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27 p. -- Bibliogr.: p. 25-27, It is widely known that conjoined sentences with and can communicate a wide range of relations between its conjuncts. Therefore, linguists in semantics and pragmatics fields have long tried to examine the nature of those relations and also, put together a plausible approach towards and-utterance interpretation. This paper aims to look at some of the most remarkable accounts that have been given for the variability in the interpretation of conjoined statements. Although totally discarded by current literature, a semantic ambiguity account for the word and is the first thing that comes to one’s mind. However, evidence has been put forward against this approach: (i) the fact that it should give account for a very large range of meanings, (ii) the fact that some juxtaposed counterparts give rise to the same interpretation and (iii) the universality of the many meanings of and in different languages. When it comes to pragmatic approaches, Paul Grice was one of the first authors that theorised about conjoined sentences in the light of pragmatics. Within a Gricean framework, the sequential interpretation of some conjoined sentences is the result of an implicature arising from Grice’s Maxim of orderliness. Many authors have argued that this approach may be unable to account for the whole issue, and evidence suggests that this theory is not consistent in some cases. Within Relevance Theory, the interpretation of conjoined sentences is regarded as an enrichment of the explicitly communicated level of an utterance, and it is governed by the principle of relevance which is rooted in the cognitive processing of a set of essential assumptions. This last theory is able to cover a wide range of conjoined sentence interpretation including narrative and some non- narrative sentences. However, there is a set of non-narrative cases that seem to be problematic for any account in which the word and is taken to equal its respective logical operator & (such as the Gricean and Relevamce The

Polysemy, the lexical semantic phenomenon in which a word form has different but related senses, is pervasive in natural languages. Examples of polysemy encompass regular polysemy and idiosyncratic forms, such as paper and atmosphere respectively. Nonetheless, regardless of its abundance in languages, it was not until 1980, with the appearance of cognitive grammar, that polysemy was given considerable attention. While this phenomenon does not seem to pose a problem in everyday communication, it has proved to be notably difficult to treat both theoretically and empirically (Falkum & Vicente, 2015, p. 3). At present, there is discussion regarding the representation of polysemy in the mental lexicon and its processing. The purpose of this dissertation is to present the main theories which are currently being discussed by linguists on this topic. In order to achieve this aim, I start by defining and comparing polysemy to homonymy, the phenomenon by which one word form has, at least, two different and unrelated meanings. I explain the criteria and some of the tests which can be applied to distinguish them (e.g. etymological derivation, native intuition, pronominalization and ellipsis). Moreover, I define the types in which polysemy can be subdivided, emphasizing metonymically and metaphorically motivated polysemy. After polysemy has been distinguished from homonymy and its subdivisions have been explained, I move on to the main section of this paper: The representation and processing of polysemy in the mental lexicon. The representation is the information which is stored in the mental lexicon for the different types of word forms. The processing is how that information is accessed and used in language production and comprehension. This being explained, I discuss what I consider to be the two main approaches regarding this issue. On the one hand, the theory named Sense Enumeration approach which postulates that the related senses of polysemous words are both stored and pr

This paper is an analysis of Semelfactives, the aspectual class introduced and defined by Smith (1991) as single-stage events occurring very quickly. Examples of Semelfactives include bodily events (e.g. blink, sneeze, cough), punctual actions (e.g. tap, peck, scratch, kick), internal events such as flash etc. Little research has been conducted on this event type class, to the extent that they have sometimes been reduced to Zeno Vendler’s Activities or Achievements. This being so, this dissertation aims at showing that Semelfactive predicates can be considered a basic aspectual category. In pursuing that objective, I define some basic concepts which need to be understood before proceeding to the analysis of Semelfactives (mainly related to lexical aspect and aspectual classifications). In addition, the grammatical and semantic characteristics of Activities and Achievements are shown, and linguistic evidence is provided in order to see how they both resemble and differ from Semelfactives in several respects. Moreover, by thoroughly analysing Semelfactives, I argue that they can have an iterative interpretation (i.e. Activity reading), which accounts for their compatibility with durative expressions such as the progressive, with which whereas Activities denote sets of events constructed via S-summing (characteristic of atelic predicates), sets of naturally atomic events are expressed by Semelfactives. I also explain telicity in terms of atomicity (following Rothstein 2004, 2007, 2008), claiming that Semelfactives behave as telic predicates, in the sense that they always denote an event with an inherent endpoint (due to their natural atomic nature), which accounts for the telic reading they obtain when combined with punctual expressions (i.e. at adverbials). Although I focus mainly on English Semelfactives, their equivalents in Spanish and Basque are also provided, where despite some minor differences, the same behaviour is observed. I conclude this paper by arguing th

This paper offers a critical assessment of the grammatical view of scalar inferences by Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012, focusing on the inadequacies that the authors find in the Gricean account, among the most important ones, the local character that these inferences often have and the role that the maxims play in the selection of alternatives to be considered. The problems facing the notion of lexical scale, key to the grammatical account, are also discussed. It is argued that the locality of these inferences in no way compromises their pragmatic nature, but make it evident that the grammar and the inferential system interact in the construction of the compositional content of the utterance., Este trabajo revisa críticamente la teoría gramatical de las inferencias escalares que presentan Chierchia, Fox y Spector 2012, centrándose en las insuficiencias explicativas que los autores encuentran en el enfoque griceano, entre las más importantes, el carácter, en ocasiones, local de estas inferencias, y el papel que desempeñam las máximas en la selección de las alternativas a considerar. Se analizan también los problemas que surgen a partir de la noción de escala léxica, central en la propuesta gramatical. Argumentaremos que el carácter local que a menudo tienen estas inferencias no desvirtúa su naturaleza pragmática, y evidencia que gramática y sistema inferencial interactúan en la construcción del contenido composicional del enunciado

Our understanding of metaphor in language and thought has been reshaped, and the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), proposed by Lakoff and Johnson has become one of the most widely accepted views. The CMT claims that our conceptual system is organised in metaphors, and that these are reflected in language. According to Lakoff (1995), in the domain of American politics, there are a number of basic metaphor schemas that underlie the conceptual systems of Democrats and Republicans. For instance, MORALITY AS EMPATHY, and MORALITY AS STRENGTH, respectively. This paper aimed at finding linguistic evidence of those conceptual systems in Hillary Clinton’s and Donald Trump’s speeches in a corpus comprising two speeches by each. To that effect, I have grouped the five most pervasive metaphor schemas in the language they use, and observed to what extent they fit in with Lakoff’s schemas. Results showed that none of the ten coincided with Lakoff’s lists of source metaphors for either party. Instead, the schemas identified dealt with more basic conceptual domains such as WAR and SPATIAL DIRECTIONS. For example, the POLITICS IS WAR metaphor is portrayed in Clinton's phrase: ‘Those rules have been under assault by Republicans in Congress and those running for president.’ The data appeared to suggest that the incoherence between my findings and Lakoff's theory was due to the discrepancy in an important premise: his metaphors systematically have MORALITY as the target domain. Thus, I resolved to perform a second examination in which I accepted MORALITY as the target domain of the discourses. The aim was to, having taken a step closer to his theory, newly attempt to find linguistic evidence of Lakoff's underlying conceptual schemas. The results indicate that his concepts are evident in the general content of the speeches. However, most of the expressions instantiating the schemas are not conveyed in a language that involves mapping between a source domain and a more abstract target do

Beginning with an explanation of lexical ambiguity in general, this paper focuses on polysemy. First, it makes a clear distinction between homonymy and polysemy, the two main lexical ambiguity types, to later finish this first section supporting the theory of a lexical ambiguity continuum as proposed by Lyons (1977) and Klepousniotou (2012) among others. The second section focuses on polysemy types, first making reference to the standard account concerning this matter, Alan Cruse’s, and then explaining two other minor theories, those by Andreas Blank and Vyvyan Evans. After talking about polysemy in isolation, information about polysemy in phraseology will be given, based on the paper by Omazić (2008). Later on, an account of theories about sense representation (in the mental lexicon) and access will be given, making reference to the link between them. Among the representation theories, the focus lies on two, the sense enumeration hypothesis and the one representation hypothesis. Even though these two theories are the most important ones, there are some others, especially within literalist approaches: rule-based approaches, the coercion hypothesis and lexical pragmatic approaches. As far as access is concerned, three main theories are given: the ordered search model, the selective (or context-dependent) access model, and the multiple (or exhaustive) access model (Klepousniotou, 2002). After this analysis, some experiments will be provided for and against the two main theories concerning sense representation in the mind. The first one, by Klepousniotou (2002), makes reference to the distinction between homonymy and polysemy in terms of representation in mind. A second experiment will be provided, this time by Beretta et al. (2005), who made a MEG study which ends up providing evidence in favor of the one representation hypothesis. Lastly, an experiment by Klepousniotou et al. is provided, also in favor of the previously mentioned hypothesis. Finally, taking into acco

Beginning with an explanation of lexical ambiguity in general, this paper focuses on polysemy. First, it makes a clear distinction between homonymy and polysemy, the two main lexical ambiguity types, to later finish this first section supporting the theory of a lexical ambiguity continuum as proposed by Lyons (1977) and Klepousniotou (2012) among others. The second section focuses on polysemy types, first making reference to the standard account concerning this matter, Alan Cruse’s, and then explaining two other minor theories, those by Andreas Blank and Vyvyan Evans. After talking about polysemy in isolation, information about polysemy in phraseology will be given, based on the paper by Omazić (2008). Later on, an account of theories about sense representation (in the mental lexicon) and access will be given, making reference to the link between them. Among the representation theories, the focus lies on two, the sense enumeration hypothesis and the one representation hypothesis. Even though these two theories are the most important ones, there are some others, especially within literalist approaches: rule-based approaches, the coercion hypothesis and lexical pragmatic approaches. As far as access is concerned, three main theories are given: the ordered search model, the selective (or context-dependent) access model, and the multiple (or exhaustive) access model (Klepousniotou, 2002). After this analysis, some experiments will be provided for and against the two main theories concerning sense representation in the mind. The first one, by Klepousniotou (2002), makes reference to the distinction between homonymy and polysemy in terms of representation in mind. A second experiment will be provided, this time by Beretta et al. (2005), who made a MEG study which ends up providing evidence in favor of the one representation hypothesis. Lastly, an experiment by Klepousniotou et al. is provided, also in favor of the previously mentioned hypothesis. Finally, taking into acco

