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Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld directed Department of Defense geographic combatant commands to create Standing Joint Force Headquarters to improve joint military operations and promote new approaches to joint warfighting. At U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the expert deployable command and control unit contributed to almost every major U.S. military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2004 and 2011. Yet chronic staff shortages and bureaucratic resistance limited its transformational potential. The small USSOUTHCOM unit exposed the big challenges of change in the Department of Defense during the early twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares and contrasts how key factors influence Americans' trust in different types of media (broadcast, print, and social) as COVID-19 information sources and how people's media trust is associated with their adoption of preventive measures. Our results from a national survey (sample = 2571) showed that age, political party affiliation, and race and ethnicity and income level were significantly associated with people's trust in different media types as COVID information sources. Elder adults trusted print and broadcast media more, while younger adults trusted social media more. Democrats and Lean Democrats had more trust in all three forms of media than Republicans and Lean Republicans. Asians had the highest levels of trust in all three media types, while Whites had the lowest level of trust in broadcast and social media. Trust in broadcast media was found to be associated with facial mask wearing, but trust in social media, however, did not contribute to the adoption of any COVID-19 preventive measures. This study contributes to a general understanding of media trust and mediated health communication and provides nuanced understanding of how demographic factors shape media trust and the consequence of media trust during a historical pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the US experience during the Iraq war, from the planning phase that began in 2001 to the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. It reveals a dearth of planning and intelligence leading up to the invasion; reluctance by conventional coalition military forces to conduct reconstruction, political and security capacity-building; and, later, full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. These forces took on some missions traditionally reserved for special operations forces, and they increasingly assumed diplomatic roles as they interfaced with the Iraqi leadership and local kingpins. Although these efforts yielded some impressive organizational learning and limited operational successes, they were hampered by lack of adequate preparation, a poor understanding of the human terrain, shortsighted strategies, and ultimately a dearth of political will to stay the course. The outcome was far from the model Middle East democracy envisioned by the invasion's architects, and the American experience in Iraq instead became a cautionary tale for military intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives. To examine the role of Department of Defense policies in identifying theater-sustained traumatic brain injuries (TBIs). Methods. We conducted a retrospective study of 48172 US military service members who sustained their first lifetime TBIs between 2001 and 2016 while deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq. We used multivariable negative binomial models to examine the changes in TBI incidence rates following the introduction of Department of Defense policies. Results. Two Army policies encouraging TBI reporting were associated with an increase of 251% and 97% in TBIs identified following their implementation, respectively. Among airmen, the introduction of TBI-specific screening questions to the Post-Deployment Health Assessment was associated with a 78% increase in reported TBIs. The 2010 Department of Defense Directive Type Memorandum 09-033 was associated with another increase of 80% in the likelihood of being identified with a TBI among soldiers, a 51% increase among sailors, and a 124% increase among Marines. Results. Department of Defense and service-specific policies introduced between 2006 and 2013 significantly increased the number of battlefield TBIs identified, successfully improving the longstanding problem of underreporting of TBIs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few studies have empirically examined how media stereotypes of Muslims influence Americans’ support for public policies exclusively harming Muslims. Across three studies, we tested the short-term and long-term effects of news portraying Muslims as terrorists on Americans’ support for public policies harming Muslims domestically and internationally. Study 1 revealed that exposure to news portraying Muslims as terrorists is positively associated with support for military action in Muslim countries. Study 2 revealed that exposure to news portraying Muslims as terrorists is positively associated with support for public policies that harm Muslims domestically and internationally; this effect was fully mediated by perceptions of Muslims as aggressive. Experimental results from Study 3 revealed that exposing participants to negative Muslim media footage, relative to neutral or no-video footage, increased perceptions of Muslims as aggressive, increased support for harsh civil restrictions of Muslim Americans, and increased support for military action in Muslim countries. Exposure to positive Muslim footage yielded opposite results. We discuss the importance of media in exacerbating aggressive attitudes and public policies in the context of intergroup relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on two experiments embedded in online surveys, this article examines the impact of news photos on support for military action. In 2011, respondents were asked about support for ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan while being randomly exposed to one of two photos—one of a soldier with a child, the other of a soldier with a gun. The former photo increased expressed support for war; and the effect was greater for those who self-identify as being very interested in international affairs. Three years later, a follow-up experiment was fielded that looked both at the past intervention in Afghanistan and ongoing interventions in Syria; results were very similar. Both experiments speak to the potentially profound role of mass media in generating support (or not) for foreign military engagements, and the increased impact of frames on those who are more attentive to the issue domain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The United States has conducted armed drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004. While there has been