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Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Categorization is an essential cognitive and perceptual process, which happens spontaneously. However, earlier research often neglected the spontaneous nature of this process by mainly adopting explicit tasks in behavioral or neuroimaging paradigms. Here, we use frequency-tagging (FT) during electroencephalography (EEG) in 22 healthy human participants (both male and female) as a direct approach to pinpoint spontaneous visual categorical processing. Starting from schematic natural visual stimuli, we created morph sequences comprising 11 equal steps. Mirroring a behavioral categorical perception discrimination paradigm, we administered a FT-EEG oddball paradigm, assessing neural sensitivity for equally sized differences within and between stimulus categories. Likewise, mirroring a behavioral category classification paradigm, we administered a sweep FT-EEG oddball paradigm, sweeping from one end of the morph sequence to the other, thereby allowing us to objectively pinpoint the neural category boundary. We found that FT-EEG can implicitly measure categorical processing and discrimination. More specifically, we could derive an objective neural index of the required level to differentiate between the two categories, and this neural index showed the typical marker of categorical perception (i.e., stronger discrimination across as compared with within categories). The neural findings of the implicit paradigms were also validated using an explicit behavioral task. These results provide evidence that FT-EEG can be used as an objective tool to measure discrimination and categorization and that the human brain inherently and spontaneously (without any conscious or decisional processes) uses higher-level meaningful categorization information to interpret ambiguous (morph) shapes., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests., (Copyright © 2024 the authors.)

Communicating about new or unknown health risks is challenging because it requires audiences to engage with and process novel and often complex health information. This study examines how texts can convey awareness and increase knowledge about health risks people are unaware of. The focus is on how text genre (narrative, expository, and mixed-genre) affects relevant emotional (arousal, transportation) and cognitive outcomes (knowledge and risk severity), measured using both online (electrodermal activity) and offline self-report measures. Mixed-effects model analyses revealed that narrative texts exhibit the highest self-reported arousal, transportation, and risk severity. Additionally, transportation mediates the relationship between text genre and risk severity. Ultimately, mixed-genre texts produced significantly higher arousal peaks and confidence ratings on knowledge posttests compared to expository texts. Taken together, the findings suggest that narrative texts perform better at raising awareness, whereas mixed-genre texts seem more effective in learning. The implications for health risk communication are discussed.

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters-at the expense of affective aspects-and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)-at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

In the last few years, a remarkable convergence of interests and results has emerged between scholars interested in the arts and aesthetics from a variety of perspectives and cognitive scientists studying the mind and brain within the predictive processing (PP) framework. This convergence has so far proven fruitful for both sides: while PP is increasingly adopted as a framework for understanding aesthetic phenomena, the arts and aesthetics, examined under the lens of PP, are starting to be seen as important windows into our mental functioning. The result is a vast and fast-growing research programme that promises to deliver important insights into our aesthetic encounters as well as a wide range of psychological phenomena of general interest. Here, we present this developing research programme, describing its grounds and highlighting its prospects. We start by clarifying how the study of the arts and aesthetics encounters the PP picture of mental functioning (§1). We then go on to outline the prospects of this encounter for the fields involved: philosophy and history of art (§2), psychology of aesthetics and neuroaesthetics (§3) and psychology and neuroscience more generally (§4). The upshot is an ambitious but well-defined framework within which aesthetics and cognitive science can partner up to illuminate crucial aspects of the human mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

We review the predictive processing theory's take on goals and affect, to shed new light on mental distress and how it develops into psychopathology such as in affective and motivational disorders. This analysis recovers many of the classical factors known to be important in those disorders, like uncertainty and control, but integrates them in a mechanistic model of adaptive and maladaptive cognition and behavior. We derive implications for treatment that have so far remained underexposed in existing predictive processing accounts of mental disorder, specifically with regard to the model-dependent construction of value, the importance of model validation (evidence), and the introduction and learning of new, adaptive beliefs that relieve suffering., Competing Interests: Conflict of interest statement Nothing declared., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Bayesian predictive coding theories of autism spectrum disorder propose that impaired acquisition or a broader shape of prior probability distributions lies at the core of the condition. However, we still know very little about how probability distributions are learned and encoded by children, let alone children with autism. Here, we take advantage of a recently developed distribution learning paradigm to characterize how children with and without autism acquire information about probability distributions. Twenty-four autistic and 25-matched neurotypical children searched for an odd-one-out target among a set of distractor lines with orientations sampled from a Gaussian distribution repeated across multiple trials to allow for learning of the parameters (mean and variance) of the distribution. We could measure the width (variance) of the participant's encoded distribution by introducing a target-distractor role-reversal while varying the similarity between target and previous distractor mean. Both groups performed similarly on the visual search task and learned the distractor distribution to a similar extent. However, the variance learned was much broader than the one presented, consistent with less informative priors in children irrespective of autism diagnosis. These findings have important implications for Bayesian accounts of perception throughout development, and Bayesian accounts of autism specifically. LAY SUMMARY: Recent theories about the underlying cognitive mechanisms of autism propose that the way autistic individuals estimate variability or uncertainty in their perceptual environment may differ from how typical individuals do so. Children had to search an oddly tilted line in a set of lines pointing in different directions, and based on their response times we examined how they learned about the variability in a set of objects. We found that autistic children learn variability as well as typical children, but both groups learn with less precision than typical adults do on the same task., (© 2021 International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

