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U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. Since 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed SOF to conduct a range of military operations, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. To meet an increase in operational demands for SOF, DOD has increased funding for U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as well as SOF force levels from about 45,700 in fiscal year 2001 (including about 43,000 military personnel and about 2,700 civilians) to about 69,500 in fiscal year 2014 (including about 63,000 military personnel and about 6,500 civilians).1 DOD s strategic guidance indicates that SOF will continue to play a prominent role in support of the defense strategy. For example, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review report states that the investment in SOF supports DOD s ability to sustain operations against terrorist networks, counter other transnational threats, and build the capacity of partners, among other things.2 DOD has taken steps to adjust some organizational structures and relationships for SOF. For example, DOD has assigned all SOF, including forward-based headquarters and forces, to SOCOM.3 With this new organizational relationship, SOCOM has direct responsibility for manning, training, and equipping all SOF.

Why GAO Did This Study. DOD purchases bulk fuel and sells it to customers, including the military services. Each fiscal year, DOD sets a standard price for budgeting purposes, endeavoring to closely approximate the price it will pay when it buys the fuel almost a year later. If this price is different than the standard price, DOD may need to take actions to manage its working capital funds funds used to purchase fuel and other commodities that are reimbursed through sales. Senate Report 113-44, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, mandated GAO to review DOD s approach for establishing its bulk fuel pricing. This report discusses, among other things, (1) how estimated bulk fuel costs have compared to actual costs since FY 2009 and the factors that have contributed to any differences; and (2) the extent to which DOD has considered options for adjusting its approach to estimating bulk fuel costs and managing working capital funds in light of any differences between estimated and actual fuel costs. GAO compared estimated and actual fuel costs for FY 2009 through 2013 and analyzed DOD actions to manage working capital funds. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD reevaluate its approach for estimating the components of the standard price and document the rationale for its assumptions. DOD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second stating there is a closely-monitored, formal process. GAO continues to believe the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD has emphasized innovative and low-cost approaches to build the defense capacity of foreign partners, and it uses its five Regional Centers to administer programs to foster partnerships and deepen foreign officials' understanding of U.S. objectives. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 112-705) mandated GAO to conduct a study of the Regional Centers. GAO's report does the following: (1) describes how the Regional Centers' activities compare with those of other DoD training and education organizations, and (2) evaluates the extent to which DoD has developed and implemented an approach to oversee and assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. This report also provides information on the process used to approve Regional Center requests to waive reimbursement of the costs for nongovernmental and international organizations that participate in the Regional Centers' activities. GAO reviewed public law and departmental directives and conducted an analysis comparing aspects of the Regional Centers with other selected DoD training and education institutions. GAO recommends that DoD develop measurable goals linked to key programming priorities for the Regional Centers, metrics for assessing performance against these goals, and a methodology to assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized the importance of developing language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures to meet current and future needs and is investing millions of dollars to provide language and culture predeployment training to its general purpose forces. DoD also has noted that such training should be viewed as a long-term investment and that training and personnel systems should better account for the knowledge and skills of service members acquired through training to help manage its forces. The committee report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 5136) directed GAO to review language and culture training for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which these services did the following: (1) captured information in training and personnel systems on the completion of language and culture predeployment training and proficiency gained from training, and (2) developed plans to sustain language skills acquired through predeployment training. GAO analyzed service documents and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO made recommendations intended to improve the availability of information on training completion and proficiency and help DoD plan for sustainment training. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations, but stated that the definition of significant language training was not intended to describe training for initial skills. However, DoD noted that current guidance does not preclude language proficiency testing at this stage., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Army and Marine Corps developed service-specific language and culture strategies, but did not include some key elements to guide their training approaches and investments, and DOD-wide efforts to establish a planning process that could better align service training approaches are incomplete. The Army and Marine Corps developed broad goals and objectives within their strategies and identified some training programs and activities tied to these goals. However, the services did not always identify priorities and the investments needed to implement the training or a set of results-oriented performance metrics to assess the contributions that training programs have made collectively, which GAO and DOD have recognized can help ensure training investments are making progress toward achieving program goals and objectives. GAO found that the Army and Marine Corps did not complete underlying analyses and assign responsibilities for program performance prior to designing and implementing their strategies and associated training programs. DOD has taken steps to develop a strategic planning process to align service training approaches. For example, in February 2011, DOD published a strategic plan for language skills and cultural capabilities that outlines a broad department-wide planning process. However, DOD has not yet set up internal mechanisms, such as procedures and milestones, by which it can reach consensus with the military services on priorities and investments. Without a clearly defined planning process, DOD does not have the tools it needs to set strategic direction for language and culture training efforts, fully align department-wide efforts to develop plans and budget requests that reflect its priorities, and measure progress in implementing various initiatives.

Today, and in the foreseeable future, military operations require U.S. personnel to work alongside multinational partners and among local populations. The Department of Defense (DoD) has placed a greater emphasis on transforming language and regional proficiency capabilities, which includes cultural awareness. GAO's prior work has found that integrated strategic plans with measurable goals and funding priorities linked to goals can help guide organizational transformations. Decision makers also require complete information to identify capability gaps and assess risk. This testimony summarizes GAO's prior work and recommendations on DoD's efforts to develop language skills and regional proficiency and the steps DoD has taken to implement our prior recommendations. Specifically, it addresses the extent to which DoD has done the following: (1) developed a strategic plan to guide its language and regional proficiency transformation efforts, and (2) obtained the information it needs to identify capability gaps and assess risk. GAO's statement is based on a June 2009 report and work conducted during May 2010 through June 2010 to update the status of GAO's recommendations., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

The Department of Defense (DOD) requested about $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and for expanded capabilities in existing ones. To support ongoing operations, the Air Force and Army have acquired a greater number of larger systems. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) plans were in place to account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure needed to support Air Force and Army UAS inventories; (2) DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations; and (3) DOD updated its publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations. Focusing on UAS programs supporting ongoing operations, GAO reviewed the services' program and funding plans in light of DOD's requirements definition and acquisition policy; interviewed UAS personnel in the United States and in Iraq about training experiences; and reviewed joint, multiservice, and service-specific publications.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) continues to increase. In 2000, DoD components had fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in their inventory. By May 2008, they had more than 6,000. However, DoD faces challenges, such as UAS acquisition and the integration of UAS into joint combat operations. GAO has made a series of recommendations to address challenges, including the need for a UAS strategic plan. To improve upon the management and use of UAS, DoD has implemented several actions, such as establishing new task forces. GAO was asked to do the following: (1) identify key DoD efforts to improve the management and operational use of UAS, and (2) assess the extent to which these efforts constitute an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee UAS efforts. GAO reviewed DoD documents such as directives and memorandums, and interviewed agency officials. GAO recommends DoD designate a single entity accountable for integrating efforts related to UAS; define roles, responsibilities, and relationships among UAS-related entities; and develop a UAS strategic plan to align and integrate efforts and funding with long-term goals. DoD partially concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with two recommendations, citing actions it has already taken. GAO recognizes DoD's efforts to date, but continues to believe additional actions are needed., Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and to perform other tasks such as training foreign military forces. To meet the demand for these forces, DoD established a Marine Corps service component under the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to integrate Marine Corps forces. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed the extent to which the following have been accomplished: (1) the Marine Corps special operations command has identified its force structure requirements, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has determined whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing its forces for assigned missions. GAO performed its work with the Marine Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed DoD plans for this new command. GAO recommends that the Marine Corps conduct an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command and that USSOCOM establish a basis to ensure they are trained to be fully interoperable with DoD's special operations forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the recommendations are underway., Report to Congressional Committees.