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International Child Law examines and discusses the international legal framework and issues relating to children. Analysing both public and private international legal aspects, this cross-disciplinary text promotes an understanding of the ongoing development of child law, children’s rights and the protection of the child. Examining the theoretical background to the law, and providing a concise and clear overview of the instruments and institutions that protect children internationally, this text then focuses on key themes and issues in child law and children’s rights. This new edition has been updated and revised throughout, including expanded material on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as discussion of recent landmark developments on the law relating to recruiting child soldiers as a result of Lubanga (2012). The third edition also includes a new case study feature that critically considers key themes and issues in international child law in a real world context. Drawing on a range of legal and other disciplines, International Child Law is a valuable resource for those in the course of study and research in this area.

This note examines the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Gazette Media Company Ltd) v Teesside Crown Court1 where the Court was asked to rule on the legality of an order under s.39, Children and Young Persons Act 1933 purporting to ban the identity of the victim and defendants in a prosecution. The facts of the prosecution are set out below but the interesting issues that arise from this decision come not so much from the facts and decision (which was, to an extent, inevitable) but rather from the fact that the current law does not, in our opinion, adequately protect children from secondary victimisation and that the courts have erred in their current understanding of the legal position.

traditional approach in England before Morgan,88 which exemplified possibility regulation rather that probability regulation, at least when adjudicating a challenged transaction inter partes.89 Lord Scarman's 'inexplicability' test thus seems too high, but it was settled quite without reference to the fiduciary nature of the regulation involved in relational undue influence cases. Lord Browne-Wilkinson may have suspected as much by his reservation in Pitt, but it was a reservation virtually ignored in the House's approach to the suspicion of abuse criterion in Etridge. Certainly, Etridge cannot be regarded as the last word on the subject. All that it can safely be regarded as is further confirmation of the House's lack of conceptual focus that has, since Morgan, epitomised its approach to the law of undue influence.

Hirst also contributes many other sections to this book.

It is popularly assumed that the consumption of alcohol and other intoxicants can affect people in a number of ways. Research has consistently shown that a high proportion of offenders have drunk alcohol prior to offending,2 but, equally, it is apparent that finding a direct causal link is highly problematic.3 One way in which it has been argued that intoxication may increase an individuals likelihood of offending is that it may impair his ability to reason with the result that an intoxicated individual may be more likely to misread a situation.4 This paper is concerned with one way in which this might occur, namely the ability of an intoxicated person to assess the danger of a situation. The criminal law has had to respond to a number of cases where an intoxicated individual attacked someone (and often killed him) in the allegedly mistaken belief that the victim was about to attack him. Recently, the Court of Appeal has considered the issue again in R v Hatton.5 Believing that they were bound by the earlier decision in

Samanta J, 50%

Research has demonstrated that Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can be used to bully and harass children on-line. Cyber-bullying and harassment can be deeply traumatic to the victim and can cause psychological harm. This article assesses possible legal solutions to this problem. The emphasis is on the criminal law, the more normal solution to the infliction of harm and distress to an individual. However, the article also examines whether the civil law provides assistance in this sphere.

Alcohol is massively associated with crime. Evidence from the British Medical Association found that alcohol use is associated with 60-70 per cent of murders, 70 per cent of stabbings, 50 per cent of fights or assaults in the home. For non-violent offences the association is very strong as well: 88 per cent of those arrested for criminal damage, 83 per cent for breach of the peace, 41 per cent for theft and 26 per cent for burglary, had drunk in the four hours prior to their arrest. At the same time there has been intense concern about public drunkenness in town and city centres, especially on the part of young people, and the cost and damage this causes. This book seeks to understand the nature of the connection between alcohol and crime, and the way the criminal justice system responds to the problem, providing a clear and accessible account and analysis of the subject. It draws upon a wide range of sources and research findings, and also sets the subject within a broader comparative context. It takes an interdisciplinary approach, and includes a sociological account of the role of alcohol in British society, a criminological analysis of the link between alcohol and crime and a philosophical consideration of individual responsibility for harm caused whilst intoxicated, and a legal analysis of different approaches that can be adopted as a response to alcohol-related offending. • strong association between alcohol and crime and a key focus of government policy • accessible and comprehensive account of the subject • shows the way in which the criminal justice system seeks to deal with the problem and assesses recent government policy initiatives

