximality principle that prevents one organism being a proper part of another organism of the same kind. That being said, such a maximality principle need not be held, and may not apply in the case of pregnancy. The aims of this paper are thus to distinguish and connect these metaphysical questions, in order to outline a taxonomy of rival mereotopological models of pregnancy that result from the various combinations of their answers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most ordinary objects - cats, humans, mountains, ships, tables, etc. - have indeterminate mereological boundaries. If the theory of mereology is meant to include ordinary objects at all, we need it to have some space for mereological indeterminacy. In this paper, we present a novel degree-theoretic semantics - Boolean semantics - and argue that it is the best degree-theoretic semantics for modeling mereological indeterminacy, for three main reasons: (a) it allows for incomparable degrees of parthood, (b) it enforces classical logic, and (c) it is compatible with all the axioms of classical mereology. Using Boolean semantics, we will also investigate the connection between vagueness in parthood and vagueness in existence/identity. We show that, contrary to what many have argued, the connection takes neither the form of entailment nor the form of exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some tools introduced by Linnebo to show that mathematical entities are thin objects can also be applied to non‐mathematical entities, which have been thought to be thin as well for a variety of reasons. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties and opportunities concerning the application of abstraction and interpretational modalities to mereological sums. In particular, I show that on one hand some prima facie attractive candidates for the role of an explanatory plural abstraction principle for mereological sums (in terms of pluralities of summed entities) are not really explanatory; on the other hand, singular abstraction principles (in terms of single summed entities) are materially inadequate. Nonetheless, explanatory criteria of identity and conditions of existence for mereological sums are provided by classical extensional mereology independent of abstraction principles. Thus, given classical extensional mereology, the reasons why, according to Linnebo, mathematical abstracted entities are thin also hold for mereological sums. Finally, I contend that interpretational modalities can be used to characterise the process by which a subject adds sums of previously admitted entities to the domain of quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical systems of mereology identify a maximuml set of jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint (RCC5) relations. The amount of information that is carried by each member of this set of (crisp) relations is determined by the number of bits of information that are required to distinguish all the members of the set. It is postulated in this paper, that vague mereological relations are limited in the amount of information they can carry. That is, if a crisp mereological relation can carry N bits of information, then a vague mereological relation can carry only 1 ⩽ n < N bits. The aim of this paper is it to explore these ideas in the context of various systems of vague mereological relations. The resulting formalism is non-classical in the sense of quantum information theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present an argument against the view that the additivity of mass (i.e., the property according to which a composite object's mass is the "sum" of its parts') is metaphysically independent of dynamical laws governing massive bodies. In particular, taking additivity to be independent of dynamics commits you to widespread unexplained correlations between the mass properties of composites and the dynamic behavior of massive bodies. The second half of the paper extends this explanatory worry, showing that the very same considerations apply to aspects of mass's quantitative structure. This gives rise to a new and powerful objection to certain influential theories about the fundamental structure of physical quantities--most notably the magnitude realism of Peacocke (2019) and the second-order absolutist accounts defended by Mundy (1987) and Eddon (2013b). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that perdurantism is incompatible with priority monism: the view that the universal mereological fusion, U, is fundamental. For the monist's fundamental object can neither persist by being a trans-temporal object (i.e., a space-time 'worm') nor by being an instantaneous stage. If U persisted via being a worm, it would be grounded in its temporal parts, meaning that it would not be fundamental as it would not be ungrounded. If U were a stage, on the other hand, it would face a problem from the possibility of 'temporal gunk'. But if U persisted by neither being a worm nor a stage, then U could not persist via having temporal parts, and thus perdurantism would be false. Given that a similar combination of perdurantism and priority pluralism also faces a problem from temporal gunk, I conclude that perdurantism does not sit well with mereological based accounts of fundamentality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]