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Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965–986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965–986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations.

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlies processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

Weber's law is a fundamental psychophysical principle. It states that the just noticeable difference (JND) between stimuli increases with stimulus magnitude; consequently, larger stimuli should be estimated with larger variability. However, visually guided grasping seems to violate this expectation: When repeatedly grasping large objects, the variability is similar to that when grasping small objects. Based on this result, it was often concluded that grasping violated Weber's law. This astonishing finding generated a flurry of research, with contradictory results and potentially far-reaching implications for theorizing about the functional architecture of the brain. We show that previous studies ignored nonlinearities in the scaling of the grasping response. These nonlinearities result from, for example, the finger span being limited such that the opening of the fingers reaches a ceiling for large objects. We describe how to mathematically take these nonlinearities into account and apply this approach to our own data, as well as to the data of three influential studies on this topic. In all four datasets, we found that-when appropriately estimated-JNDs increase with object size, as expected by Weber's law. We conclude that grasping obeys Weber's law, as do essentially all sensory dimensions.

Studies using the priming paradigm often infer that unconscious processes have more veridical access to the world than conscious processes. These interpretations are based on a standard reasoning that erroneously infers good sensitivity of indirect measures from a clear priming effect. To correct for this fallacy, researchers should explicitly compute the sensitivities from indirect measures and compare them against the sensitivities of direct measures. Recent results suggest that indirect behavioral measures are not more sensitive than direct measures and challenge interpretations about veridical unconscious processing. We add to these behavioral results by focusing on neurophysiological indirect measures. In two EEG experiments, we investigate whether event related potentials (ERPs) are more sensitive to different visual stimuli than direct measures. The results show the opposite effect: higher sensitivities for direct than indirect measures. Therefore-contrasting commonly held belief-we find no evidence for more veridical unconscious than conscious processes in ERP measures.

In priming research, it is often argued that humans can discriminate stimuli outside consciousness. For example, the semantic meaning of numbers can be processed even when the numbers are so strongly masked that participants are not aware of them. These claims are typically based on a certain pattern of results: Direct measures indicate no conscious awareness of the masked stimuli, while indirect measures show clear priming effects of the same stimuli on reaction times or neurophysiological measures. From this pattern, preserved (unconscious) processing in the indirect task is concluded. However, this widely used standard reasoning is problematic and leads to spurious claims of unconscious processing. Such problems can be avoided by comparing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures. Many studies are affected by these problems, such that a reassessment of the literature is needed. Here, we investigated whether numbers can be processed unconsciously. In three experiments, we replicated and extended well-established effects of number priming over a wide range of stimulus visibilities. We then compared the standard reasoning to a sensitivity analysis, where direct and indirect effects are compared using the same metric. Results show that the sensitivities of indirect measures did not exceed those of direct measures, thereby indicating no evidence for preserved unconscious processing when awareness of the stimuli is low. Instead, it seems that at low visibility there is residual processing that affects direct and indirect measures to a similar degree. This suggests that similar processing modes cause those effects in direct and indirect measures.

Current literature holds that many cognitive functions can be performed outside consciousness. Evidence for this view comes from unconscious priming. In a typical experiment, visual stimuli are masked, such that participants are close to chance when directly asked to which of two categories the stimuli belong. This close-to-zero sensitivity is seen as evidence that participants cannot consciously report the category of the masked stimuli. Nevertheless, the category of the masked stimuli can indirectly affect responses to other stimuli (e.g., reaction times or brain activity). Priming is therefore seen as evidence that there is still some (albeit unconscious) sensitivity to the stimulus categories, thereby indicating processing outside consciousness. Although this "standard reasoning of unconscious priming" has been used in many studies, we show that it is flawed: Sensitivities are not calculated appropriately, hereby creating the wrong impression that priming indicated better sensitivity than the close-to-zero sensitivity of the direct discrimination. We describe the appropriate way to determine sensitivities, replicate the behavioral part of a landmark study, develop a method to estimate sensitivities for published studies from reported summary statistics, and use this method to reanalyze 15 highly influential studies. Results show that the interpretations of many studies need to be changed and that a community effort to reassess the vast literature on unconscious priming is needed. This process will allow scientists to learn more about the true boundary conditions of unconscious priming, thereby advancing the scientific understanding of consciousness., Comment: Accepted for Publication, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

