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From the social media-driven inceptions of civil wars in Libya and Syria to the recent cyber-augmented Russian invasion of Ukraine, information and communications technology (ICT) plays an integral role in the operational success of armed organizations in modern combat. Increased access to ICT, coupled with ease of adoption and low investment costs, have enabled armed organizations - both state militaries and non-state armed groups - to incorporate ICT as a critical component of organizational operations. States have increasingly co-opted and manipulated the online environment to their benefit, leveraging social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to monitor internal dissent, influence foreign populations, and propagate incendiary ideas abroad. Meanwhile, rebel groups have leveraged Google Maps, Google Earth, WhatsApp, and Skype to supplement kinetic operations, correct mortar fire, engage in information collection, and communicate with one another and civilians. And yet, international relations scholarship has failed to account for the diversity of armed organizations' use of ICT, as well as the forces contributing to patterns of adoption and adaptation. Existing models of military technology adoption are often centered on the impact of organizational factors, overlooking the role of technological attributes and focused primarily on the behaviors of states. This article-based dissertation aims to explore the impact of the new information landscape and how armed organizations respond to the strategic challenges of modern ICT. Paper 1 (The Armed CTO: Towards a Theory of ICT Adoption) introduces disruptive attribute theory, presenting four intervening variables for understanding ICT adoption by states and non-states. The paper leverages case studies across conflicts, technologies, and organizations to engage in a plausibility probe. Case studies include the creation of a national radio network by the Los Zetas drug cartel of Mexico, the use of satellite phones by the CPN-Maoists of Nepal during a national suspension of phone service, Russian reliance on state-owned social media platform VKontakte during its occupation of eastern Ukraine, and the weaponization of Facebook and Twitter by the Chinese military to wage influence operations in Taiwan. Paper 2 (What's New about the New Information Environment? How Private Firms Shape the Landscape for Strategic Competition), co-authored with Dr. Jacob N. Shapiro, focuses on the modern information environment, arguing that social media platforms have created a fundamentally new landscape for strategic competition. Using a series of case studies, we highlight how social media policies alter the environment for influence operations along three key dimensions: resource constraints, audience access constraints, and content constraints. This analysis also presents a large dataset (n = 163) of platform policy changes categorized by strategic impact. Finally, Paper 3 (Twitter and the Taliban: Patterns, Paradoxes, and the Power of Platforms) engages in an in-depth analysis of a novel dataset of 112,354 tweets from 63 Taliban-linked Twitter accounts. It reviews the Taliban's social media presence throughout the group's 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, comparing online activity with on-the-ground events and highlighting the use of platform features to amplify their influence campaign.