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One of the most controversial administrative actions in recent years is the U.S. Department of Education's campaign against sexual assault on college campuses. Using its authority under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (mandating nondiscrimination on the basis of sex in all educational programs and activities receiving federal funds), the Department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has launched an enforcement effort that critics denounce as aggressive, manipulative, and corrosive of individual liberties. Missing from the commentary is a historically informed understanding of why this administrative campaign unfolded as it did. This Article offers crucial context by reminding readers that freedom from sexual violence was once celebrated as a national civil right--upon the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994--but then lost that status in a 5-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. OCR's recent campaign reflects a legal and political landscape in which at least some potential victims of sexual violence had come to feel rightfully connected to the institutions of the federal government, and then became righteously outraged by the endurance of such violence in their communities. OCR's campaign also reflects the unique role of federal administrative agencies in this landscape. Thanks to the power of the purse and the conditions that Congress has attached to funding streams, agencies enjoy a powerful form of jurisdiction over particular spaces and institutions. Attempts to harness this jurisdiction in service of aspirational rights claims should not surprise us; indeed, we should expect such efforts to continue. Building on this insight, the Article concludes with a research agenda for other scholars seeking to understand and evaluate OCR's handiwork. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of economic and noneconomic distinction under commercial clause jurisprudence in the U.S. Topics discussed include U.S. Supreme Court cases United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, related to statutes regulating noneconomic activities; Lopez and Morrssin's guidance on economic activity; and scholars and dissenting justices reaction to the economic and noneconomic distinction.

The article discusses how the U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. constitution ca affect Congress's Thirteenth Amendment authority. It reports that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case 'United States v. Morrison' in which the Court held that Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under both the Article I Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

On the twentieth anniversary of United States v. Lopez (1995), this Article revisits the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution. Much of what has been said about the federalism cases of the Rehnquist Court misses a fundamental aspect of those decisions-one with profound implications for making sense not just of the Rehnquist era but a large component of the Supreme Court's work since the earliest days of the Republic. Focusing particularly on Lopez and the follow-up case of United States v. Morrison (2000), this Article offers a new perspective on what the Rehnquist Court was up to. We set forth a practical reading of Lopez and Morrison as cases about docket control. In both cases, we suggest, the Court was concerned, at least in part, with shielding the federal district courts from ever-expanding criminal and civil cases that resulted from new federal laws. This Article shows that, from the Court's perspective, docket control was not simply about keeping the caseloads of the district courts at a manageable level. Instead, quite apart from numbers, the Court was concerned with the particular types of cases Congress was requiring the district courts to handle. Congress, the Justices feared, was undermining the prestige of the federal judiciary by blurring the distinction between state and federal judges and turning federal judges into petty magistrates. Docket control was thus about protecting the integrity of the third branch of government-a mechanism, in other words, that began in federalism but also served separation of powers. While we draw on a variety of sources in presenting our account, this Article relies heavily on a rich and surprisingly underused resource: the annual testimony by Supreme Court Justices before congressional committees in support of the Court's annual budgetary requests. These hearings document candid comments by the Justices on a range of issues, including a deep concern with Congress's treatment of the lower federal courts. Indeed, read with the benefit of hindsight, the hearings show the Justices shortly prior to Lopez and Morrison forecasting the outcomes in those cases and articulating an overlooked rationale underlying the decisions. Our account provokes a rethinking of the constitutional justification for Lopez and Morrison (and other federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court). The two cases, we show, represented the culmination of more than a century of efforts by the Supreme Court to safeguard the role of the judicial branch in our constitutional system. Doctrinally, Lopez and Morrison involved questions of the scope of congressional power and the degree of deference courts owe to Congress when it legislates. By centering on these issues, however, debate over the outcomes in Lopez and Morrison has overlooked a more basic justification for the Court's rulings. When the Court acts to protect the judiciary-and particularly when it does so after repeated requests to Congress for help-it is on firmer constitutional ground than critics of Lopez and Morrison have recognized. At the time of Lopez and Morrison, the federal courts were under considerable stress and there was no indication that Congress-continuing to create new federal causes of action-would provide relief. Under those circumstances, the Court's response, invalidating one criminal statute (in Lopez) and one civil cause of action (in Morrison), was less revolutionary than preservationist. The significance of our account extends beyond explaining a single episode in the history of the Supreme Court. Once cast in terms of docket control, Lopez and Morrison represent not a break-revolutionary or otherwise-but the culmination of a much longer history of overburdened (and underappreciated) federal judges pushing back against congressional demands to perform tasks that would distract them from their core functions under the Constitution. Apart from the federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court, many cases-many landmark cases-are better understood in the new light of docket control. We even offer a new reading of Marbury v. Madison. While at first blush docket control may seem less exciting than other accounts of Supreme Court cases, it helps make sense of a good deal of the Court's role, and it provides a new lens through which to examine and assess judicial decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the history of a civil rights remedy in the U.S. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) which was struck down by the nation's Supreme Court in the case United States v. Morrison. According to the article, the VAWA civil rights remedy created a cause of action for gender-motivated crime victims who wished to sue their attackers for monetary damages in America's federal court system. The U.S. Congress' powers and Title VII of the nation's Civil Rights Act of 1964 are examined.