This note discusses the recent decision by the House of Lords in R v Durham Police and another, ex parte R.1 This case concerns the legality of the reprimand scheme introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 19982 which replaced the previous informal and formal system of cautions. The principal issue in this case was whether it was necessary for an offender to consent to a reprimand being issued or whether one can be imposed on a youth offender. Consent was a pre-requisite for formal cautions, and continues to be so for adult offenders yet the statute is silent as to the place of consent in the reprimand system. The House of Lords, in this case, decided that consent was not required before the police could issue a reprimand and it is contended in this article that this has significant implications for the right of juvenile offenders to due process. The case is important but also quite unusual in that it is one of these rare situations when the decision is de jure unanimous but de facto a majority decision, with Lady Hale and Lord Steyn strenuously objecting to the decision but without actually dissenting. The objection takes the form of an examination of International law although Lady Hale concludes that its place within the European Convention on Human Rights remains questionable and thus the temptation to proceed to Strasbourg for a definitive ruling may well be compelling.

The Human Tissue Bill, described in Parliament as a'landmark Bill',' was introduced into the House of Commons on 3 December 2003 by Secretary of State John Reid, was brought to the House of Lords on 29 June 2004, completed its progress through the Upper House on 10 November 2004, and received the Royal Assent on 15 November 2004. It is due to come into force, for the most part, on days to be specified in commencement orders. Full implementation is not anticipated until at least April 2006, although transitional arrangements will be put in place. The Act will repeal in their entirety the Human Tissue Act 1961, the Anatomy Act 1984 and the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (except with regard to Scotland), and the Human Tissue Act (Northern Ireland) 1962, as well as making various other smaller and consequential amendments. The Act is principally a response to the furore generated by revelations about practices relating to the retention and use of human tissue in the Bristol Royal Infirmary2 (Kennedy) and Alder Hey Children's Hospital in Liverpool3 (Redfern) Inquiry Reports, and more latterly the Isaacs Report,4 in particular.5 These Reports catalogued local practices resulting in relatives, principally parents of dead children, lacking appreciation of subsequent tissue retention and use for research following (generally coroners')6 post-mortem examinations, often resulting in the burial or cremation of loved ones without the realisation that they were not 'complete', and some further burials or cremations of body parts.' It tran

‘therapy’ is a legal concept of considerable import, traditionally juxtaposed with, but separate from, research and also, to some degree, marking the boundaries of legitimate medical intervention. the recent case of simms highlighted these issues, in addition to which novel clinical interventions were the subject of specific recommendations in the bristol royal infirmary inquiry report. this article subjects the notion of therapy to analytical scrutiny and considers the extent of proper clinician discretion to innovate and, albeit much more superficially, how medicine should itself evolve. it advocates a new, more (patient) protective model which should generate confidence in the ethical character of contemporary innovatory practices.

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Buck 65%, Bonner 25% and Sainsbury 10% per p.ix preface

This article examines the territorial and extra-territorial ambit of the offence of murder under English law. This is not strictly speaking a question concerning the jurisdiction of the courts, but one concerning the actus reus of the offence itself. Murder committed outside England and Wales cannot ordinarily amount to an offence under English law, but there are numerous exceptions to this general rule, which are noted and (in the case of the more significant exceptions) examined here.

The provision of student housing since the post-Robbins expansion of higher education has followed no easily discernible policy path. With the post-1992 continued expansion of the sector, many questions are now being asked about student accommodation; not least as to by whom it should be provided and what the tenurial status of its occupants should be. However, central government policy on this issue seems unformulated or, at best, uncoordinated and recent statutory instruments granting exempt landlord status to two commercial providers of student housing give cause for concern. Rather than policy being translated into law, are we now facing a situation where, on an incremental and pragmatic basis, law will determine policy--and that on an issue which touches the lives of an increasing number of this nation's young people?

Traditionally the courts have been reluctant to trespass too far on the sanctity of academic freedom, and have certainly not wished to be seen as final arbiters of academic decisions. It is doubtful whether anything in the fast changing world of higher education has yet changed enough to modify such reluctance. However, when the student/college relationship is viewed through the prism of 'service provision' very different conclusions may be reached. It seems very hard to deny that the agreement between an academic institution and a student is a contract, and (most obviously) a contract for the provision of educational services. If the advertised services are not provided, or are provided inadequately or incompletely then an action for breach of contract on behalf of the student(s) affected may lie. Moreover any generalised disclaimer on behalf of the academic institution may (now) fall foul of unfair contract terms legislation. In Education and the Law Vol 11 No. 2, 1999, Tim Birtwistle and Melissa Askew ...

Mackay 60%

Mackay 60%