Search

31 augustus 2022, Contains fulltext : 253037.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)

31 augustus 2022, Contains fulltext : 253037.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)

21 april 2021, Contains fulltext : 232360.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access), In dit artikel staat de ontwikkeling en performativiteit van Lean centraal. Onderzoek uit de management accounting en control (MAC)-literatuur laat zien wat een MAC-systeem (zoals bijvoorbeeld de balanced scorecard (BSC)) bewerkstelligt als organisaties een dergelijk systeem invoeren. Daarentegen is soortgelijk onderzoek naar een organisatieconcept als Lean schaars, waardoor we een beperkt beeld hebben van wat er zich tijdens een implementatie van Lean afspeelt en wat Lean binnen een organisatie teweegbrengt. Door gebruikmaking van theoretische inzichten uit de MAC-literatuur op een praktijkcase, toont dit artikel aan dat Lean zelf ook een actieve speler in een netwerk is. Dat wil zeggen dat Lean niet alleen rationeel in te zetten instrument is dat ten dienste staat van een besluitvormer, maar mede invloed uitoefent omdat het relaties aangaat en interacteert. Het biedt managers en organisatieadviseurs (practici) inzichten in hoe zij een Lean-implementatie anders kunnen begeleiden.

Radboud University, 26 februari 2021, Promotor : Vosselman, E.G.J. Co-promotores : Schouteten, R.L.J., Visser, Max, Contains fulltext : 228904.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Radboud University, 10 januari 2019, Promotores : Vosselman, E.G.J., Loo, I. de, Contains fulltext : 196970.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Item does not contain fulltext

Radboud University, 2 juli 2019, Promotores : Vosselman, E.G.J., Lauche, K. Co-promotor : Pas, B.R., Contains fulltext : 204315.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Afscheidscollege, 4 oktober 2019, Item does not contain fulltext

Key note MARG conference, 14 november 2019, Item does not contain fulltext

University of Groningen, 09 december 2019, Promotores : Veen-Dirks, P.M.G. van, Vosselman, E.G.J., Item does not contain fulltext

Contains fulltext : 213097.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 212684.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

17 oktober 2017, Contains fulltext : 200839pub.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Item does not contain fulltext

Radboud University, 29 maart 2017, Promotores : Vosselman, E.G.J., Haan, R.J. de, Contains fulltext : 166544.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 167413.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access), This paper makes sense of the contract-control-trust nexus in interfirm relationships by exposing the performativity of a contract and its incorporated control structures in generating trust. In our study of an outsourcing relationship between Semorg (an international manufacturer of semi-conductors) and Fasorg (the provider of facility management services), we find that trust is interactively related to control in complex and often unpredictable ways rather than in linear ways that result from managerial decision-making. In the network of associations that constitutes the interfirm relationship, trust is not a stable solution that generates predictability, but a quasi-actor that is made to act by the contract and the incorporated control structures. As a quasi-actor, trust is fluent and performative. Once in existence, it mobilises human actors and shapes the relationship. Thus, from a relational perspective trust is a possible and to a large extent unpredictable network effect. This differs from the rational perspective in which trust is an expectation that (in multiple categories) straightforwardly emerges and develops from managerial decisions.

Invitation presentation Bocconi University, 03 mei 2016, Contains fulltext : 160145.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access)

Contains fulltext : 160154.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access), This article challenges the performativity of organizational economics in the construction of “nexus-of-contract” organizations (or market bureaucracies) and inherent frames of instrumental accountability in the public sector. It argues for a duality between instrumental accountability and relational response-ability, and it shows how such a duality is related to a conceptualization of the public organization as a moral community rather than a market bureaucracy. Relational response-ability originates from the interconnected intentions of individuals at local positions. It encourages and channels intrinsic motivation, virtuous behavior, and stewardship. In a duality with instrumental accountability it may prevent a performance management paradox from occurring.

12 februari 2016, Contains fulltext : 160168.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access), This paper explores the mediation of governance and control structures in an inter-firm relationship between a semiconductor producer and its contractor. As mediating instruments the contract and the control structures are not just pre-given results of distanced managerial decision-making, but are generated in and constitutive of the relationship. They offer the possibility to interpret and to interact and they contribute to more or less unexpected transformations in the relationship. In particular, the study explores how the mediation of the governance and control structures has socialising and/or individualising consequences. The paper particularly offers insights into how the mediation of the governance and control structures is impacted by changes in boundary spanners (i.e. managers who represent their organisations in an inter-firm relationship). The paper draws on Roberts 2001. Trust and control in Anglo-American systems of corporate governance: the individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability. Human Relations, 54 (12), 1547–1572. and distinguishes four patterns of governance that may be consequential of mediation by governance and control structures: immobilised governance, individualised governance, socialised governance and complementary governance. The study illustrates that accounting is not so much a force that creates transparency for distanced others, but a constitutive mechanism that produces a collaborative inter-firm relationship with socialised governance. It provides a basis for discussion and debate in the relationship.

Contains fulltext : 170790_a.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access), The way governance structures and control instruments are designed (Adler & Borys, 1996) and enacted in strategic alliances can influence the development of such relationships. Controls can become coercive or enabling depending on how they are designed and used (Jordan & Messner, 2012). We draw upon the framework of coercive and enabling controls introduced by Adler and Borys (1996) to illustrate the changes in control orientations over time in tandem with some other developments in a particular case study (a long term outsourcing contract) regarding the management of facility services. Our analysis suggests that the key-persons (those who represent their organizations in a strategic alliance) and their ways of working are influential in generating a coercive or enabling orientation in control design and use. The chapter highlights how unexpected changes in key persons shaped control orientations over time. More specifically, it is shown how a change

Contains fulltext : 162368.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access), Accounting wordt vaak in verband gebracht met transparantie: cijfers worden verondersteld een organisatiewerkelijkheid bloot te leggen. Dit artikel laat zien hoe de calculatie van de waarde van ‘goodwill impairment’ in relatienetwerken tot stand komt en hoe die calculatie niet tot transparantie leidt, maar mobiliseert. De uit de calculatie resulterende waarde reflecteert niet de waarheid, maar zet aan tot handelen. Die mobilisatiekracht van de waarde van de ‘goodwill impairment’ werpt haar schaduw vooruit in de calculatiepraktijk. De gebruikers van de calculatie vragen in het vooruitzicht van hun handelen om betrouwbare calculaties. Ter vergroting van de betrouwbaarheid van de calculaties moeten die zich verwijderen van de specifieke organisatiepraktijken. Daarom put het calculatiecentrum (de ‘financial controller’) veel uit externe bronnen.

Item does not contain fulltext