Current theories propose that our sense of curiosity is determined by the learning progress or information gain that our cognitive system expects to make. However, few studies have explicitly tried to quantify subjective information gain and link it to measures of curiosity. Here, we asked people to report their curiosity about the intrinsically engaging perceptual 'puzzles' known as Mooney images, and to report on the strength of their aha experience upon revealing the solution image (curiosity relief). We also asked our participants (279) to make a guess concerning the solution of the image, and used the distribution of these guesses to compute the crowdsourced semantic entropy (or ambiguity) of the images, as a measure of the potential for information gain. Our results confirm that curiosity and, even more so, aha experience is substantially associated with this semantic information gain measure. These findings support the expected information gain theory of curiosity and suggest that the aha experience or intrinsic reward is driven by the actual information gain. In an unannounced memory part, we also established that the often reported influence of curiosity on memory is fully mediated by the aha experience or curiosity relief. We discuss the implications of our results for the burgeoning fields of curiosity and psychoaesthetics., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

We show that TTOM has a lot to offer for the study of the evolution of cultures, but that this also brings to the fore the dark implications of TTOM, unexposed in Veissière et al. Those implications lead us to move beyond meme-centered or an organism-centered concept of fitness based on free-energy minimization, toward a social system-centered view.

Ward's signal detection theory-based framework elucidates some aspects of interindividual differences in sensitivity, but, we argue, obscures others. Specifically, it disregards the important challenge of inferring the meaning of sensory inputs. Within Bayesian predictive coding accounts, the meaning is given by inferences to more deeply hidden causes of sensory inputs and is generally the basis for initiating context-appropriate (e.g., social) behavior. As such, when inference of hierarchical causes is hampered, as accounts of autism based on deficient precision estimation imply, a form of hyporesponsivity can emerge (together with the hypersensitivity already highlighted by Ward).

We examine whether a stimulus generalization framework can provide insight in how experience shapes evaluative responses to artworks. Participants received positive information about one artwork and negative information about another artwork. Afterwards, we tested their evaluative responses not only to these artworks but also to similar artworks, which allowed us to assess generalization. Results showed that the artwork that was paired with positive information and the artwork that was similar to it were evaluated more positively than the other artworks. These findings confirm that theories that aim to explain art appreciation could benefit from taking learning and its generalization into account., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

One recent, promising account of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) situates the cause of the disorder in an atypicality in basic neural information processing, more specifically in how activity of one neuron is modulated by neighboring neurons. The canonical neural computation that implements such contextual influence is called divisive (or suppressive) normalization. The account proposes that this normalization is reduced in ASD. We tested one fundamental prediction of this model for low-level perception, namely that individuals with ASD would show reduced cross-orientation suppression (leading to an illusory tilt perception). 11 young adults with an ASD diagnosis and 12 age-, gender-, and IQ-matched control participants performed a psychophysical orientation perception task with compound grating stimuli. Illusory tilt perception did not differ significantly between groups, indicating typical divisive normalization in individuals with ASD. In fact, all individuals with ASD showed a considerable orientation bias. There was also no correlation between illusory tilt perception and autistic traits as measured by the Social Responsiveness Scale. These results provide clear evidence against the decreased divisive normalization model of ASD in low-level perception, where divisive normalization is best characterized. We evaluate the broader existing evidence for this model and propose ways to salvage and refine the model.