The article explores the idea of limited government in the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. Congress lacked authority to enact many of the provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA); decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case 'United States v. Lopez,' and 'United States v. Morrison;' and the first act of the first U.S. Congress of creating a national bank in the U.S.

In United States v . Morrison, the Supreme Court announced the rule that the Section 5 power cannot be used to regulate private individuals. This is one of the most meaningful and, thus far, durable constraints that the Court has placed on federal power. It is the more surprising, then, that it turns out to be based on essentially nothing at all. The Morrison Court asserted that its rule was derived by--indeed, "controlled by"--precedent, but a closer reading of the Reconstruction-era decisions it cites shows that this is simply not the case. An independent evaluation of the rule against regulation of private individuals suggests that it cannot be defended on its own merits. Thus, the Article urges that Morrison be overruled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on challenges faced by victims of domestic violence as well as laws regulating domestic violence in the U.S. Topics discussed include the enactment of the U.S Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994 as part of the U.S Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the reauthorization of the VAWA in 2013, the U.S Supreme Court's decision in case United States v. Morrison that addressed civil rights remedy provision of VAWA as well as case Castle Rock v. Gonzales.

The article examines the requirements of Patent and Copyright Clause for making it dominant over the Commerce Clause. Topics discussed include analysis of the interaction of commerce clause with the constitutional provisions, laws made for showing the significance of Commerce Clause over Bankruptcy clauses and judicial review of the U.S. Supreme Court on the case United States v. Morrison.

The article discusses various civil rights remedies for alleged victims of gender violence in the U.S. as of January 2013, focusing on private rights of action and the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in the cases United States v. Morrison and Castle Rock v. Gonzales. Law enforcement accountability for gender violence is addressed, along with the principles of equality and liberty in America. The U.S. Violence Against Women Act is mentioned, along with a private right of action by an individual.

The article discusses state civil remedies and a proposed government subsidy to incentivize claims by rape victims in the U.S. as of January 2013, focusing on America's Violence Against Women Act, U.S. constitutional law, and the ruling by the nation's Supreme Court in the 2000 case United States v. Morrison. Criminal justice administration in America is addressed, along with punishment and crime deterrence. Civil lawsuits by sexual assault victims are also mentioned.

The article focuses on the preservation of the biodiversity through the U.S Endangered Species Act (ESA). Topics discussed include the Supreme Court's commerce clause jurisprudence in cases such as United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison that dealt with commerce clause challenges to the ESA, and the U.S Supreme Court's decision in case Gonzales v. Raich that addressed a commerce clause challenge to the U.S Controlled Substances Act (CSA).