some recent work on Pakistani public opinion about drones, there is very little research on how Pakistan’s media characterize the US drone program. This is an important gap in understanding the determinants of Pakistani popular perceptions of this program. Decades of research has shown that “news framing”, a process by which certain aspects of a complex concept are emphasized in political communications with others played down, influences individual cognition while forming political opinions. In this essay, we address this lacuna by assembling an unprecedented sample of editorials about the drone program from three English newspapers and one Urdu newspaper and analyzing the news frames within them. We next compare the trends in these news frames to public opinion data collected by Pew between the spring of 2009 and 2014. Initially, most Pakistanis were unaware of the drone program, media coverage of the program expanded as drone strikes increased in frequency. While Pakistanis became more cognizant of the US drone strikes, even by 2014 large minorities remained unaware. Pakistani public opinion strongly reflected the top media frames, particularly those that are negative. This is an important finding suggesting that newspaper editorials are a good barometer of Pakistani opinions despite the fact that only information elites rely upon newspapers for political information. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author argues that the American government's use of military force against terrorism is illegal, immoral, and futile, and claims that the U.S. military has been involved in excessive use of force incidents and violations of human rights. According to the article, the war on terror rhetoric and military policies have helped to spread terrorism. The International Criminal Court and a justification legal doctrine are examined. Other topics include the Afghan War, the Iraq War, and President George W. Bush's military policies after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Powerful forces are competing for the next-generation knowledge organization system in order to shape the future of academic libraries. The purpose of the paper is to examine these forces and see how they have been influencing the ways in which information-seekers in U.S. colleges and universities will be gathering information on that system of tomorrow. Moreover, this paper explores the scholarship in the literature to gain insight on how the historical development of the country outside academic libraries has exerted influences on the direction of academic libraries in the 21st century. By stepping back for a broader perspective, areas where libraries see themselves challenged can also be opportunities to mold the existing system into one for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with a growing Algerian insurgency in 1955, French Governor-General Jacques Soustelle turned to his ethnological training to convert soldiers into amateur social scientists, hoping to better know the people of Algeria and therefore ease pacification through cultural understanding. Soustelle failed to appreciate the sophistication of revolt in Algeria, a diverse array of movements that did not fit traditional European categories. Confronting similar problems in understanding the causes of Iraqi and Afghan resistance in the years following the invasions of 2001–2003, American military planners also turned to anthropology. Though not taken to the administrative extreme seen in Soustelle's Algeria, the United States Army instituted the Human Terrain System in order to better understand native populations involved in an active insurgency. American planners can learn from the French experience by developing a more nuanced approach to study that includes more advanced anthropological techniques without the baggage of the colonial system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven that COIN, however revised and updated to fit the globalised era in which we live, is a problematic and ineffective solution to the irregular warfare waged by insurgents. The United States and the West in general will have to accept the chastening lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan lest they repeat it: that they are not good at waging COIN and must try to avoid getting involved in such costly campaigns again. If intervention abroad has to be undertaken, it will have to fulfill a set of demanding conditions. Nonetheless, while COIN in its contemporary guise has failed to deliver long-term, tangible results, thinking about how to counter asymmetric challenges, including the waging of irregular warfare, cannot be ignored, given the likelihood that external interventions will continue to be required in the future. Moreover, while COIN as the basis of a grand strategy is unrealistic, some of its basic principles are useful in orientating future approaches to insurgencies and terrorism towards comprehensive and collaborative approaches, as opposed to merely hard security operations unilaterally undertaken by States, which fail to address the underlying fundamental causes of political violence and which undermine long-term legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The adoption of pre-emptive self-defence as a policy by the United States of America in its war against terrorism has revived the controversy over the concept of pre-emptive use of force in international politics. Some scholars argue that states are stretching the right of self-defence as pre-emptive, preventive and anticipatory in accordance with their needs and interests and to justify their actions. For others, in the context of changing security threats such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction pre-emptive strikes are permissible. These efforts to redefine and re-interpret the right of self-defence and use of force for justifying state’s actions have challenged the role of international organisations that were principally designed to regulate the unilateral use of force, and to maintain international peace and security. Against this backdrop, this article will examine how the pre-emptive and preventive use of force undermines the role of the United Nations in international politics through probing the case of Iraq War 2003. This would be a much needed reflection on the implications of Iraq War on multilateralism in the context of 10 years after the war. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses justifications for war and the limits of humanitarianism as of April 2014, focusing on human rights and the jus ad bellum legal doctrine. Moral legitimacy and the necessity legal principle are mentioned, along with the U.S. military's role in an international campaign to protect civilians in Libya from then-Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. Questions of law and policy are examined, along with the humanization of international law.