Background: Recent predictive coding accounts of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) suggest that a key deficit in ASD concerns the inflexibility in modulating local prediction errors as a function of global top-down expectations. As a direct test of this central hypothesis, we used electroencephalography to investigate whether local prediction error processing was less modulated by global context (i.e., global stimulus frequency) in ASD., Methods: A group of 18 adults with ASD was compared with a group of 24 typically developed adults on a well-validated hierarchical auditory oddball task in which participants listened to short sequences of either five identical sounds (local standard) or four identical sounds and a fifth deviant sound (local deviant). The latter condition is known to generate the mismatch negativity (MMN) component, believed to reflect early sensory prediction error processing. Crucially, previous studies have shown that in blocks with a higher frequency of local deviant sequences, top-down expectations seem to attenuate the MMN. We predicted that this modulation by global context would be less pronounced in the ASD group., Results: Both groups showed an MMN that was modulated by global context. However, this effect was smaller in the ASD group as compared with the typically developed group. In contrast, the P3b, as an electroencephalographic marker of conscious expectation processes, did not differ across groups., Conclusions: Our results demonstrate that people with ASD are less flexible in modulating their local predictions (reflected in MMN), thereby confirming the central hypothesis of contemporary predictive coding accounts of ASD., (Copyright © 2018 Society of Biological Psychiatry. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.

A large body of research reports individual differences in local and global visual processing in relation to expertise, culture and psychopathology. However, recent research has suggested that various different measures of local-global processing are not strongly associated with one another, calling its construct validity into question. The current study sought to further explore the validity of local-global processing biases in perception by developing three tasks based on two existing paradigms: the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and the Navon hierarchical letters task. The newly developed tasks aimed to control for stimulus and response factors that may have impacted upon the reliability of previous research. They were administered to a large sample of undergraduate students (N>100). The results of two new versions of the EFT indicated that disembedding performance is influenced by the structure of the embedding context. In addition, global precedence and interference in the Navon task remained present even when local attentional approaches to global hierarchical stimuli were restricted. Inter-task correlations within the EFT were high but low between the EFT and the Navon task, lending support to the notion that local-global processing is not a monolithic construct, but representative of a number of distinct perceptual abilities and biases. Future research may use these task distinctions to pinpoint more precisely which aspects of perceptual processing characterise specific (clinical) participant populations., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

We explored the strength of implicit social inferences in adolescents with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) using a chasing paradigm in which participants judged the absence/presence of a chase within a display of four seemingly randomly moving dots. While two of these dots always moved randomly, the two others could fulfill the role of being either the chasing (wolf) or chased (sheep) dot. In the chase-present (but not the chase-absent) trials the wolf displayed chasing behavior defined by the degree to which the dot reliably moved towards the sheep (chasing subtlety). Previous research indicated that chasing subtlety strongly influenced chase detection in typically developing (TD) adults. We intended to replicate and extend this finding to adolescents with and without ASD, while also adding either a social or a non-social cue to the displays. Our results confirmed the importance of chasing subtlety and indicated that adding social, but not non-social, information further improved chase detection performance. Interestingly, the performance of adolescents with ASD was less dependent on chasing subtlety than that of their TD counterparts. Nonetheless, adolescents with and without ASD did not differ in their use of the added social (or non-social) cue.

Predictive coding has recently been welcomed as a fruitful framework to understand autism spectrum disorder. Starting from an account centered on deficient differential weighting of prediction errors (based in so-called precision estimation), we illustrate that individuals with autism have particular difficulties with separating signal from noise, across different tasks. Specifically, we discuss how deficient precision-setting is detrimental for learning in unstable environments, for context-dependent assignment of salience to inputs, and for robustness in perception, as illustrated in coherent motion paradigms., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

We use the example of art-derived solace to discuss a broader mechanism by which negative affect is instrumental in creating positive appreciation of artworks. Based on the theory of predictive processing, we argue that increasing attunement or reduction of prediction errors, which implies increasing validation of the agents (models), is experienced as positive, even if the artwork's content is negative.