In 2000, the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that enabled victims of gender-motivated violence to bring civil suits against their attackers in federal court. In the wake of that decision, several states and localities have created similar remedies, and there has been a great deal of scholarly discussion of ways to craft a federal civil rights remedy that comports with the Constitution. The decision to create the federal provision stemmed from Congress's recognition that violent crimes against women are systematically under-enforced or unenforced: presumably, the comparable state remedies were also intended to address this problem. Such remedies have received considerable scholarly support. In this Note, I argue that this continued emphasis on civil remedies for victims of gender violence is both pragmatically and normatively problematic. I argue that reliance on private civil remedies to address law enforcement failure reinforces the traditional separation of women from civil society and their relegation to the private sphere. This same relegation of women to the private sphere, I posit, also underlies the continued failure of the state to protect women from violent crime. As such, any serious efforts to address the continued prevalence of gender-motivated violence must focus not on private alternatives to inadequate law enforcement, but on changing the understanding of the relationship between women and the state that underlies the state's continued failure to protect them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several legal aspects including federalism, individualism right and judicial engagement. It highlights court cases such as United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison in which the Supreme Court has contradicted between federal and state authority. It further mentions federalism as an individual right under the constitution.

In this article, the author discusses the role of gender education at providing knowledge and awareness on constitutional rights. He highlights the role played by education in the constitutional framework of any nation. He emphasizes on several U.S. Supreme Court cases including Castle Rock v. Gonzales, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and United States v. Morrison which describes the legal issues and applicability of gender education.

The Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Morrison struck down, as a violation of the Commerce Clause, § 13,981 of the Violence Against Women Act, that provided a private right of action for victims of gender-motivated violence to assert against their abusers. However, § 13,981 should have been affirmed as implementing legislation designed to fulfill U.S. obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international law. Recognizing § 13,981 as implementing legislation serves as a foundation for the United States to restore itself as a legitimate human rights leader capable of both appreciating its own international obligations and pressuring other nations to come into compliance with international human rights obligations. Furthermore, only through setting a precedent recognizing broad Congressional authority to pass implementing legislation would there be a structure in place for Congress to devote itself to domesticating the legal obligations present in non-self-executing human rights treaties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that the Civil Rights Cases should be discarded due to lack of coherence. It is said that the irrationality of the current doctrine is a direct result of its invidious origin. The failure to consider racism as a driving force in the case leads to a failure to appreciate the operation of the doctrine. Finding that the state action doctrine as it applies to the Fourteenth Amendment is a rule grounded in racism, is another reason to discard it. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is being defeated by the state action doctrine for two reasons. First, it prevents Congress from regulating private discriminatory conduct as shown by the case U.S. v. Morrison. Second, it shields private actors from constitutional scrutiny when they engage in systematic racist practices as illustrated in the Civil Rights Cases.

Analyzes the Commerce Clause or the Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its impact on the U.S. versus Morrison violence on women case. Description of the landmark Enforcement Clause cases and the perception of the Congress on the Section 5; Details on elements mentioned in the second clause of the Section 5; Asessment of the provisions iof the law regarding prophylactic gender legislation.

Discusses the provision of the Violence Against Women Act giving victims of gender-motivated violence a private damages remedy with relevance to the United States Supreme Court case of Antonio Morrison. Research and conclusion of the United States Congress on violence against women; Details on Morrison's alleged assault on Virginia Tech student Christy Brzonkala; Opinion of the Supreme Court.

Discusses the federal government's authority to regulate intrastate use of marijuana for medicinal purposes after the court decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. Background of federal criminal legislation; Arguments on individual rights to protect medical marijuana initiatives from federal interference; Background of the Lopez case and the commerce clause; Application of the values of the Lopez case to the case of medical marijuana.

Deals with a letter to the United States Supreme Court about the missing argument in the case Brzonkala versus Morrison which deals with the rape of a student at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Importance of the case; Discussion on the missing argument on the Congress authority to enact the Section 5 of the Violence Against Women Act; Possible objections to the argument.

Examines Supreme Court decision on the United States versus Morrison case. Misconception on the enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; Views on the future of federal antidiscrimination law; Circumstances applicable for the implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment.