Search

This report provides a descriptive analysis of the African swine fever (ASF) Genotype II epidemic in the affected Member States in the EU and two neighbouring countries for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 August 2021. ASF continued to spread in wild boar in the EU, it entered Germany in September 2020, while Belgium became free from ASF in October 2020. No ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs nor cases in wild boar have been reported in Greece since February 2020. In the Baltic States, overall, there has been a declining trend in proportions of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-positive samples from wild boar carcasses in the last few years. In the other countries, the proportions of PCR-positive wild boar carcasses remained high, indicating continuing spread of the disease. A systematic literature review revealed that the risk factors most frequently significantly associated with ASF in domestic pigs were pig density, low levels of biosecurity and socio-economic factors. For wild boar, most significant risk factors were related to habitat, socio-economic factors and wild boar management. The effectiveness of different control options in the so-named white zones, areas where wild boar densities have been drastically reduced to avoid further spread of ASF after a new introduction, was assessed with a stochastic model. Important findings were that establishing a white zone is much more challenging when the area of ASF incursion is adjacent to an area where limited control measures are in place. Very stringent wild boar population reduction measures in the white zone are key to success. The white zone needs to be far enough away from the affected core area so that the population can be reduced in time before the disease arrives and the timing of this will depend on the wild boar density and the required population reduction target in the white zone. Finally, establishing a proactive white zone along the demarcation line of an affected area requires higher culling effort

An update on the African swine fever (ASF) situation in the 10 affected Member States (MS) in the EU and in two neighbouring countries from the 1 September 2019 until the 31 August 2020 is provided. The dynamics of the proportions of PCR‐ and ELISA‐positive samples since the first ASF detection in the country were provided and seasonal patterns were investigated. The impact of the ASF epidemic on the annual numbers of hunted wild boar in each affected MS was investigated. To evaluate differences in the extent of spread of ASF in the wild boar populations, the number of notifications that could be classified as secondary cases to a single source was calculated for each affected MS and compared for the earliest and latest year of the epidemic in the country. To evaluate possible risk factors for the occurrence of ASFV in wild boar or domestic pigs, a literature review was performed. Risk factors for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar in Romanian hunting grounds in 2019 were identified with a generalised linear model. The probability to find at least one PCR‐confirmed ASF case in wild boar in a hunting ground in Romania was driven by environmental factors, wild boar abundance and the density of backyard pigs in the hunting ground area, while hunting‐related variables were not retained in the final model. Finally, measures implemented in white zones (ASF‐free zones that are geographically adjacent to an area where ASF is present in wild boar) to prevent further spread of ASF were analysed with a spatially, explicit stochastic individual‐based model. To be effective, the wild boar population in the white zone would need to be drastically reduced before ASF arrives at the zone and it must be wide enough. To achieve the necessary pre‐emptive culling targets of wild boar in the white zone, at the start of the establishment, the white zone should be placed sufficiently far from the affected area, considering the speed of the natur

African swine fever (ASF) entered Georgia in 2007 and the EU in 2014. In the EU, the virus primarily spread in wild boar (Sus scrofa) in the period from 2014-2018. However, from the summer 2018, numerous domestic pig farms in Romania were affected by ASF. In contrast to the existing knowledge on ASF transmission routes, the understanding of risk factors and the importance of different transmission routes is still limited. In the period from May to September 2019, 655 Romanian pig farms were included in a matched case-control study investigating possible risk factors for ASF incursion in commercial and backyard pig farms. The results showed that close proximity to outbreaks in domestic farms was a risk factor in commercial as well as backyard farms. Furthermore, in backyard farms, herd size, wild boar abundance around the farm, number of domestic outbreaks within 2 km around farms, short distance to wild boar cases and visits of professionals working on farms were statistically significant risk factors. Additionally, growing crops around the farm, which could potentially attract wild boar, and feeding forage from ASF affected areas to the pigs were risk factors for ASF incursion in backyard farms.

Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector-borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants and camels) and humans. Rift Valley fever is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula, with periodic epidemics characterised by 5–15 years of inter-epizootic periods. In the last two decades, RVF was notified in new African regions (e.g. Sahel), RVF epidemics occurred more frequently and low-level enzootic virus circulation has been demonstrated in livestock in various areas. Recent outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya raised the attention of the EU for a possible incursion into neighbouring countries. The movement of live animals is the most important pathway for RVF spread from the African endemic areas to North Africa and the Middle East. The movement of infected animals and infected vectors when shipped by flights, containers or road transport is considered as other plausible pathways of introduction into Europe. The overall risk of introduction of RVF into EU through the movement of infected animals is very low in all the EU regions and in all MSs (less than one epidemic every 500 years), given the strict EU animal import policy. The same level of risk of introduction in all the EU regions was estimated also considering the movement of infected vectors, with the highest level for Belgium, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands (one epidemic every 228–700 years), mainly linked to the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF infected countries. Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of RVFV introduction, the risk of further spread into countries neighbouring the EU and the risks of possible introduction of infected vectors, suggest that EU authorities need to strengthen their surveillance and response capacities, as well as the collaboration w

