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The analysis presented in this article uses attendance at imperial diets (1521-1613) to estimate how politically well-integrated the Holy Roman Empire was. In doing so, it tests two conceptualisations of the political geography of the Empire: Moraw’s distinction between zones ‘close to’ and ‘distant from’ the monarch and its application to early modern history, and Schmidt’s distinction between an ‘Empire of the German nation’ and a larger ‘feudal Empire’. The analysis finds that Moraw’s zones retained at most a transient importance. Extending his model to early modern history thus risks misrepresenting political geography. The analysis also finds that geographical distance had a significant influence on the representation of the estates at the diets, with those geographically close to the diets attending increasingly often and those located in the geographical periphery increasingly staying away. Moreover, geographical distance had a consistent, strong, and significant effect on the personal presence of rulers. The Empire thus developed a well-integrated core that had the potential to form a state such as the one conceptualised by Schmidt, while the outlying regions were in increasing danger of dropping away.

Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung, Bd. 71 Nr. 3 (2022)

The paper starts out from the insight that success or failure of the common currency, on which the diet of the Holy Roman Empire agreed in 1559, cannot be assessed against how modern currencies are functioning. Rather, the benchmark is provided by historical criteria, primarily by the aims of the political authorities that joined the union. The analysis finds that there were two overriding aims: 1) preventing high-ranking economic agents from exploiting their social standing in order to push up prices and rents, and 2) removing the conditions that allowed Gresham’s Law to undermine monetary stability. The participants in the union tried to reach the first aim by retaining regional small change in addition to the Empire-wide larger units. While there is limited evidence for the common currency preventing the functioning of Gresham’s Law within the Empire up to the immediate run-up to the Thirty Years War (1618-48), it failed to prevent inflation and the inflow of foreign coinage. However, in neither respect the post1559 Empire differed from other contemporary polities. On balance, therefore, the Empire’s common currency can be considered a success.

Scholars agree that a core feature of the political style of the Holy Roman Empire was the focus on consensus, without which policies at the level of the Empire were impossible. The present article demonstrates that the consensus on which decisions of the imperial estates was based tended to be superficial and was often in danger of breaking down. This was because the diet’s open and sequential voting procedure allowed the bandwagon effect to distort outcomes. An analysis of the votes cast in the princes’ college of the diet of 1555 shows that low-status members of the college regularly imitated the decisions of high-status voters. Reforming the system would have required accepting that the members of the college were equals – an idea no one was prepared to countenance. Hence, superficial and transitory agreements remained a systematic feature of politics at the level of the Empire.

Research on premodern monetary unions has so far started out from the idea that such unions were designed to promote trade and economic integration. The present paper demonstrates that this in an anachronistic misconception. Premodern monetary unions were the answer to political and fiscal problems caused by Gresham’s Law in a monetary environment characterised permeable borders and by the increasing integration of currency markets. As integration advanced significantly in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the regional monetary unions that had been formed in the late medieval Holy Roman Empire were increasingly insufficient to address these problems. This is why the imperial estates were interested in creating and Empire-wide common currency – an aim they reached at the end of the 1550s.

The paper examines price convergence and increases in the efficiency of wheat markets across Europe from the mid-fourteenth to the early twentieth century. The analysis is based on a new data set of prices from more than 500 markets. Unlike previous research, we find that convergence was a predominantly pre-modern phenomenon. It started in the late fifteenth and reached a first high point in the early seventeenth century - a level of integration that was surpassed only in the nineteenth century. In terms of market integration, the ‘little divergence’ between parts of North-Western Europe and the rest of the continent appears since about 1600. Long-term improvements in market efficiency began in the early sixteenth century, with advances being temporarily as uneven as in price convergence. We trace this to uneven institutional change and the non-synchronous spread of modern media and systems of information transmission that affected the ability of merchants to react to news.

The paper discusses which options medieval political authorities had to satisfy the demand for complex currencies. It distinguishes several models, each of which caused problems: A first one, where the basic unit was supplemented by a range of other denominations whose weight and purity where exactly proportional. While this did not take the proportionally larger labour costs involved in the production of small change into account, the second model did: here, small change had an over proportionally high content of base metal. In consequence, the stable numerical ratios between units of the same currency began to shift. The third option involved using gold for high purchasing power coins; a strategy that made currencies vulnerable to changes in the relative market prices of gold and silver. Again, the outcome was a that the numerical ratios between units of the same currency became instable. The paper discusses how political authorities chose between these options, how they supplied their mints with the necessary bullion and how minting was organised.

The paper argues that in premodern Europe, the practice of debasement was far more ‘messy’ than research has generally recognised. First, high information costs often prevented the effective control of mint officials who could exploit their resulting autonomy in order to debase coins on their own account. Second, these costs made it impossible to monitor markets closely enough to enforce regulations. Attempts by governments to debase coins by increasing their nominal value therefore ‘worked’ only if they conformed to the market rates of these coins. Finally, high information costs prevented the creation of closed areas where the domestic currency enjoyed a monopoly. The resulting trade in coinage created incentives for governments to issue inferior copies of their neighbour’s coins – a practice that had the same consequences as a debasement – and forced the affected governments to follow suit by debasing their own coinage, too.

The article uses new sources to review the hypotheses that Charles V’s currency bill of 1551 failed because of the electoral-Saxon resistance against the undervaluation of the taler that it stipulated, or because the emperor was too weak to overcome the estates’ resistance to collective action in monetary policies. The study shows that these issues were overshadowed by the dispute about whether a bimetallic currency should be established. Charles V’s currency bill failed because the Diet of Augsburg (1550-51) asked the emperor to publish it before all open issues had been resolved. This request placed the emperor in a dilemma where he had to make a decision but could not do so without antagonising important parties. It was the result of a coordination failure at the level of the Empire; this, in turn, was a consequence of a lack of continuity among the personnel involved in shaping monetary policies.

This paper addresses two questions. First, when and to what extent did capital markets integrate north and south of the Alps? Second, how mobile was capital? Analysing a unique new dataset on pre-modern urban annuities, we find that northern markets were consistently better integrated than Italian markets. Long-term integration was driven by initially peripheral places in the Netherlands and Upper Germany integrating with the rest of the Holy Roman Empire where the distance and volume of inter-urban investments grew primarily in the sixteenth century. The institutions of the Empire contributed to stronger market integration north of the Alps.

The article argues that in the first half of the sixteenth century the need to avoid rounds of competitive debasements was the primary motive for the creation of a common currency valid in the whole Holy Roman Empire. In the years 1549 to 1551, the estates came close to achieving this. In contrast to what is suggested in the literature, their attempt did not fail because the Empire was economically poorly integrated or the will to co-operate was lacking. Rather, it failed because during the talks, the estates lost sight of the original motive, the princes favouring a bimetallic system that they hoped would allow them deflating the real value of their debts, and Charles V undervaluing the taler in the hope that this would weaken political opponents. These decisions antagonised important actors; when it proved impossible to enforce them, the Empire’s common currency failed.