The mental number line (MNL) is a popular metaphor for magnitude representation in numerical cognition. Its shape has frequently been reported as being nonlinear, based on nonlinear response functions in magnitude estimation. We investigated whether this shape reflects a phenomenon of the mapping from stimulus to internal magnitude representation or of the mapping from internal representation to response. In five experiments, participants (total N = 66) viewed stimuli that represented numerical magnitude either in a symbolic notation (i.e., Arabic digits) or in a nonsymbolic notation (i.e., clouds of dots). Participants estimated these magnitudes by either adjusting the position of a mark on a ruler-like response bar (nonsymbolic response) or by typing the corresponding number on a keyboard (symbolic response). Responses to symbolic stimuli were markedly different from responses to nonsymbolic stimuli, in that they were mostly powershaped. We investigated whether the nonlinearity could be explained by effects of previous trials, but such effects were (a) not strong enough to explain the nonlinear responses and (b) existed only between trials of the same input notation, suggesting that the nonlinearity is due to input mappings. Introducing veridical feedback improved the accuracy of responses, thereby showing a calibration based on the feedback. However, this calibration persisted only temporarily, and responses to nonsymbolic stimuli remained nonlinear. Overall, we conclude that the nonlinearity is a phenomenon of the mapping from nonsymbolic input format to internal magnitude representation and that the phenomenon is surprisingly robust to calibration.

A common set of tasks frequently employed in the neuropsychological assessment of patients with visuomotor or perceptual deficits are the card-posting and the perceptual orientation matching tasks. In the posting task, patients have to post a card (or their hand) through a slot of varying orientations while the matching task requires them to indicate the slot's orientation as accurately as possible. Observations that damage to different areas of the brain (dorsal vs. ventral stream) is associated with selective impairment in one of the tasks - but not the other - has led to the suggestion that different cortical pathways process visual orientation information for perception versus action. In three experiments, we show that this conclusion may be premature as posting does not seem to rely on the processing of visual orientation information but is instead performed using obstacle avoidance strategies that require an accurate judgement of egocentric distances between the card's and the slot's edges. Specifically, we found that while matching is susceptible to the oblique effect (i.e., common perceptual orientation bias with higher accuracy for cardinal than oblique orientations), this was not the case for posting, neither in immediate nor in memory-guided conditions. In contrast to matching, posting errors primarily depended on biomechanical demands and reflected a preference for performing efficient and comfortable movements. Thus, we suggest that previous dissociations between perceptual and visuomotor performance in letter posting tasks are better explained by impairments in egocentric and allocentric spatial processing than by independent visual processing systems.

A Correction to this paper has been published: 10.3758/s13414-021-02332-y

It has been suggested that goal-directed actions performed under full vision are immune to certain visual illusions, while movements relying on perception-based visual information are deceived by them (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Consequently, pointing movements should be deceived by visual illusions when a delay is introduced (memory demands) or when antipointing (spatial imagery) is required. In 2 experiments, participants performed either propointing or antipointing movements to different versions of the Muller-Lyer illusion in 2 vision conditions (open-loop vs. delay). Apart from open-loop propointing, all conditions should rely on perceptual processing and should therefore yield similarly illusion effects. While we observed illusion effects in all conditions, their magnitude varied in unexpected ways. Most surprisingly, introducing a delay seemed to reduce illusion effects in antipointing. We show that this decrease can be explained by the fact that pointing after delay is less responsive to physical size changes. After correcting for this, illusion effects in antipointing were similar in both vision conditions but still twice as large as in the delayed propointing task. Our findings highlight the necessity of employing a correction procedure when comparing illusion effects across tasks and do not conform well to the predictions derived from the perception-action model.

According to Weber's law, the just noticeable difference between stimuli increases proportionally with stimulus magnitude, suggesting that perception becomes more variable when a stimulus becomes larger. Surprisingly, this basic psychophysical principle appears to be violated in grasping because the variability of grasping movements does not increase with object size. This dissociation between perception and grasping has been interpreted either as evidence for different neuronal processing of real-time visual size information [Ganel, T., Chajut, E., Algom, D. (2008a). Current Biology, 18(14), R599-R601], or for the idea that grasping ignores stimulus size and is based on position information only [Smeets, J. B. J., and Brenner, E. (2008). Current Biology, 18(23), R1089-R1090]. Both accounts assume that it is the processing of visual information that leads to the absence of Weber's law in grasping. We show that even if neither visual nor any real-time sensory information about the stimulus is presented (but only abstract, semantic information about its size), grasping does not follow Weber's law. This indicates that other mechanisms must be responsible for the unexpected behavior of grasping.