This article examines the effects the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counterterrorism strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

ISAF exists to protect the Afghan constitutional model. This strategic objective will be defeated because the GIRoA model has a conceptual flaw that renders it incapable of delivering governance at the local level (Tier IV). This fatal flaw has enabled the Taliban, by developingparallel hierarchies, todisplaceGIRoA and establish itself in southern locales as the political authority. The Taliban are fighting arevolutionary war, a Maoistdisplacement strategythat uses guerrilla tactics to advance a political program. Petraeus and McChrystal failed to recognize thecharacter of war, and believed the Taliban are pursuing anexhaustion strategy. They failed to devise a counter-RW strategy. The ‘Surge’ was doomedab initio. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the complex legacy of David Petraeus who was a key figure in the emergence of the US military shift towards counterinsurgency doctrine in the years after 2006. Although Petraeus has been perceived by critics as a publicity seeker, he can be credited with laying the foundations for a more serious commitment to COIN involving in particular in integrating conventional and Special Forces in arenas like village stability operations. The article looks a Petraeus's role in both Iraq and Afghanistan: it concludes that, in the case of Afghanistan, it is too early to assess whether counterinsurgency has had a decisive impact of the outcome of the war against the Taliban. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article introduces the concept of ‘utile forms’ and analyses the effects of these forms in imperial rule and contemporary counterinsurgency. Utile forms are media that enable bureaucracies to disseminate specialised knowledges to officials operating in the field. Examples include smart cards, field manuals, and handheld biometric devices. We argue that utile forms have significant social and political effects irrespective of the ‘truth value’ of the knowledge they contain. We analyse these effects in terms of world-ordering and world-making properties: utile forms both embody a particular worldview or ideology (world-ordering) and they facilitate official attempts to remake the world in accordance with this vision (world-making). We draw on examples of utile forms from British India and more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The article concludes by reflecting on the relations between truth, knowledge, and power in times of war and imperialism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay argues that President Bush and President Obama had in common the view that the problem of "terrorism" needed to be handled through military means. This fundamentally flawed approach has led to a succession of policy failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan. US soldiers and civilians in these countries have experienced enormous hardship for elusive goals. Apart from the human costs and the steady drain on the American treasury, there is little reason to think that the United States is any less vulnerable to terrorism. The rising tide of hostility in the Muslim world poses considerable danger. While President Obama has changed the tone of US foreign relations and has exhibited increasing reluctance to pursue ground wars, his continued reliance on military means, as exemplified by his use of drones, continues to multiply enemies of the United States. The choices of both Presidents are less a reflection of their intellect and character, than of a disposition towards militarism embedded in American institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America's sense of security was shattered by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This has culminated in ostentatious 'war on terrorism' which, to all intents and purposes, has been misconstrued. This paper explores the historical antecedents of terrorism and the attempts at quelling it. It views the unfolding trend of the use of force to 'eliminate' terrorism as faulty. The paper believes that until the basic psychology and motivations of terrorists are understood and some of their reasonable grievances addressed, rather than stemming the tide, current approaches will exacerbate the incident of global terrorism. The paper concludes by recommending inter alia: that policy and attitudinal change rather than military bravado, will reduce the ugly incident of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between the military strategies of the U.S. and China, including the former's formation of partnerships and goal of avoiding war, referred to as Phase Zero, and the latter's strategy of focusing on defeating an enemy prior to the commencing of war. An overview of the history of Chinese strategic culture, including the influence of Daoist philosopher Laozi and the philosopher Confucius on the Chinese philosophy of war, is provided. An overview of U.S. military planning since the Iraq War of 2003-2011, including its use of limited war and adaptation to confronting irregular warfare, is also provided.