Parasites are important food‐borne pathogens. Their complex lifecycles, varied transmission routes, and prolonged periods between infection and symptoms mean that the public health burden and relative importance of different transmission routes are often difficult to assess. Furthermore, there are challenges in detection and diagnostics, and variations in reporting. A Europe‐focused ranking exercise, using multicriteria decision analysis, identified potentially food‐borne parasites of importance, and that are currently not routinely controlled in food. These are Cryptosporidium spp., Toxoplasma gondii and Echinococcus spp. Infection with these parasites in humans and animals, or their occurrence in food, is not notifiable in all Member States. This Opinion reviews current methods for detection, identification and tracing of these parasites in relevant foods, reviews literature on food‐borne pathways, examines information on their occurrence and persistence in foods, and investigates possible control measures along the food chain. The differences between these three parasites are substantial, but for all there is a paucity of well‐established, standardised, validated methods that can be applied across the range of relevant foods. Furthermore, the prolonged period between infection and clinical symptoms (from several days for Cryptosporidium to years for Echinococcus spp.) means that source attribution studies are very difficult. Nevertheless, our knowledge of the domestic animal lifecycle (involving dogs and livestock) for Echinoccocus granulosus means that this parasite is controllable. For Echinococcus multilocularis, for which the lifecycle involves wildlife (foxes and rodents), control would be expensive and complicated, but could be achieved in targeted areas with sufficient commitment and resources. Quantitative risk assessments have been described for Toxoplasma in meat. However, for T. gondii and Cryptosporidium as faecal contaminants, development of validate

One of the aims of the DynVect project was to set up a network of European entomologists working on Culicoides, the vectors of bluetongue virus, to create a platform for discussion, data sharing and data analysis. The first task consisted in describing the surveillance systems in place in each country. For this, a questionnaire was sent to 9 countries: Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands. Between 1 and 9 institutes per country were involved in the surveillance. The first country to set up a surveillance system was Spain (in 2000), followed by other southern countries (Italy and France). A second wave of countries set up surveillance systems in 2006, with the arrival of bluetongue in northern Europe. All countries currently continue the surveillance except Germany (which stopped the surveillance in mid 2008). All countries shared common aims: defining "vector-free" periods and describing the diversity and dynamics of species. Except in Italy, all surveillance protocols evolved over the years, for example from covering specific regions to the entire country, and/or with an increasing number of traps. Surveillance systems vary between countries in terms of i) number of traps per country (5 - 300), ii) types of traps used (OVI, CDC, BG, Rieb, Rothamsted suction trap), although currently all countries use OVI traps except for Spain, iii) trapping frequency (day and night, weekly, fortnightly or monthly), iv) number of collection nights (mainly 1 night trapping, except Belgium with 2 consecutive nights and Germany with 7 consecutive days), v) trap location within farm (inside or outside buildings or both according to the season), vi) the level to which species are identified (Group, Complex or species) and vii) the definition of the vector-free period. Following this descriptive phase, participants discussed the data which could be shared and the associated aims as well as the database structure which should be used. This w

In recent years the vector-borne diseases (VBD) are (re)-emerging and spreading across the world having a profound impact on human and veterinary health, ecology, socio-economics and disease management. Arguably the best-documented example of veterinary importance is the recent twofold invasion of bluetongue (BT) in Europe. Much attention has been devoted to derive presence-absence habitat distribution models and to model transmission through direct contact. Limited research has focused on the dynamic modelling of wind mediated BT spread. This paper shows the results of a stochastic predictive model used to assess the spread of bluetongue by vectors considering both wind-independent and wind-mediated movement of the vectors. The model was parameterised using epidemiological knowledge from the BTV8 epidemic in 2006/2007 and the BTV1 epidemic in 2008 in South-France. The model correctly reflects the total surface of the infected zone (overall accuracy = 0.77; sensitivity = 0.94; specificity = 0.65) whilst slightly overestimating spatial case density. The model was used operationally in spring 2009 to predict further spread of BTV1. This allowed veterinary officers in Belgium to decide whether there was a risk of introduction of BTV1 from France into Belgium and thus, whether there was a need for vaccination. Given the far distance from the predicted infected zone to the Belgian border, it was decided not to vaccinate against BTV1 in 2009 in Belgium.

A real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay for the rapid detection of African swine fever virus (ASFV), multiplexed for simultaneous detection of swine beta-actin as an endogenous control, has been developed and validated by four National Reference Laboratories of the European Union for African swine fever (ASF) including the European Union Reference Laboratory. Primers and a TaqMan ® probe specific for ASFV were selected from conserved regions of the p72 gene. The limit of detection of the new real-time PCR assay is 5.7-57 copies of the ASFV genome. High accuracy, reproducibility and robustness of the PCR assay (CV ranging from 0.7 to 5.4%) were demonstrated both within and between laboratories using different real-time PCR equipments. The specificity of virus detection was validated using a panel of 44 isolates collected over many years in various geographical locations in Europe, Africa and America, including recent isolates from the Caucasus region, Sardinia, East and West Africa. Compared to the OIE-prescribed conventional and real-time PCR assays, the sensitivity of the new assay with internal control was improved, as demonstrated by testing 281 field samples collected in recent outbreaks and surveillance areas in Europe and Africa (170 samples) together with samples obtained through experimental infections (111 samples). This is particularly evident in the early days following experimental infection and during the course of the disease in pigs sub-clinically infected with strains of low virulence (from 35 up to 70dpi). The specificity of the assay was also confirmed on 150 samples from uninfected pigs and wild boar from ASF-free areas. Measured on the total of 431 tested samples, the positive deviation of the new assay reaches 21% or 26% compared to PCR and real-time PCR methods recommended by OIE. This improved and rigorously validated real-time PCR assay with internal control will provide a rapid, sensitive and reliable molecular tool for ASFV detect