The Perception-Action Model (PAM) claims to provide a coherent interpretation of data from all areas of the visual neurosciences, most notably data from neuropsychological patients and from behavioral experiments in healthy people. Here, we tested two claims that are part of the core version of the PAM: (a) certain actions (natural, highly practiced, and right-handed) are controlled by the dorsal vision for action pathway, while other actions (awkward, unpracticed, or left-handed) are controlled by the ventral vision for perception pathway. (b) Only the dorsal pathway operates in an analytical fashion, being able to selectively focus on the task-relevant dimension of an object (Ganel and Goodale, Nature 426(6967):664-667, 2003). We show that one of these claims must be wrong: using the same test for analytical processing as Ganel and Goodale (2003), we found that even an action that should clearly be ventral (left-handed awkward grasping) shows analytical processing just as a dorsal task does (right-handed natural precision grasping). These results are at odds with the PAM and point to an inconsistency of the model.

Illusions are useful tools for understanding fundamental visual processing. The method used to measure illusion strength is important but often neglected. We identified two methods of comparing bipart illusion elements (eg of the Müller-Lyer or Ebbinghaus illusions). For simultaneous adjustment an increase in size of one figure causes a decrease in the other. For independent adjustment one figure remains fixed while the other is adjusted to match it. These direct comparison illusion effects are contrasted to separate comparison illusion effects, where a neutral stimulus is matched to each illusory figure. If the illusion is stronger for direct comparisons, it is superadditive. The superadditivity of the Ebbinghaus illusion has been investigated using only simultaneous adjustment (Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000, Psychological Science11 20–25), and the Müller-Lyer illusion using only independent adjustment (Gilster & Kuhtz-Buschbeck, 2010, Journal of Vision10(1):11, 1–13). Superadditivity was found for the Ebbinghaus but not the Müller-Lyer illusion, but this may have been due to the comparison method or differences between the illusions. Here we test both illusions with both methods of adjustment. Our results suggest that both illusions are superadditive for simultaneous adjustment, but for independent adjustment only under limited circumstances. Implications for research on illusions and perception and action are discussed.

The SNARC effect refers to an association of numbers and spatial properties of responses that is commonly thought to be amodal and independent of stimulus notation. We tested for a horizontal SNARC effect using Arabic digits, simple-form Chinese characters and Chinese hand signs in participants from Mainland China. We found a horizontal SNARC effect in all notations. This is the first time that a horizontal SNARC effect has been demonstrated in Chinese characters and Chinese hand signs. We tested for the SNARC effect in two experiments (parity judgement and magnitude judgement). The parity judgement task yielded clear, consistent SNARC effects in all notations, whereas results were more mixed in magnitude judgement. Both Chinese characters and Chinese hand signs are represented non-symbolically for low numbers and symbolically for higher numbers, allowing us to contrast within the same notation the effects of heavily learned non-symbolic vs. symbolic representation on the processing of numbers. In addition to finding a horizontal SNARC effect, we also found a robust numerical distance effect in all notations. This is particularly interesting as it persisted when participants reported using purely visual features to solve the task, thereby suggesting that numbers were processed semantically even when the task could be solved without the semantic information.

The most prominent explanation for the spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect is the direct mapping account (DMA). The DMA assumes that (a) numbers are represented on a mental number line, (b) this mental number line is mapped to external space, and (c) the better the mapping location corresponds to the response location, the faster the response. The DMA leaves open whether a variation of response locations can (ceteris paribus) influence the location to which numbers are mapped in external space. In order to investigate this question, we varied response key distance during a standard parity judgment and a magnitude judgment task. We found that even drastic manipulations of response key distance did not modulate the SNARC effect. Power and meta-analyses show that this null effect is not due to insufficient statistical power or a poor experimental setup. Thus, our results indicate that, in order for the DMA to explain the SNARC effect, it must assume that the mapping from the mental number line to external space is anchored to response location. For future research, our results suggest that it is not necessary to control the horizontal separation of the response keys in basic SNARC experiments.

We investigated whether 6- and 7-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds, as well as adults, process object dimensions independent of or in interaction with one another in a perception and action task by adapting Ganel and Goodale's method for testing adults (Nature, 2003, Vol. 426, pp. 664-667). In addition, we aimed to confirm Ganel and Goodale's results in adults to reliably compare their processing strategies with those of children. Specifically, we tested the abilities of children and adults to perceptually classify (perception task) or grasp (action task) the width of a rectangular object while ignoring its length. We found that adults process object dimensions in interaction with one another in visual perception but independent of each other in action, thereby replicating Ganel and Goodale's results. Children processed object dimensions interactively in visual perception, and there was also some evidence for interactive processing in action. Possible reasons for these differences in object processing between children and adults are discussed.

Repeated measures designs are common in experimental psychology. Because of the correlational structure in these designs, the calculation and interpretation of confidence intervals is nontrivial. One solution was provided by Loftus and Masson (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1:476–490, 1994). This solution, although widely adopted, has the limitation of implying same-size confidence intervals for all factor levels, and therefore does not allow for the assessment of variance homogeneity assumptions (i.e., the circularity assumption, which is crucial for the repeated measures ANOVA). This limitation and the method’s perceived complexity have sometimes led scientists to use a simplified variant, based on a per-subject normalization of the data (Bakeman & McArthur, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 28:584–589, 1996; Cousineau, Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology 1:42–45, 2005; Morey, Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology 4:61–64, 2008; Morrison & Weaver, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 27:52–56, 1995). We show that this normalization method leads to biased results and is uninformative with regard to circularity. Instead, we provide a simple, intuitive generalization of the Loftus and Masson method that allows for assessment of the circularity assumption.

Westwood and Goodale (this issue) review the evidence for distinct visual streams for action and perception. They argue that, on balance, both the neuropsychological and psychophysical data support this distinction. They claim that critical results were either statistically inconclusive (because they consisted of negative evidence) or based on a suspect “calibration” procedure. Finally, they suggest that explanations dismissing the psychophysical evidence for the TVSH are contradicted by the neuropsychological evidence. We disagree with their assessment. ‘Negative evidence’ is not necessarily inconclusive. Problems raised by mixed evidence are best dealt with by conducting meta-analytical studies, which so far are only in part consistent with the TVSH. Correction (“calibration”) of illusion effects is critical for comparisons across stimuli, studies, and tasks. We furthermore argue that both psychophysical and neuropsychological evidence can be explained without assuming divergent pathways for perception and action.

The finding that in a patient with visual form agnosia (DF), the performance level varies in a visuomotor letter-posting task and a perceptual orientation matching task was considered as part of the evidence for the perception–action model (Milner and Goodale, 1995). In this study we examined an alternative interpretation of these findings. We specifically tested whether orientation matching and letter posting can be accomplished using different strategies. Sixteen neurologically intact participants were asked to either put cards of different sizes through a target slot of a certain orientation or to simply indicate the slot's orientation. Letter-posting was performed in three different conditions varying the amount of visual feedback available. Results show that some participants apply a strategy of obstacle-avoidance in the posting task. That is, they oriented the card such that the safety margin between the edges of the target and the card was increased. This tendency became stronger with increasing card size. In contrast, in the orientation matching task, the end-orientation of the card was unaffected by its size and closer to the slot's actual orientation. The findings suggest that posting and matching can be solved using different visuo-spatial information. The perception–action dissociation reported for these tasks in DF might therefore simply indicate a difficulty in computing visual orientation, an ability that is needed for successful orientation matching but not for posting.

It is an open question whether the visual transformations guiding human actions are similar to those generating visual perception. The Action-Perception model assumes a strict division of labor: the ventral cortical stream generates perception while the dorsal stream guides actions. However, only skilled and natural actions are assumed to be under dorsal control, while awkward and left-handed actions should be under ventral control in the same way as perception. Here, we used a combination of Garner-Interference and the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm to test this notion. We found that all types of grasping (left-handed, awkward, using a tool) behave in a way similar to skilled right-handed grasping: other than perception they show no Garner-Interference, but similar to perception they show a limitation of processing capacities as indicated by the PRP paradigm. This behavior suggests that similar processes guide all these actions.

We tested whether a delay between stimulus presentation and grasping leads to a shift from dorsal to ventral control of the movement, as suggested by the perception-action theory of Milner and Goodale (Milner, A.D., & Goodale, M.A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). In this theory the dorsal cortical stream has a short memory, such that after a few seconds the dorsal information is decayed and the action is guided by the ventral stream. Accordingly, grasping should become responsive to certain visual illusions after a delay (because only the ventral stream is assumed to be deceived by these illusions). We used the Muller-Lyer illusion, the typical illusion in this area of research, and replicated the increase of the motor illusion after a delay. However, we found that this increase is not due to memory demands but to the availability of visual feedback during movement execution which leads to online corrections of the movement. Because such online corrections are to be expected if the movement is guided by one single representation of object size, we conclude that there is no evidence for a shift from dorsal to ventral control in delayed grasping of the Muller-Lyer illusion. We also performed the first empirical test of a critique Goodale (Goodale, M.A. (2006, October 27). Visual duplicity: Action without perception in the human visual system. The XIV. Kanizsa lecture, Triest, Italy.) raised against studies finding illusion effects in grasping: Goodale argued that these studies used methods that lead to unnatural grasping which is guided by the ventral stream. Therefore, these studies might never have measured the dorsal stream, but always the ventral stream. We found clear evidence against this conjecture.

Milner and Goodale (1995) [Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press] proposed a functional division of labor between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action. Their proposal is supported by neuropsychological, brain-imaging, and psychophysical evidence. However, it has remained controversial in the prediction that actions are not affected by visual illusions. Following up on a related review on pointing (see Bruno et al., 2008 [Bruno, N., Bernardis, P., & Gentilucci, M. (2008). Visually guided pointing, the Muller-Lyer illusion, and the functional interpretation of the dorsal-ventral split: Conclusions from 33 independent studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 32(3), 423-437]), here we re-analyze 18 studies on grasping objects embedded in the Muller-Lyer (ML) illusion. We find that median percent effects across studies are indeed larger for perceptual than for grasping measures. However, almost all grasping effects are larger than zero and the two distributions show substantial overlap and variability. A fine-grained analysis reveals that critical roles in accounting for this variability are played by the informational basis for guiding the action, by the number of trials per condition of the experiment, and by the angle of the illusion fins. When all these factors are considered together, the data support a difference between grasping and perception only when online visual feedback is available during movement. Thus, unlike pointing, grasping studies of the Muller-Lyer (ML) illusion suggest that the perceptual and motor effects of the illusion differ only because of online, feedback-driven corrections, and do not appear to support independent spatial representations for vision-for-action and vision-for-perception.

It has been suggested that the metrics of grasping movements directed to visible objects are controlled in real time and are therefore unaffected by previous experience. We tested whether the properties of a visually presented distractor object influence the kinematics of a subsequent grasping movement performed under full vision. After viewing an elliptical distractor object in one of two different orientations participants grasped a target object, which was either the same object with the same orientation or a circular object without obvious orientation. When grasping the circular target, grip orientation was influenced by the orientation of the distractor. Moreover, as in classical visuomotor priming, grasping movements were initiated faster when distractor and target were identical. Results provide evidence that planning of visually guided grasping movements is influenced by prior perceptual experience, challenging the notion that metric aspects of grasping are controlled exclusively on the basis of real-time information.

It has often been suggested that visual illusions affect perception but not actions such as grasping, as predicted by the "two-visual-systems" hypothesis of Milner and Goodale (1995, The Visual Brain in Action, Oxford University press). However, at least for the Ebbinghaus illusion, relevant studies seem to reveal a consistent illusion effect on grasping (Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008. Grasping visual illusions: consistent data and no dissociation. Cognitive Neuropsychology). Two interpretations are possible: either grasping is not immune to illusions (arguing against dissociable processing mechanisms for vision-for-perception and vision-for-action), or some other factors modulate grasping in ways that mimic a vision-for perception effect in actions. It has been suggested that one such factor may be obstacle avoidance (Haffenden Schiff & Goodale, 2001. The dissociation between perception and action in the Ebbinghaus illusion: nonillusory effects of pictorial cues on grasp. Current Biology, 11, 177-181). In four different labs (total N = 144), we conducted an exact replication of previous studies suggesting obstacle avoidance mechanisms, implementing conditions that tested grasping as well as multiple perceptual tasks. This replication was supplemented by additional conditions to obtain more conclusive results. Our results confirm that grasping is affected by the Ebbinghaus illusion and demonstrate that this effect cannot be explained by obstacle avoidance.

Lesions of the parieto-occipital junction (POJ) in humans cause gross deviations of reaching movements and impaired grip formation if the targets are located in the subjects’ peripheral visual field. Movements to central targets are typically less impaired. This disorder has been termed “optic ataxia”. It has been suggested that a general deficit of online corrections under central as well as peripheral viewing conditions might be sufficient to explain this discrepancy. According to this hypothesis, patients with optic ataxia should demonstrate an impaired online correction of grip aperture under central viewing conditions if the target object changes its size during the grasping movement. We investigated this prediction in a patient with optic ataxia (I.G.) in a virtual visuo-haptic grasping task. We imposed an isolated need for online corrections of the hand aperture independently of positional changes of the target object. While we found some general inaccuracies of her grasping movements, the patient d id not show a specific impairment of online adjustment of grip aperture. On the contrary, I.G. smoothly adjusted her grip aperture comparable to healthy subjects. A general deficit of fast movement correction affecting targets in peripheral as well as central visual fields thus does not appear to account for the overt visuomotor deficits in optic ataxia. Rather, it seems more likely that an anatomical dissociation between visuomotor pathways related to actions in the central and in the peripheral visual field underlies the dissociation of visuomotor performance depending on the retinotopic target position in optic ataxia.

The planning/control model of action assumes that grasping is sensitive to the context of an object only in early stages of the movement (planning), but not in later stages (control). In consequence, the effects of context-induced illusions (such as the Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion) should decrease during a grasping movement. Here, we tested this claim by reanalysing a large data set (N = 26) on grasping in the Ebbinghaus illusion. Contrary to the predictions of the planning/control model, we found that the effects of the illusion did not decrease over time. Instead, the illusion effects stayed remarkably constant.

When we grasp an object, our visuomotor system has to solve an intricate problem: how to find the best out of an infinity of possible contact points of the fingers with the object? The contact point selection model (CoPS) we present here solves this problem and predicts human grasp point selection in precision grip grasping by combining a few basic rules that have been identified in human and robotic grasping. Usually, not all of the rules can be perfectly satisfied. Therefore, we assessed their relative importance by creating simple stimuli that put them into conflict with each other in pairs. Based on these conflict experiments we made model-based grasp point predictions for another experiment with a novel set of complexly shaped objects. The results show that our model predicts the human choice of grasp points very well, and that observers' preferences for their natural grasp angles is as important as physical stability constraints. Incorporating a human grasp point selection model like the one presented here could markedly improve current approaches to cortically guided arm and hand prostheses by making movements more natural while also allowing for a more efficient use of the available information.

Studies claiming a differential processing of visual illusions for perception and action have been subjected to many challenges. One criticism is that attentional demands were mismatched between the perception and action tasks. Dewar and Carey (2006) reexamined this argument by comparing bimanual grasping to bimanual size estimation and concluded that manual size estimation (ManEst) was affected by the illusion to a greater extent than grasping, supporting the case for two functionally distinct streams of visual processing. We tested whether this result may be due to their use of closed loop visual conditions by replicating their study under both closed and open loop conditions. We found that the difference in illusion effects between grasping and ManEst disappeared under open loop conditions, indicating that Dewar and Carey's findings can be explained by the availability of visual feedback and not a perception/action dissociation. We also discuss potential shortcomings of bimanual designs.

Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging was applied to identify cortical areas involved in maintaining target information in working memory used for an upcoming grasping action. Participants had to grasp with their thumb and index finger of the dominant right hand three-dimensional objects of different size and orientation. Reaching-to-grasp movements were performed without visual feedback either immediately after object presentation or after a variable delay of 2-12 s. The right inferior parietal cortex demonstrated sustained neural activity throughout the delay, which overlapped with activity observed during encoding of the grasp target. Immediate and delayed grasping activated similar motor-related brain areas and showed no differential activity. The results suggest that the right inferior parietal cortex plays an important functional role in working memory maintenance of grasp-related information. Moreover, our findings confirm the assumption that brain areas engaged in maintaining information are also involved in encoding the same information, and thus extend previous findings on working memory function of the posterior parietal cortex in saccadic behavior to reach-to-grasp movements.

The accuracy with which goal-directed movements are executed depends substantially on the availability of accurate visuomotor information. When no visual information is available during movement execution, movement kinematics change and become more variable, indicating that the visual information about the movement environment is stored for a restricted period of time. However, little is known about the underlying decay characteristics. In this study we investigated how increasing memory demands change the kinematics of a grasping movement and whether these alterations reflect a continuous or an abrupt decay of the underlying visuomotor memory. Ten participants grasped differently sized objects under a full vision condition and four different delay conditions. Results show that the visuomotor information used for grasping decays rapidly after visual occlusion. The information decay over time became obvious in a decrease of movement accuracy and an increase in movement variability that were both well described by exponential decay models. Our findings suggest that visuomotor information is represented in some sort of short-term memory showing the same decay characteristics as observed in classical memory research.

We used a virtual reality setup to let participants grasp discs, which differed in luminance, chromaticity and size. Current theories on perception and action propose a division of labor in the brain into a color proficient perception pathway and a less color-capable action pathway. In this study, we addressed the question whether isoluminant stimuli, which provide only a chromatic but no luminance contrast for action planning, are harder to grasp than stimuli providing luminance contrast or both kinds of contrast. Although we found that grasps of isoluminant stimuli had a slightly steeper slope relating the maximum grip aperture to disc size, all other measures of grip quality were unaffected. Overall, our results do not support the view that isoluminance of stimulus and background impedes the planning of a grasping movement.

The finding that the Ebbinghaus/Titchener illusion deceives perception but not grasping is usually seen as strong evidence for Goodale and Milner's (1992) notion of two parallel visual systems, one being conscious and deceived by the illusion (vision-for-perception) and the other being unconscious and not deceived (vision-for-action). However, this finding is controversial and led to studies with seemingly contradictory results. We argue that these results are not as contradictory as it might seem. Instead, studies consistently show similar effects of the illusion on grasping. The perceptual effects are strongly dependent on the specific perceptual measure employed. If, however, some methodological precautions are used, then these diverse perceptual results can be reconciled and point to a single internal size estimate that is used for perception and for grasping. This suggests that the Ebbinghaus illusion deceives a common representation of object size that is used by perception and action.

Researchers proposed that humans may achieve grip adaptation to a new object size by reprogramming and substituting the initially planned motor program. The authors investigated corrective processes in grasping by using a size perturbation paradigm. In 3 experiments, they investigated how grip adjustments are influenced by different perturbation times (early or late), the visibility of the moving hand, and different perturbation sizes (small or large). Results indicated that individuals execute corrections faster after late perturbations. The availability of visual information about the hand had minimal effect on the corrections, suggesting that feedforward mechanisms are involved. Moreover, participants achieved adjustments mainly by smooth changes of the aperture over time, contradicting the researchers' assumption that a new movement is programmed and superimposed.

Milner and Goodale (1995) [Milner, A. D.,Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press] proposed a functional division of labor between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action. Their proposal is supported by neuropsychological, brain-imaging, and psychophysical evidence. However, it has remained controversial in the prediction that actions are not affected by visual illusions. Following up on a related review on pointing (see Bruno et al., 2008 [Bruno, N., Bernardis, P.,Gentilucci, M. (2008). Visually guided pointing, the Müller-Lyer illusion, and the functional interpretation of the dorsal-ventral split: Conclusions from 33 independent studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 32(3), 423-437]), here we re-analyze 18 studies on grasping objects embedded in the Müller-Lyer (ML) illusion. We find that median percent effects across studies are indeed larger for perceptual than for grasping measures. However, almost all grasping effects are larger than zero and the two distributions show substantial overlap and variability. A fine-grained analysis reveals that critical roles in accounting for this variability are played by the informational basis for guiding the action, by the number of trials per condition of the experiment, and by the angle of the illusion fins. When all these factors are considered together, the data support a difference between grasping and perception only when online visual feedback is available during movement. Thus, unlike pointing, grasping studies of the Müller-Lyer (ML) illusion suggest that the perceptual and motor effects of the illusion differ only because of online, feedback-driven corrections, and do not appear to support independent spatial representations for vision-for-action and vision-for-perception.