The article examines the war on terror policy of the U.S. It discusses the operational advantages as well as political challenges associated with the war that threatened the relations of the U.S. with Pakistan. The author also examines the effects of its policy on regional and national conflicts between Israel and Pakistan.

The article discusses U.S. participation in war and the strategy of counterinsurgency during the 21st century. The author examines the notion of the U.S. as an empire and states that U.S. government and military policy during the Korean War can serve as a foundation for an ongoing policy of counterinsurgency. The article discusses the subsequent polices of the administration of the late U.S. president John F. Kennedy concerning the Vietnam War as well as military strategy in the late 20th century and early 21st century that attempts to avoid alleged mistakes during the Vietnam War. The author examines U.S. military policy in the so-called War against Terror and counterinsurgency as a strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st century.

While much of the focus of terrorism research is on successful terrorist attacks, the most significant lessons for terrorism prevention may come from examination of terrorist plots and attacks that do not succeed. This article analyzes 176 terrorist plots against American targets that have been thwarted or otherwise failed during the past 25 years. It considers what kinds of intelligence and security measures are most useful in counterterrorism, and argues that the conventional wisdom about why intelligence fails-because analysts and agencies are unable to 'connect the dots'-is wrong. Most plots, especially domestic terrorist plots, are not foiled through imaginative analysis, but through conventional law enforcement efforts and aggressive domestic intelligence collection that reveal to authorities just what the plotters are up to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discipline of anthropology has been wracked with controversy since the 2007 establishment of a new program within the United States military, which officially employs anthropologists and other social scientists to collect "ethnographic intelligence" on local populations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The program, the Human Terrain System (HTS) , was created to help U.S. military personnel better understand local cultural contexts. As part of this program, experts throughout the academy are being contacted by State Department officials to provide information on topics of interest to those in the Pentagon. The politicization of ethnographic fieldwork has posed a series of moral dilemmas for anthropologists, particularly feminist anthropologists who work with already vulnerable populations. This article proposes to examine the question of collaboration with reference to the HTS and recent debates raging among anthropologists about whether or not to cooperate with the U.S. government or any foreign government. Drawing on the author's own experiences conducting fieldwork among Slavic Muslims in Bulgaria, during which she was "invited" to share her findings with both the Bulgarian and American governments, the goal of the article is to openly discuss these dilemmas and offer some brief suggestions about how to navigate the murky waters of doing research in an increasingly fraught global context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of US criticism that Al-Jazeera network is biased in its coverage against the United States by aiding the terrorist cause and the fact that most of the accusations of bias continue to be based on the claim that Arab media such as Al-Jazeera Arabic include the language of terror organizations, while its English-language counterpart, Al-Jazeera English, is being cleansed by changes and omissions, this research sought to investigate whether these claims could be validated. Examining online coverage of the US/Al Qaeda conflict in the Arabic-language Al-Jazeera website, these claims were measured against online coverage of the conflict in the English-language Al-Jazeera website. By content analyzing prominence of news stories (frequency and placement), use of sources and tone of coverage, the research demonstrates a significant difference regarding the placement of news stories between the English- and Arabic-language Al-Jazeera websites, but no further differences were found. The overwhelming majority of attributed sources were from the United States and its allies. Furthermore, results revealed Al-Jazeera websites did not shy away from negative coverage regarding all those involved in the conflict. By and large in a highly competitive media environment, our findings suggest that in reporting the US/Al Qaeda conflict Al-Jazeera websites did not provide different perspectives of the war to Arabic- and English-language online users. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Pakistan is the worst hit country due to War or Terrorism especially in terms of growing extremism which has led to increasing number of suicide attacks, radicalization and militancy resulting in a tense and fearful environment within society and eventually has to face the stigma of producing terrorism from its soil. Pakistan is suffering from a festering wound; ethnic and sectarian strife, extremism and economic instability have all taken their toll on the state and made it internally vulnerable. The thriving virus that is extremism has made the common man fearful to the extent of a near nihilistic apathy. The seeds of the present militant extremism are linked to Afghan war, the political rulers at that time and now the decision of Pakistan to join the US War on Terror has brought Pakistan to such levels of extremism which it has never seen. This paper examines the impact of Afghan War and 9/11 on Pakistan especially with reference to extremism. The towering behemoth of political, social and economic despair along with the menace of extremism has left Pakistan with an astoundingly daunting task, and it may be altogether too accurate to claim that no other country has been affected as adversely by 9/11 than Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article depicts the causes and course of internecine violence in Iraq in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of March-April 2003, analysing the factors behind the Sunni Arab and Shia (Mahdi Army) insurgencies, from Saddam Hussein’s overthrow to the aftermath of the ‘surge’ of 2006-2007. It concludes by examining whether the Iraqi insurgencies represent a departure from traditional conflicts of this type, and the potential of insurgent activities for the future stability of Iraq as a state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American troop surge is best described as one of several factors that came together to bequeath the current relatively stability and security now experienced in most parts of Iraq. But most importantly the surge has only achieved the tactical goals of improving short-term security and allowing for phased troop withdrawal and not the key strategic and long-term goal of political breakthrough to create the foundations for long-term stability. Fundamentally these short-term considerations are at the heart of the long-term issues that will continue to make a stable and secure Iraq a difficult and perhaps distant goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global war on terror was used by the Bush administration and its allies to defend a US dominated geopolitical configuration. To this end, counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) were introduced which strengthened the alignment of development aid with diplomacy and defence. The broad, adverse effects of CTMs on civil liberties and human rights are well documented. Despite the advent of a new US administration and a ‘soft power’ approach to international relations, the legacy of the war on terror remains embedded in the laws, policies and attitudes of many states and regimes that continue to enclose the lives of citizens. This article describes the experiences of civil society organizations (CSOs) as ‘securitization’ processes unfolded. Studies over two years involving some forty countries provide an on-the-ground view to probe the gains and losses of securitization, both for governments in the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ and for civil society in terms of the pressures emerging from a development-for-security agenda. The authors identify some of the perverse zero-sum effects on governments of CTM philosophy and the means employed. Findings also show asymmetry between northern and southern CSOs in terms of their negative-sum subordination, found in the definition of security and in the vulnerability to new risks involved in undertaking development work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “Global War on Terror,” led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international alliances in tackling terrorist threats. By their very nature, international counterterrorism efforts challenge state sovereignty by requiring changes to both foreign and domestic policies. This, in turn, creates complex sovereignty issues and raises some interesting questions for closer examination. How has cooperation in counterterrorism altered the perceptions and behavior of allies of the United States? Has the post-9/11 security environment constrained the sovereignty of other nations? This article explores these questions in the context of Canada's cooperation with the United States. The study argues that Canada's sovereignty has been bounded, but not determined, by U.S. demands. Examining the relationship between the United States and Canada can help us understand both the limitations and the continuing relevance of the traditional concepts of power, sovereignty, and interdependence in international relations. La “Guerra Global contra el Terrorismo,” encabezada por los Estados Unidos, enfatiza el rol de las alianzas internacionales para afrontar las amenazas terroristas. Por su propia naturaleza, las acciones contra el terrorismo ponen a prueba la soberanía de los estados al requerir cambios tanto en su política exterior como en la interna. Esto, a su vez, genera complejos problemas de soberanía y crea algunas preguntas interesantes para ser examinadas. ¿Cómo ha alterado la cooperación contra el terrorismo la percepción y el comportamiento de los aliadosde Estados Unidos? ¿Ha restringido la soberanía de otras naciones el ambiente de seguridad posterior a 11/9? Este artículo explora estas cuestiones en el contexto de la cooperación Canadiense con los Estados Unidos. El estudio argumenta que la soberanía Canadiense ha sido limitada, pero no determinada, por las demandas estadounidenses. Examinar la relación entre los Estados Unidos y Canadá puede ayudarnos a comprender tanto las limitaciones y la continua relevancia de las concepciones tradicionales de poder, soberanía, e interdependencia en las relaciones internacionales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The War on Terror, created by the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11, has brought about changes in domestic intelligence and protest policing that have proven hard to conclusively identify, track, and explain despite the importance of these changes to research on the repression of social movements. This paper argues that a second important trend has also been part of the War on Terror: increasing government secrecy regarding its protest control and anti-terrorism programs. Using battles over access to information on NYPD's and the