Search

info:eu-repo/semantics/published

info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The year 2021 was the first full year for the De Croo I Cabinet, which had been installed in October 2020 after difficult and lengthy negotiations. The oversized and ideologically diverse ?Vivaldi? coalition government struggled as it was confronted with the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, amidst frequent tensions between the coalition partners, with the two largest Flemish parties (Flemish Interest/Vlaams Belang and New Flemish Alliance/Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie) shooting from the opposition. Further, usual disagreements continued to prevail between Flemish and Francophone parties and their respective executives at the subnational level. Hence, discussions on the contours of a ? still very tentative ? seventh state reform did not make much progress. Wallonia, the country's southern region, was hit by catastrophic floods in July. The whole public response to these floods added up to the massive costs of handling COVID-19, which resulted in a structurally large budget deficit., L'année 2021 fut la première année complète pour le gouvernement De Croo I entré en fonction en octobre 2020 au terme de longues et difficiles négociations. La coalition ?Vivaldi?, très large et idéologiquement diversifiée, rencontra bien des difficultés dans sa gestion de la pandémie COVID-19; cette dernière suscita de fréquentes tensions entre les partenaires de la coalition alors que les deux plus grands partis flamands (le VB et la N-VA) menaient une opposition active. Par ailleurs, les désaccords habituels se prolongèrent entre les partis flamands et francophones et leurs exécutifs respectifs à l?échelon subnational. Dans ces conditions, les discussions autour d'une septième réforme de l'Etat aux contours encore très vagues ne progressèrent guère. La Wallonie, la région du Sud du pays, fut frappée par des inondations catastrophiques en juillet. La réponse des autorités publiques à ces inondations, conjuguée aux coûts très élevés de la gestion COVID-19, se traduisit par un déficit budgétaire structurellement élevé.

The framing impact of political discourses has long been attested for. Metaphors in particular are known to ease the understanding of complex concepts and processes. Yet, the question remains to what extent metaphors do work the same on different recipients? Based on an experimental design, we test a potentially key moderating variable in the study of political metaphors: political knowledge. Our experiment aims at determining the extent to which the confrontation of individuals to arguments and metaphors impacts their preferences regarding the implementation of a basic income in Belgium. In particular, we hypothesize that the marginal effect of metaphors as cognitive shortcuts decreases when political knowledge increases. Our findings suggest that some metaphorical frames are more successful than others, hereby supporting the idea that the aptness of the metaphorical frame is a key factor when conducting experiments. We conclude that political knowledge is an important variable when analyzing the framing effect of metaphors, especially when it goes about very low or very high levels of political knowledge. The insertion of metaphors in political discourses may easily succeed in rallying individuals behind a given cause, but this would only work if participants have a lower knowledge of politics., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Many Western parties have opened up the process of leadership selection to party members under the noble premises to democratize the party. Yet, this might just be window-dressing as party leadership selection is often a coronation rather than an open contest. We argue that the preparation phase preceding the actual election phase is crucial in understanding the balance between the impact of party members and the steering of the party elite. This study compares the preparation phase of two leadership contests after losing elections in one party, the Flemish Christian-democratic party in Belgium: one with a single candidate and one with an exceptionally high number of candidates. Our analysis, based on 22 in-depth elite interviews, demonstrates that leadership elections are influenced by a cluster of different influencing actors, but in particular by what we label the “last person standing” whose candidacy is identified as the most effective mechanism to influence the nomination process. Other (slightly less effective) influencing mechanisms include encouragements, discouragements and the diffusion of an ideal profile for the future party leader., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The literature on candidate selection has focussed extensively on the degree of inclusiveness and decentralization of the selectorate, as part of the debate on intra-party democracy. However, much less attention has been paid to the degree of openness of candidacies, or selection criteria within parties. Yet parties have a lot of leeway in how they design selection criteria internally. Which guidelines do parties follow when making the crucial choice on which candidates to select for elections? This paper investigates selection criteria from two perspectives: the formal rules set by parties that restrict the candidate’s pool and the (informal) preferences of selectors that shape who gets selected. We aim first at contrasting the degree of party institutionalization and parties’ formal rules in candidate selection and so, we shed light on whether parties formalise their candidacy requirements and candidate selection processes to the same extent as other party activities. Second, the paper investigates the role of the selectorates, and how selectorate’s characteristics matter for the kind of (informal) selection criteria, be they intended at maximizing offices, votes or policies. Drawing on party statutes coded in the Political Party Database (PPDB) and 23 in-depth interviews with selectors, we study three francophone Belgian parties that differ both in terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate who has the final say on candidate selection and in terms of degree of centralisation, and in terms of party institutionalisation: the green party (Ecolo), the socialist party (PS), and the liberal party (MR). Our comparative analysis of parties, selection criteria provides new insights into the secret garden of politics and highlights in particular the major impact of parties, degree of centralization., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This book focuses on the triadic relationship between electoral candidates and the two other poles of the delegation and accountability triangle—political parties and voters. The chapters rely mostly on the Belgian Candidate Survey (CCS project), gathering about 2000 candidates belonging to 15 parties represented in Parliament and running for the 2014 federal and regional elections, and the authors’ conclusions serve at answering broad political science questions linked with elite recruitment, party and candidate electoral strategies, personalisation, party cohesion, and descriptive and substantive representation. Its multilevel semi-open electoral system, atypical federal structure, extreme party system fragmentation and volatility make Belgium an exceptionally rich but complex case that offers findings highly relevant to research on candidates in other democracies.