The availability of visual information influences the execution of goal-directed movements. This is very prominent in memory conditions, where a delay is introduced between stimulus presentation and execution of the movement. The corresponding effects could be due to a decay of the visual information or to different processing mechanisms used for movements directed at visible (dorsal stream) and remembered (ventral stream) objects as proposed by the two visual systems hypothesis. In three experiments, the authors investigated grasping under full vision and three different delay conditions with increasing memory demands. Results indicate that the visuomotor information used for grasping decays rapidly. No evidence was found for qualitative changes in movement kinematics and the use of different representations for visually guided and memory guided movements. Findings rather suggest that delayed grasping is similar to grasping directed to larger objects under full vision. Therefore, the authors propose that grasping after a delay is guided by classic memory mechanisms and that this is reflected in an increasing maximum grip aperture in grasping.

When grasping an object, subjects tend to look at the contact positions of the digits (A. M. Brouwer, V. H. Franz, D. Kerzel, & K. R. Gegenfurtner, 2005; R. S. Johansson, G. Westling, A. Bäckström, & J. R. Flanagan, 2001). However, these contact positions are not always visible due to occlusion. Subjects might look at occluded parts to determine the location of the contact positions based on extrapolated information. On the other hand, subjects might avoid looking at occluded parts since no object information can be gathered there. To find out where subjects fixate when grasping occluded objects, we let them grasp flat shapes with the index finger and thumb at predefined contact positions. Either the contact position of the thumb or the finger or both was occluded. In a control condition, a part of the object that does not involve the contact positions was occluded. The results showed that subjects did look at occluded object parts, suggesting that they used extrapolated object information for grasping. Additionally, they preferred to look in the direction of the index finger. When the contact position of the index finger was occluded, this tendency was inhibited. Thus, an occluder does not prevent fixations on occluded object parts, but it does affect fixation locations especially in conditions where the preferred fixation location is occluded. © ARVO.

When grasping rectangular or circular objects with a precision grip the digits close in on the object in opposite directions. In doing so the digits move perpendicular to the local surface orientation as they approach opposite sides of the object. This perpendicular approach is advantageous for accurately placing the digits. Trapezoidal objects have non-parallel surfaces so that moving the digits in opposite directions would make the digits approach the contact surfaces at an angle that is not 90°. In this study we examined whether this happens, or whether subjects tend to approach trapezoidal objects' surfaces perpendicularly. We used objects of different sizes and with different surface slants. Subjects tended to approach the object's surfaces orthogonally, suggesting that they aim for an optimal precision of digit placement rather than simply closing their hand as it reaches the object. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.

Unconscious response priming has been amply reported in studies adopting the dissociation paradigm, in which heavily masked prime stimuli modulate responses to targets (giving rise to a significant priming effect, mostly measured in reaction times, RT), whilst participants cannot classify the prime stimuli above chance level (e.g., measured in percent correct). The dissociation (significant priming effect vs. chance-level prime classification) is assumed to indicate that, even when participants are not consciously aware of the primes, they are nonetheless perceived and processed. Such purported dissociation, however, is predominantly based on a methodological problem of inequivalent metrics. We illustrated the problem by replicating and extending the behavioral part of Dehaene et al. (1998, Nature): In the masked priming experiment, one-digit numbers were visually presented as primes and targets. Participants judged whether target numbers were smaller or larger than 5. Subsequently, they were asked to ignore targets and classify heavily masked primes as smaller or larger than 5. The prime duration was manipulated by parametrically varying prime-mask stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, from 10 milliseconds [ms] to 80 ms by 10 ms). At SOA=40 ms, a highly significant congruency priming effect (in RT difference) emerged, whereas prime classification (in percent correct) approximated chance-level. Upon closer inspection, however, no dissociation was found when the priming effect and prime classification performance was estimated in the same metric (e.g., in percent correct). Nor did a dissociation between priming task performance and prime classification performance arise at any other SOA. Furthermore, performance on prime classification increased monotonically along with increasing SOAs (from 20 ms upwards), which argues against chance-level prime classification at SOA=40 ms. In conclusion, performance dissociation, from which perception without awareness is to be derived, may purport to exist when the priming effect and prime classification is not compared in a shared metri Meeting abstract presented at VSS 2015.