Our understanding of metaphor in language and thought has been reshaped, and the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), proposed by Lakoff and Johnson has become one of the most widely accepted views. The CMT claims that our conceptual system is organised in metaphors, and that these are reflected in language. According to Lakoff (1995), in the domain of American politics, there are a number of basic metaphor schemas that underlie the conceptual systems of Democrats and Republicans. For instance, MORALITY AS EMPATHY, and MORALITY AS STRENGTH, respectively. This paper aimed at finding linguistic evidence of those conceptual systems in Hillary Clinton’s and Donald Trump’s speeches in a corpus comprising two speeches by each. To that effect, I have grouped the five most pervasive metaphor schemas in the language they use, and observed to what extent they fit in with Lakoff’s schemas. Results showed that none of the ten coincided with Lakoff’s lists of source metaphors for either party. Instead, the schemas identified dealt with more basic conceptual domains such as WAR and SPATIAL DIRECTIONS. For example, the POLITICS IS WAR metaphor is portrayed in Clinton's phrase: ‘Those rules have been under assault by Republicans in Congress and those running for president.’ The data appeared to suggest that the incoherence between my findings and Lakoff's theory was due to the discrepancy in an important premise: his metaphors systematically have MORALITY as the target domain. Thus, I resolved to perform a second examination in which I accepted MORALITY as the target domain of the discourses. The aim was to, having taken a step closer to his theory, newly attempt to find linguistic evidence of Lakoff's underlying conceptual schemas. The results indicate that his concepts are evident in the general content of the speeches. However, most of the expressions instantiating the schemas are not conveyed in a language that involves mapping between a source domain and a more abstract target do

Beginning with an explanation of lexical ambiguity in general, this paper focuses on polysemy. First, it makes a clear distinction between homonymy and polysemy, the two main lexical ambiguity types, to later finish this first section supporting the theory of a lexical ambiguity continuum as proposed by Lyons (1977) and Klepousniotou (2012) among others. The second section focuses on polysemy types, first making reference to the standard account concerning this matter, Alan Cruse’s, and then explaining two other minor theories, those by Andreas Blank and Vyvyan Evans. After talking about polysemy in isolation, information about polysemy in phraseology will be given, based on the paper by Omazić (2008). Later on, an account of theories about sense representation (in the mental lexicon) and access will be given, making reference to the link between them. Among the representation theories, the focus lies on two, the sense enumeration hypothesis and the one representation hypothesis. Even though these two theories are the most important ones, there are some others, especially within literalist approaches: rule-based approaches, the coercion hypothesis and lexical pragmatic approaches. As far as access is concerned, three main theories are given: the ordered search model, the selective (or context-dependent) access model, and the multiple (or exhaustive) access model (Klepousniotou, 2002). After this analysis, some experiments will be provided for and against the two main theories concerning sense representation in the mind. The first one, by Klepousniotou (2002), makes reference to the distinction between homonymy and polysemy in terms of representation in mind. A second experiment will be provided, this time by Beretta et al. (2005), who made a MEG study which ends up providing evidence in favor of the one representation hypothesis. Lastly, an experiment by Klepousniotou et al. is provided, also in favor of the previously mentioned hypothesis. Finally, taking into acco

Our understanding of metaphor in language and thought has been reshaped, and the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), proposed by Lakoff and Johnson has become one of the most widely accepted views. The CMT claims that our conceptual system is organised in metaphors, and that these are reflected in language. According to Lakoff (1995), in the domain of American politics, there are a number of basic metaphor schemas that underlie the conceptual systems of Democrats and Republicans. For instance, MORALITY AS EMPATHY, and MORALITY AS STRENGTH, respectively. This paper aimed at finding linguistic evidence of those conceptual systems in Hillary Clinton’s and Donald Trump’s speeches in a corpus comprising two speeches by each. To that effect, I have grouped the five most pervasive metaphor schemas in the language they use, and observed to what extent they fit in with Lakoff’s schemas. Results showed that none of the ten coincided with Lakoff’s lists of source metaphors for either party. Instead, the schemas identified dealt with more basic conceptual domains such as WAR and SPATIAL DIRECTIONS. For example, the POLITICS IS WAR metaphor is portrayed in Clinton's phrase: ‘Those rules have been under assault by Republicans in Congress and those running for president.’ The data appeared to suggest that the incoherence between my findings and Lakoff's theory was due to the discrepancy in an important premise: his metaphors systematically have MORALITY as the target domain. Thus, I resolved to perform a second examination in which I accepted MORALITY as the target domain of the discourses. The aim was to, having taken a step closer to his theory, newly attempt to find linguistic evidence of Lakoff's underlying conceptual schemas. The results indicate that his concepts are evident in the general content of the speeches. However, most of the expressions instantiating the schemas are not conveyed in a language that involves mapping between a source domain and a more abstract target do