A daily rhythm that is not in synchrony with the environmental light-dark cycle (as in jetlag and shift work) is known to affect mood and health through an as yet unresolved neural mechanism. Here, we combine Bayesian probabilistic 'cue-conflict' theory with known physiology of the biological clock of the brain, entailing the insight that, for a functional pacemaker, it is sufficient to have two interacting units (reflecting environmental and internal time-of-day cues), without the need for an extra homuncular directing unit. Unnatural light-dark cycles cause a time-of-day cue-conflict that is reflected by a desynchronization between the ventral (environmental) and dorsal (internal) pacemaking signals of the pacemaker. We argue that this desynchronization, in-and-of-itself, produces health issues that we designate as 'circadian-time sickness', analogous to 'motion sickness'., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

In many magic tricks, magicians fool their audience by performing a mock action (a so-called "ruse"), which merely serves the purpose of providing a seemingly natural explanation for visible movements that are actually part of the secret move they want to hide from the audience. Here, we discuss a special magic ruse in which the action of secretly putting something somewhere is "explained away" by the mock action of fetching something from the same place, or vice versa . Interestingly, the psychological principles underlying the amazing potency and robustness of this technique seem to be very similar to the general perceptual principles underlying figure-ground perception and the assignment of border ownership. This analogy may be useful for exploring the possibility that this and similar magical effects involve immediate "unconscious inferences" about intentions more akin to perceptual processing than to explicit deliberations based on a reflective "theory" of mind.

There have been numerous attempts to explain the enigma of autism, but existing neurocognitive theories often provide merely a refined description of 1 cluster of symptoms. Here we argue that deficits in executive functioning, theory of mind, and central coherence can all be understood as the consequence of a core deficit in the flexibility with which people with autism spectrum disorder can process violations to their expectations. More formally we argue that the human mind processes information by making and testing predictions and that the errors resulting from violations to these predictions are given a uniform, inflexibly high weight in autism spectrum disorder. The complex, fluctuating nature of regularities in the world and the stochastic and noisy biological system through which people experience it require that, in the real world, people not only learn from their errors but also need to (meta-)learn to sometimes ignore errors. Especially when situations (e.g., social) or stimuli (e.g., faces) become too complex or dynamic, people need to tolerate a certain degree of error in order to develop a more abstract level of representation. Starting from an inability to flexibly process prediction errors, a number of seemingly core deficits become logically secondary symptoms. Moreover, an insistence on sameness or the acting out of stereotyped and repetitive behaviors can be understood as attempts to provide a reassuring sense of predictive success in a world otherwise filled with error. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Human sensitivity for social cues is exquisite, as illustrated by the ease with which simplified point-light movements invoke social and emotional responses. Compared to faces, these biological motion stimuli only recently started to be used to explore questions regarding social cognition and anxiety. We presented human point-light walkers that could be perceived as facing towards or facing away from the observer, and tested whether participants with high social anxiety would perceive these bistable stimuli differently, because this type of stimuli has particular relevance for them. The results showed that observers with high social anxiety tended to see walkers as facing away more frequently than those with low social anxiety. This may mean that high socially anxious observers are biased towards the more positive perceptual alternative because they are motivated to protect themselves against threatening social experiences, but we also explore alternative explanations. The findings are in line with the evidence for a positivity bias in perception, also called wishful seeing, but in contrast with the attentional negativity bias often found in social anxiety. We discuss reasons for this divergence and possible limitations of the current study., (© 2013.)

Pellicano and Burr (2012) argue that a Bayesian framework can help us understand the perceptual peculiarities in autism. We agree, but we think that their assumption of uniformly flat or equivocal priors in autism is not empirically supported. Moreover, we argue that any full account has to take into consideration not only the nature of priors in autism, but also how these priors are constructed or learned. We argue that predictive coding provides a more constrained framework that very naturally explains how priors are constructed in autism leading to strong, but overfitted, and non-generalizable predictions.

The predictive coding model is increasingly and fruitfully used to explain a wide range of findings in perception. Here we discuss the potential of this model in explaining the mechanisms underlying aesthetic experiences. Traditionally art appreciation has been associated with concepts such as harmony, perceptual fluency, and the so-called good Gestalt. We observe that more often than not great artworks blatantly violate these characteristics. Using the concept of prediction error from the predictive coding approach, we attempt to resolve this contradiction. We argue that artists often destroy predictions that they have first carefully built up in their viewers, and thus highlight the importance of negative affect in aesthetic experience. However, the viewer often succeeds in recovering the predictable pattern, sometimes on a different level. The ensuing rewarding effect is derived from this transition from a state of uncertainty to a state of increased predictability. We illustrate our account with several example paintings and with a discussion of art movements and individual differences in preference. On a more fundamental level, our theorizing leads us to consider the affective implications of prediction confirmation and violation. We compare our proposal to other influential theories on aesthetics and explore its advantages and limitations.