City of New York's planning for, and execution of, protest control strategies at the 2004 Republican National Convention, this article examines how information secrecy operates by using fears of terrorism as a veil and examines the collateral damage to academic inquiry, and therefore also to public dialogue and debate, created by increasing government secrecy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The examination of 25 pre-primary and primary debates of the 2008 campaign indicates most Republicans, over time, moved toward ever stronger support of President Bush and the surge policy, while continuing to link meeting the challenge in Iraq with the war on terror and moral resolve. The Democrats, conversely, increasingly embraced timetables for withdrawal. McCain and Obama, the ultimate victors, depicted Iraq as the defi ning issue that best reflected their respective leadership capabilities, thereby setting the key frames of "judgment" and "experience" that would continue to dominate the 2008 general election, even when the economy eclipsed Iraq as an issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several observers have argued that the radical transformation of American foreign policy wrought by George W. Bush is already over. They argue that the ‘Bush Revolution’ was merely a result of the short-term conjuncture of neoconservative influence and the impact of September 11, 2001, and that this temporary deviation has been ended by the American failure in Iraq. Yet the causes of the Bush Revolution are more fundamental and long-term than this argument implies. It is in the combination of the shift to a militarily unipolar international system and the dominance of the Republican Party by its conservative wing that the real roots of the Bush foreign policy lie, and neither condition is likely to alter in the foreseeable future. Moreover, although the Iraq War has led to some shifts in policy, the Republicans' selection of John McCain as their presidential candidate confirms the continued vitality of the Bush Revolution.International Politics (2009) 46, 157–176. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.42 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US national security state was fashioned at the beginning of the Cold War to contain the global threat of the rival superpower, the Soviet Union. However, this security framework did not wither away with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR. The events of September 11 starkly exposed the limitations of a state-centric approach to international security in a globalizing world. But the Bush administration falsely assumed that the traumatic events of 9/11 came out of a clear blue sky, and that a rejuvenated national security state would eventually overwhelm the ‘new’ threat of terrorism. The dangers of persisting in this direction were shown by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Far from closing the gap between the US approach to security and the operation environment of a post-Cold War world, Bush's war on terror undermined the international reputation of the US and presented the American taxpayer with a huge and probably unsustainable burden. All this highlighted the need for a more multilateral direction in US security policy in the post-Bush era. Such an approach would not only correspond better to the realities of today's interconnected world, but also serve as a buffer against the extension of the power of government that had been witnessed in America during the Bush years.International Politics (2009) 46, 210–233. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.46 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 American geopolitical categories changed as the world was remapped into categories congruent with the prosecution of the global war on terror. The designation global was linked to the capabilities of the new military technologies of the revolution in military affairs in official documents that codified the Bush doctrine. The official US doctrine now explicitly states that ending tyranny on earth is the national security objective for which these new forces will be used. But a careful reading of the official 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and Thomas Barnett's popular exposition of the logic of the war on terror in The Pentagon's New Map shows that both these geographical specification of contemporary geopolitics, and the high-technology forces planned to fight the war, offer little promise that it will be successfully prosecuted. Geopolitics remains much more complicated than either contemporary policy statements or popular cartographic justifications suggest.International Politics (2009) 46, 234–252. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.40 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoconservative democratization took on new life after 9/11: the United States should be a global guarantor of liberty, even if coercing this freedom. The justification was a hybrid of liberal democratic peace and realist national security. However, this aggressive democratization is contradictory: the philosophical foundation is insincerely decorated by liberal language that overlooks damaging compromises when ideology is put into practice. Uzbekistan, with whom a close partnership in the war against terror was developed and then was further deepened along supposedly democratic development lines, is used as a critical case study. In short, the contradictions in neoconservative ideology create flaws in policy implementation that do not create smoother paths to development, prevent democratic consolidation and weaken American security interests.International Politics (2009) 46, 298–326. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.39 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]